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Abstract
This thesis investigates the role of information uncertainty in determining the s-
tock price performance and managers’ equity financing decisions. The previous
literature documents the experimental evidence of significant impact of informa-
tion uncertainty on investors’ preference and decision making. The first empirical
(chapter 3) examines the interaction effect between information uncertainty and
underreaction anomaly in UK stock market. The empirical evidence is consistent
with behavioral finance theory that stocks with higher information uncertainty
have greater abnormal adjusted returns, especially following bad news. Chapter
4 further tests the role of information uncertainty in cross-sectional stock returns
within 30 global stock markets. The evidence confirms my conjecture that both
growth options and information asymmetry are attributes to the information un-
certainty. The empirical findings show that stocks with higher information uncer-
tainty have lower future stock returns after controlling for information asymmetry
and other characteristics of market and firm. Chapter 5 reports a positive corre-
lation between information uncertainty and probability of equity issuance among
industry firms in US market. The evidence shows that information uncertain-
ty does not only affect the stock price performance, but also have influence in
managers’ equity financing decisions. Overall, our empirical work contributes to
the literature with conclusive evidence that information uncertainty amplifies the
extent of stock mispricing, which is consistent with behavioral finance and is in
contrast to predictions of neoclassic finance theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information uncertainty has been an old topic in finance even before the found-
ing of modern financial theory. In the famous book of Knight (1921), the author,
for the first time, establishes the academic definition of ’uncertainty’ that an even-
t is said to be uncertain if its probability of occurrence is unknown. The term
’uncertainty’ is distinguished from ’risk’, as the latter depends on the randomness
with known probability. The author further argues that it is uncertainty, rather
than risk, that rewards the investors with abnormal profits. However, since the
introduction of Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory, the focus of financial research
in asset pricing rests mostly on risk bearing and compensation. The neoclassical
asset pricing models such as Sharpe’s (1964)capital asset pricing model, Merton’s
(1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model, and Breeden’s (1979) consump-
tion capital asset pricing model assume that the distributions of risky asset payoffs
are known to all investors before they make portfolio investment decisions. The as-
sumption of complete information presents the asset pricing models in a simplified
form, but ignores the issue of information uncertainty.
1
The academic interest in information uncertainty was reignited by the semi-
nal experimental work of Ellsberg (1961), who finds that, in addition to riskiness,
people are commonly and significantly averse to uncertainty. Although the axiom-
s of preference under uncertainty were established in Savage’s (1954) subjective
expected utility (SEU), how uncertainty would impact the representative’s utili-
ty and decision-making was not observed and convincing until the publication of
Ellsberg’s paper. This experiment has been repeated and refined in many research
studies, the results of which are surprisingly consistent with the original work.
Although the experimental work concerning the uncertainty effect seems to be
conclusive, the role of information uncertainty in the real market remains contro-
versial. It is partially due to the fact that information uncertainty is entangled
with market microstructure, investors’ psychological biases, and other exogenous
factors. The SEU theory predicts that investors with ambiguity aversion require
compensation to hold assets with high information uncertainty, whereas other the-
ories from behavioral finance and new neoclassic finance suggest an opposite effect.
In Miller’s (1977) seminal paper, uncertainty is associated with investors’ dis-
agreement. In a complete market without uncertainty, the demand curve should be
perfectly flat, as all investors would agree on the unique intrinsic value. However,
the author suggests that uncertainty about a firm’s fundamental value increases
the divergence of opinions in the market, and shifts the demand curve into a slope.
With short-sale constraints, pessimistic investors cannot trade in negative volume.
Hence, the equilibrium price is inflated by investors with a more optimistic view,
which generates the future stock returns. The prediction of Miller’s theory con-
tradicts the SEU theory, as information uncertainty generates a discount of stock
returns rather than a premium for compensation.
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Another aspect of information uncertainty literature focuses on the interaction
effect of uncertainty and psychological biases. In the excellent survey of behavioral
finance literature, Hirshleifer (2001) argues that information uncertainty may am-
plify the psychological biases amongst investors, which triggers larger misvaluation
and drives the stock price away from its fundamental. The direction of the stock
misvaluation depends on the type of investor bias. For instance, overconfidence is
one type of well-documented bias, which leads to cross-sectional overpricing and
low ex ante returns (Odean (1998)). When the news on a firm is more ambiguous
to interpret, overconfident investors may give more weight to their own experi-
ence and neglect the recent public news. Hence, information uncertainty enhances
the overconfidence effect and lowers the returns to investors by excessive trading.
Moreover, uncertainty is also considered the shield of noisy traders. When infor-
mation uncertainty increases at the firm or market level, the arbitrage risk also
increases. Consequently, sophisticated traders, even if they have perfect knowl-
edge of the true valuation, may temporally avoid the market (Shleifer and Vishny
(1997)).
The school of Bayesian learning in financial research asserts that uncertainty
will be resolved in the process of rational learning and updating. Pastor and
Veronesi (2003, 2009) argue that information uncertainty may increase the firm’s
valuation because of Jensen’s inequality in the dividend discount model. The
augmented evaluation, however, is fully rational according to Bayesian law. The
authors predict that information uncertainty positively contributes to stock price,
but does not affect the cross-sectional stock returns. The aim of this thesis is to
empirically investigate the role of information uncertainty in determining stock
performance and affecting financing behavioral. The study is motivated by the
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fact that empirical evidence concerning the role of information uncertainty in the
real market is essential for one’s understanding, but currently inadequate to draw
any conclusions. One of the main difficulties affecting the empirical research of
information uncertainty is mainly the measure of information uncertainty. Unlike
the riskiness that researchers can practically measure with many well-developed
statistical techniques, uncertainty, like its definition, is difficult to capture by a
neat and concise proxy.
To solve the problem of information uncertainty proxies, several proxies are
used together to gauge the uncertainty level of common stocks. These proxies
include firm market capitalization, firm age, shares turnover by volume, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, etc. Although each of these
proxies is also used as a proxy in other academic research, together they jointly
capture the effect of information uncertainty. For example, a firm’s market capi-
talization is frequently used in the empirical test of size effect, and shares turnover
by volume measures the liquidity in the literature of market microstructure and
asset pricing models. Both of them are included for information uncertainty prox-
ies. Large firms usually disclose more information to the market than small firms
because of their increased media exposure, branding, public attention, etc. Hence,
it is assumed that investors generally have more knowledge of these large firms.
For shares turnover by volume, a higher trading volume means more disagreemen-
t amongst investors, and is logically considered to bear more uncertainty in the
market level.
The second chapter reviews the literature in information uncertainty research
from various viewpoints. The concept of information uncertainty and the building
blocks of subjective utility theory are also introduced. In addition, the analogy
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and discrepancy between information uncertainty and information asymmetry are
outlined. The research of information uncertainty is further discussed in the con-
text of incomplete information, short-sale constraints, and investors’ psychological
biases. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the empirical analysis also provide a literature
review, which is essential for hypothesis building.
As information uncertainty has been found to be a breeding ground for in-
vestors’ psychological biases, the third empirical chapter (chapter 3) address the
research question that whether firms with greater information uncertainty are sub-
ject to more abnormal returns from underreaction phenomenon. This study is
motivated by the conjecture of Hirshleifer (2001) that information uncertainty
increases the likelihood of investor irrationality and the magnitude of stock mis-
pricing. The under-reaction to recent news has been documented in worldwide
markets, and is conventionally regarded as the manifestation of investors’ behav-
ioral biases (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1994)). We test the magnitude of underreaction anomaly among vari-
ous level of information uncertainty in the UK stock market. The empirical results
reveal that high information uncertainty leads to large investors’ under-reaction
to recent news and therefore to greater earning and price momentum effects. Us-
ing five different proxies of information uncertainty, it is found that the earning
(price) momentum amongst stocks with high information uncertainty is on aver-
age 1 percent (1.7%) higher per month than amongst stocks with low information
uncertainty. The results further support the previous literature that attributes
under-reaction to recent news to investor psychological biases.
Further to chapter 3’s finding in time series analysis, chapter 4 investigates
the role of information uncertainty in cross-sectional stock returns with an ex-
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tended data sample. The empirical test of the fourth chapter is conducted in the
international markets from 1988 to 2007. We try to answer what determines the
magnitude of information uncertainty across the stocks, and whether information
uncertainty universally influence the stock performance. One can conjecture that
information uncertainty is jointly attributed to a firm’s endogenous growth options
and exogenous disclosure policy. A firm that is at the early life cycle, in a growing
industry sector or emerging market, should naturally bear more uncertainty of
its future profitability, as less experience is available. Secondly, disclosure policy
determines the amount of information that outsider investors can acquire from
the firm. Firms in the emerging markets are generally obligated to less disclosure
requirement, and are therefore subject to greater information uncertainty.
One aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between information
uncertainty and a firm’s growth options across the global markets. The market-
to-book ratio is used as the main proxy for a firm’s growth options, and analyst
forecast dispersion and idiosyncratic volatility are used as the proxies of infor-
mation uncertainty. The results reveal a positive relationship between a firm’s
growth options and information uncertainty across all markets. Given Cao, Simin,
and Zhao’s (2008) finding of a positive correlation between growth options and
market level uncertainty, this study provides supportive empirical evidence for the
nexus of uncertainty and growth opportunity in the individual firm’s level in an
out-of-sample test.
The role of information uncertainty is further tested in the cross-sectional re-
turns, and stocks with previous high monthly uncertainty are found to outperform
those with low uncertainty, especially in poorly protected, less mature market-
s. The negative relationship between uncertainty and future returns is largely
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attributed to extreme high uncertainty portfolios. Furthermore, when mutually
controlling for potential growth and asymmetric information, a significant rela-
tionship no longer exists between information uncertainty and future returns. One
can interpret this evidence that information uncertainty is composed of endogenous
earnings volatility and exogenous asymmetric information. The former uncertain-
ty increases the value of a firm’s growth options, whereas the latter increases the
investors’ risk exposure and requires a higher premium. Previous research assumes
that the magnitude of information uncertainty is given in the market and focus-
es on the normative rules of investors’ decision-making. This study decomposes
information uncertainty, and differentiates the impact of information uncertainty
from different sources on investors’ valuation.
The fifth chapter tests the influence of information uncertainty in equity fi-
nancing decisions. The logic is that if information uncertainty would affect stock
valuation from investors’ perspective, managers who actively observe and respond
to market conditions would also be affected by degree of information uncertain-
ty. A large body of literature has documented that equity issuance decisions are
positively affected by stock valuation. Managers tend to issue equity when the
prior stock price is high or increases. Behavioral corporate finance interprets the
market timing phenomenon as the consequence of stock mispricing, which man-
agers try to exploit by selling their stocks. Hence, one can conjecture that, as
information uncertainty leads to a higher level of mispricing, it will also lead to
a higher probability of equity issuance if firms are subject to greater uncertainty.
The results in Chapter 5 are consistent with the conjecture that firms with higher
uncertainty tend to conduct more seasoned equity offerings1. After controlling for
1Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009)build a model of one representative controlling share-
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stock valuation, the impact of information uncertainty in equity issuance is still
significant.
holder who learn from firm performance and make initial public offering decision. Their model
shows that firms with greater uncertainty are more likely to make equity offering decisions to
exchange controlling rights for diversification benefits.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Information plays a central role in financial literature. The neoclassic finance
theory relies heavily on rational expectation equilibrium models in which rep-
resentative agents maximize their expected utility based on perfect information
assumption. The classic asset pricing models such as Sharpe’s (1964) capital as-
set pricing model, Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory, and Merton’s (1973)
Intertemporal CAPM are built on a perfect market in which all information is
precise and available to participants in the market. The critical assumption of
a perfect market assures that investors know the true distributions of each risky
asset and risk factors, and can strictly maximize their expected utility by investing
in optimized portfolios.
Although these normative models are built on one representative agent, their
implications are not compromised as long as all investors have the same infor-
mation set. The reason is attributed to the two natures of these models. First,
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equilibrium means that there is no trading between investors once the market
achieves a steady state. Every investor is better off holding the optimum portfo-
lios in the equilibrium, regardless of his or her preference. Second, in the rational
expectation setting, not only do all rational investors form and update their beliefs
uniformly, but their subjective distribution is also correct and agrees with the ex
ante distributions of asset payoffs.
This rational expectation framework dominates in normative financial research
for its simplicity and generality. However, it neglects the fact that information
is sometimes too sparse and inaccurate for investors to evaluate securities and
decide on a firm’s fundamental. In reality, investors deal with a large amount of
news every day, much of which is not easy to interpret. Whether investors have a
preference on receiving more precise information and how they update their beliefs
from this noisy news matters in the real investment world. For instance, in Welch’s
(2000) survey, financial economists widely dispersed their view of expected equity
premium.
2.2 Uncertainty And Psychological Biases
Recently, researchers start to examine information uncertainty in the context
of behavioral finance. From the investors’ perspective, a lot of evidence suggests
that investors are likely to suffer more psychological biases with high uncertainty
(Hirshleifer (2001)). According to cognitive psychology, irrational investors are
also likely to place less emphasis on the news if its implication on stock price is
difficult to assess (high uncertainty). Hence, they tend to be overconfident about
their private information or focus too much on the previous value. In addition,
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the gradual-information-diffusion hypothesis argues that it takes more time for
private signals to travel across the market with more ambiguity if public traders
irrationally infer the insider traders’ information and follow their strategy. Be-
havioral models, including Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Hong and Stein (1999), provide the
theoretical implications of information uncertainty based on earning and price
momentum.
On the other hand, more information uncertainty implicitly increases the arbi-
trage risk. Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argue that irrational
traders are likely to be encouraged by positive feedback from the market price,
and therefore arbitrageurs may simply follow the irrational trading rather than
correct it. The rationale of this mechanism is that it should be strong if the new
feedback is not clear and biases the irrational expectation with a larger magni-
tude. Moreover, the cost of information acquisition increases with the information
uncertainty, which further delays the time required for the price to converge to
fundamental value. Thus, arbitrageurs may stay neutral to avoid undertaking pe-
riod costs and liquidity risk (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) find that monthly stock returns persist within an intermediate term. For
example, stocks with past higher returns continue to outperform those with past
lower returns over six months to one year. This phenomenon does not change
after controlling for other anomalies such as January or size effects. Furthermore,
additional studies reveal that this phenomenon survives within and beyond the
sample period and in global markets, which strongly disputes the view of data
mining (Jegadeesh and Titman (2001),Rouwenhorst (1998)).
On the other hand, Bernard and Thomas (1989),Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakon-
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ishok (1996) and Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) use different method-
ologies 1 but find identical implications that investors initially under-react to earn-
ings announcements that are later absorbed into the market price with a short-term
trend. These anomalies show that expected future stock returns are predictable,
which challenges the rational asset pricing models and efficient market hypothe-
sis. In particular, no prevailing rational asset pricing model can fully explain all
cross-sectional and time-series anomalies (see Barberis and Thaler (2003) survey
for details). An alternative explanation given by behavioral finance suggests that
investors or even arbitrageurs ’leave the money on the table’ because they and/or
others are ’blinded’ by systematic psychological biases.
Despite extensive research on the under-reaction anomaly, the rationale behind
its existence remains controversial.Behavioral finance literature provides several
potential explanations based on psychological biases such as overconfidence about
private information, the disposition effect or neglected attention. However, Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Jackson and Johnson (2006) argue that
price and earning momentum are closely related and attribute them to under-
reaction to recent public information. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998) also developed a model of a representative investor who is overconfident
about his or her private information and biased by self-attribution. They ar-
gue that investors tend to be more overconfident when the feedback from a new
price or information is inconclusive. In addition, the disposition hypothesis based
1Bernard and Thomas (1989) use standardized unexpected earnings to test post-earning-
announcement-drift, while Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) further adopt analyst fore-
cast revision as one additional measure of earning surprises. Apart from earning announcement
and abnormal stock returns, Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) extract unexpected cash
flow news by decomposing stock returns into expected return component and cash flow compo-
nent.
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on prospect theory and mental accounting suggests investors’ tendency to realise
gains and hold losses. Frazzini (2006) further provides empirical evidence that
price-earnings-announcement drifts are much higher when capital gains and re-
cent news have the same sign, which is consistent with the disposition hypothesis.
Furthermore, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) find that stocks with less attention
generate a larger under-reaction effect, which could be explained by the distraction
hypothesis.
2.3 Uncertainty And Asymmetric Information
Information uncertainty is also closely related to asymmetric information in
the manner in which investors interpret noisy signals. Here, past research on the
theoretic building of asymmetric information and its implications are reviewed.
A discussion related to information uncertainty will then follow. Asymmetric
information means that some investors possess more insider information about
underlying firms. This leads to three major problems in corporate finance: adverse
selection, which means the inability to distinguish between positive and negative
investment opportunities, as investors prefer the one with the lower risk or higher
safety; moral hazard, which means that managers will not stick to the investment
plan if such a plan does not serve their interests; the third is monitoring cost, which
is used to restrict the manager’s ability to fool previous shareholders and new stock
owners. Hence, asymmetric information is considered a risk factor for uninformed
investors. Moreover, the environment of the market or market development is also
crucial for investors’ reactions to such asymmetric information. For example, in a
market in which insider information trading is not restricted by regulators, insiders
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will most likely always trade based on the difference set he or she possesses and
common market information. Therefore, the probability of insider trading is much
higher for markets with poor credibility.
Easley and O’Hara (2004) focus on the role of asymmetric information in af-
fecting a firm’s cost of capital. They suggest that the composition of information
between public and private information can affect risk exposure. It differs from the
previous view of information structure that not only the public, but also the qual-
ity and quantity of private information are a determinant factor in cross-sectional
stock returns. In their model, both informed and uninformed investors are risk
averse and make rational investment decisions. Information is defined by a set of
signals, a part of which uninformed investors cannot acquire. Informed investors
hold optimum portfolios based on all information. Hence, their investment should
be no different with the traditional mean-variance criteria. However, uninformed
investors infer the excess asset demand of informed traders from observed price.
In this setting, uninformed investors may conjecture the composition of private
and public information (i.e. how much they do not know, but not the actual
information).
In equilibrium, informed and uninformed traders hold different portfolios that
rely on their subjective security market line. Expected returns with the same level
of risk differ for these two types of investors due to different portfolios. Similar to
Lintner (1969), heterogeneous beliefs among investors would not affect the efficien-
cy of market portfolio as long as the average expectations of investors are correct.
However, in Easley and O’Hara (2004) model, simply holding market portfolios is
less effective than the optimal strategy of uninformed investors. The main reasons
are 1) private information is not systematic; otherwise, it is of no value; 2) the
14
optimal technique can help the uninformed learn some news. If informed traders
hold more and the fraction of private information is large, there is a high possibility
that positive news is forthcoming.
One important feature of this model is that rational uninformed investors can-
not diversify the risks of asymmetric information. The previous literature stem-
ming from Merton (1987) suggests that uninformed investors may reduce or ex-
clude stocks with private information from their portfolios. However, in Easley
and O’Hara’s (2004) model, the expected utility of the uninformed is higher if
they trade based on conjecture about the information structure. Another fea-
ture is that this different risk cannot be arbitraged away (i.e. longing the stocks
with less private information and shorting the counterpart), since the unrevealed
information contains both good and bad news. This trading strategy certainty
increases the portfolio risks. On the other hand, informed traders will hold more
stocks with good news than uninformed traders and fewer stocks with bad news.
However, uninformed traders cannot mimic the portfolios, since they do not know
the information.
The traditional asymmetric information theory suggests that large dispersion
is caused by more private information, rather than uninformed investors reducing
their holdings of the underlying assets and requiring higher returns. However, this
paper suggests that dispersion may help to reveal information from the informed
to the uninformed, thus reducing the required returns if uninformed investors can
infer the fraction of informed investors and private information from the market
price. This result is similar to the dispersion effect hypothesis that heterogeneous
belief lowers future stock returns. To distinguish these two hypotheses, analysts
should control for the information diffusion effect. The excess returns are negative-
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ly related to the fraction of informed traders and the precision of signals. When
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts increases, it may convert some informed traders
to uninformed due to the absence of a private information signal. In addition, the
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is related to the precision of the signals.
Following this line, Li (2005) shows that information quality has a negative
impact on a firm’s cost of capital. Noisier information could increase both the risk
premium required by market participants and stock return volatility, as investors
are disadvantaged by the uncertain dividend growth rate and estimation error.
2.4 Uncertainty, Undiversified Risk And Incom-
plete Information
Similar to asymmetric information, the research on incomplete information
assumes that market participants have a different information domain and analyze
its effect on the risk and return of securities. The remarkable paper by Merton
(1987) presents a two-period model with different information endowment amongst
investors. Uninformed investors face the parameter of uncertainty or estimate risk
from certain assets. Since each investor may only hold a small proportion of all
securities, they probably construct the portfolios by the known securities. He
argues that the cost of information acquisition and diffusion results in a higher
future return of the underlying asset than equilibrium with a complete market.
In contrast to Merton’s setting, Williams (1977) assumes that investors disagree
with the mean and covariance of securities returns. Hence, incomplete information
may increase investors’ estimate error from observed returns. In equilibrium, the
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security market line may still hold, as investors agree on the disagreement of stock
prices. However, if the disagreement of stocks’ covariance matrix is constant, the
beta representation holds but is no longer efficient. Moreover, if the dispersion
of opinion is observable, investors may require higher returns for more uncertain
stocks. Varian (1985) further models a complete market by stating that in ev-
ery condition there exists an Arrow-Debreu payoff. In his model, with constant
or stable absolute risk aversion, dispersion lowers the asset price via aggregate
consumption.
2.5 Uncertainty And Miller’s Theory
Miller (1977) argues that stocks with investor disagreement and short-sale con-
straints should be priced at a premium. With a homogeneous expectation, the
demand curve of a security is completely flat. In other words, no one will buy
overpriced securities or sell underpriced securities, as the expectation is identical
across all investors. Real financial markets, however, are consists of participants
with different opinions on almost every aspect of market conditions and valuation.
The heterogeneous beliefs on security prices will shift the demand curve from pure
flat to stiff one. At this stage, pessimistic investors will sell the security to opti-
mistic investors, and the equilibrium still holds at the fundamental value. Once
the short sale is limited, so that pessimistic investors cannot sell as much as they
want, the total supply is diminished. In Miller’s model, these two conditions mu-
tually inflate the current security prices and lower the future returns. In addition,
Harrison and Kreps (1978) suggest that these optimistic investors may hold the
securities and sell them to more optimistic investors, which is also known as the
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winner’s curse.
Neoclassical finance responds to Miller’s hypothesis with several challenges.
Jarrow (1980) argues that stocks are somewhat correlated across the market. If
the aggregate demand does not change, the rise of one stock price with dispersion
effect and short-sale constraints will decrease other correlated securities’ demands.
Hence, in equilibrium, the final effect of dispersion in opinions is ambiguous, since it
affects all stocks. William’s (1977) model suggests that the initial disagreement of
mean and covariance may move to agreement of covariance under heterogeneous
beliefs and constant absolute risk aversion. This means that the future returns
should be identical with different opinions.
However, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model a rational market maker in
an incomplete market with short-sale constraints. They analyze the effects of
strict and loose short-sale constraints and argue that loose short-sale constraints
may theoretically improve the information revealed and absorbed into the market
price, since the cost of the short-sale is relatively high to uninformed traders, but
still profitable to informed traders. If the market maker sets the asset price with
respect to this consideration, he or she may obtain more information about the
selling orders and adjust the price accordingly. In other words, if the market maker
is rational, disagreement and short-sale constraints will not affect the asset prices
or leave any arbitrage.
Much empirical research examines this hypothesis. Amongst them, Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) found that stocks with high dispersion in analysts’
forecasts will generate lower future returns, with the effect much stronger within
small firms and past losers. Moreover, the dispersion may not be a risk factor,
since it is negatively correlated with other risk factors such as market beta and
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volatility. Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) also synchronously control for
the dispersion in opinion and short-sale constraints and find that overvaluation
exists with both, but is not significant with only one proxy controlled. In addition,
Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006) use the methodology in Barron, Kim, Lim, and
Stevens (1998) to separate the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts into a heterogeneous
term and an uncertainty term. Their findings indicate that the uncertainty term
increases the current price and lowers the future returns.
Other empirical literature tests the effect of short-selling stress on the under-
lying stock prices. Figlewski (1981) tested heavily short-sold stocks compared
to others and found that the former insignificantly underperform. Figlewski and
Webb (1993) further find no relationship between the percentage of stocks shorted
and future returns. In contrast, Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran
(2002) use Nasdaq stocks and find supportive evidence for the premium hypoth-
esis. Jones and Lamont (2002) use a short interest rate and show that stocks
with a high short-sale cost generally earn less than others. D’Avolio (2002) argues
that limited arbitrage is related to short-sale cost, which lowers the future returns
of costly-shorted stocks. Furthermore, Nagel (2005) and Chen, Hong, and Stein
(2002) suggest that corporate ownership is another indicator of short-sale cost,
as a sparse ownership structure will increase the seeking cost. Bris, Goetzmann,
and Zhu (2007) examines the stock return pattern with short-sale constraints in
the worldwide stock market. They find that stocks in a more constrained market
exhibit higher skewness, which indirectly supports the premium hypothesis.
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2.6 Ambiguity Aversion
Risk and risk aversion are the foundation of expected utility theory in economics
and finance. Generally speaking, riskiness to a representative agent is the volatility
of his or her consumption plan. The classic utility theory posits that people prefer
less volatility of consumption given any fixed consumption level.
It is assumed that people dislike riskier consumption plans and require com-
pensation for them to choose riskier plans. This preference forms the cornerstone
of modern finance theory: that riskier asset should have higher expected return-
s in the equilibrium. However, the measure of riskiness relies on the odds or
distribution of the underlying assets’ payoffs. Investors have to know the ex ante
distribution of payoffs to determine the risk level of the underlying asset. However,
such information endowment is not always granted to every participant. There-
fore, another type of risk, Knight’s (1921) uncertainty, may also affect investors’
preferences and decision-making. Knight’s uncertainty 2
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is that the former can be explicit-
ly described by the probability of outcomes, whilst the latter means insufficient or
not precise enough information for decision makers to gauge the probability. Re-
searchers sometimes use the terms ’ambiguity’ or ’vagueness’ to refer to Knight’s
uncertainty. Uncertainty is a broader concept that is difficult to quantify compared
to conventional riskiness.
2’Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk,
from which it has never been properly separated . . . It will appear that a measurable uncertainty,
or ’risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is
not in effect an uncertainty at all.’– Knight (1921) ’Risk, Uncertainty and Profit’ refers to the
unknown distribution of assets’ payoff that makes it difficult for investors to evaluate.
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2.6.1 Ellsberg’s Experiment
Although Knight (1921) introduced the definition of uncertainty to economics
research, it was not until Ellsberg (1961) famous experiment that uncertainty was
found to empirically affect the decision-making process. The classic design of
Ellsberg’s experiment is as follows. There are 90 balls in an urn, of which 30 balls
are red, and the remaining 60 balls are either yellow or blue. Participants are
asked to bet on the color of the ball drawn from the urn, as Table 1 shows. In
the first round, participants can choose one of two gambles. If one chooses gamble
A (B), he will receive £100 if the ball drawn from the urn is red (yellow). In the
second round, participants have to make another choice of gamble. For gamble C
(D), the participant will receive £100 if the ball is red or blue (yellow or blue).
The probability of winning the gamble is uncertain for B and C, since the exact
number of yellow and blue balls is not known. Assume the number of yellow balls
is X. The probability of winning in each game shows that if one believes that X is
less than 30, he should choose gamble A and C. Alternatively, if one assumes that
X is higher than 30, he should choose gamble B and D.
This experiment has been performed repeatedly, and the majority of partic-
ipants choose to bet on gamble A and D. This combination of choices seems to
violate the expected utility theory, regardless of the participants’ utility func-
tion and risk aversion. The preference of A over B, and D over C means that
U(100) ∗ 1/3 > U(100) ∗X/90 and U(100) ∗ 2/3 > U(100) ∗ (1−X/90). Rearrang-
ing these two inequalities results in U(100) > U(100), which is obviously false.
The evidence confirms the existence of ambiguity aversion; people do not like to
make decisions when the probability of the outcome is unknown. In this experi-
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ment, one possible interpretation is that the participants lose some utility when
betting on gambles B and C with an uncertain probability of winning. Taking am-
biguity aversion into account, the inequality should be changed, as U(100)∗ 1/3 >
U(100) ∗X/90−U(AA), and U(100) ∗ 2/3 > U(100) ∗ (1−X/90)−U(AA), where
U(AA) represents the utility loss caused by ambiguity aversion. Then the final
inequality may stand as U(100) > U(100) − 2U(AA).
2.6.2 Theoretical Buildings Of Ambiguity Aversion
Before modern financial theory became popular, investors considered uncer-
tainty as a simple chance of gains and losses. However, since the 1950s, expected
utility theory and portfolio selection postulate that rational investors are as con-
cerned about risk as volatility or the covariance of stock payoffs with a certain
mean, whilst uncertainty or unobservable probability is left to subjective utility
theory and behavioral finance. In contrast to the assumption of prior known pay-
off distribution, subjective utility theory suggests that agents are also averse to
uncertain odds of outcomes. In a clinical experiment involving scanning the hu-
man brain’s reaction to such gambles, Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, and Camerer
(2005) provide solid and consistent evidence that aversion to ambiguity has the
same mechanism as risk aversion.
Applying ambiguity aversion utility in asset pricing, Cvitanic, Lazrak, Martelli-
ni, and Zapatero (2006) generated a closed-form solution for the optimal portfo-
lio of a utility maximizer who faces ambiguity the alphas and show that learn-
ing about the expected return can trigger a substantial amount of the demand.
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006)also studied the option pricing and volume implica-
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tions for heterogeneous agents facing model uncertainty. Market incompleteness
makes options non-redundant, whilst heterogeneity creates a link between differ-
ences in beliefs and option volumes. Hence, a dynamic relationship exists between
option volume and implied volatility with uncertainty.Chateauneuf, Eichberger,
and Grant (2007) also developed the simplest generalization of subjective ex-
pected utility that can accommodate both optimistic and pessimistic attitudes
towards uncertainty-Choquet expected utility with non-extreme-outcome-additive
(neo-additive) capacities. They showed that neo-additive capacities can be readily
applied in economic problems. Lo (1996) proved that equilibrium exists for games
with the subjective expected utility model. He generated a measure of probability
with both a closed and convex principle to form a representative agent’s expecta-
tion. In addition, Rigotti and Shannon (2005) generated an equilibrium model for
decision-makers under uncertainty and risk, revealing that equilibrium prices and
portfolio allocation vary with the underlying fundamental of a firm’s value.
Although these models consider preference over ambiguity with the support of
experimental evidence, they are not widely examined due to the following short-
comings. First, ambiguity is difficult, if not impossible, to measure and calculate.
If the ambiguity level of an event could be quantified, ambiguity would no longer
exist in the common sense. Secondly, theoretical work shows that the equilibri-
um of the financial market embedded with ambiguity only exists with many strict
assumptions. Even Knight (1921) suggests that ”nothing was to be learned by
modeling agents unable to act in uncertain setting”. A full review of ambigu-
ity aversion literature is not the purpose of this chapter. Camerer and Weber
(1992), Leippold, Trojani, and Vanini (2008), Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rusti-
chini (2006) and Rigotti and Shannon (2005) provide a more detailed analysis.
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A close link between ambiguity aversion and information uncertainty is sug-
gested by Epstein and Schneider (2008). Their model concerns ambiguity-aversion
and investors’ attitudes and decisions to ex post and ex ante information quality.
Investors with ambiguity aversion derive their estimates of asset payoff distribution
from information and generate multiple prior beliefs. When information does not
have a conclusive implication about a firm’s performance, or the signal is noisy,
the imprecision leads to a likelihood of payoff distribution from the investor’s
view. Moreover, ambiguity aversion implicates that the investor always assumes
the worst-case scenario, which means that their expectation is the outcome of a
worst-case scenario. For example, if the weather forecast states that the proba-
bility of rain for tomorrow is 40 to 60 percent, ambiguity aversion agents would
assume the probability is close to 60 percent. In this setting, their model suggests
that 1) negative information has more influence on investor preference, as it seem-
s more reliable than positive news, and 2) the anticipation of future low-quality
information has a negative impact on investor preference.
The logic is that, when good (bad) news arrives, investors will take the lowest
(highest) probability of the exact outcome happening. Hence, they place more em-
phasis on the credibility of bad news and react more asymmetrically to bad news.
Second, investors may infer the quality of future information from the precision
of past news and signals. Ambiguity aversion investors dislike securities with past
inaccurate information, and require compensation for holding such assets. More-
over, Daniel and Titman (2006) distinguish between tangible and intangible infor-
mation. The formal represents past solid accounting reports, whereas the latter
refers to unexplained market returns that reflect market views about future earn-
ings growth. Since intangible information is generally subject to the ambiguity of
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implication, investors often overreact to bad news and under-react to good news.
This gives an alternative explanation to the behavioral finance literature.
In short, their model suggests that ambiguity has three implications on invest-
ment decision and asset pricing. First, given ambiguity aversion, securities with
uncertain information require a premier for investors to hold them, due to a lack
of confidence. Secondly, after uncertain information, agents respond asymmetri-
cally; bad news affects them more than good news. Moreover, a security with poor
future information quality will discourage investors. Consequently, the quality of
past information lowers the investor’s utility and hence requires a higher return.
This argument is contradictory to learning with the Bayesian approach, which
suggests that the quality of past information does not affect the expectations of
future signal precision.
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Chapter 3
Information Uncertainty And
Underreaction To Recent News
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in introduction and literature review, the main objective of this
thesis is to examine the role of information uncertainty in financial markets. This
chapter addresses the question of whether information uncertainty has impact
on future stock returns and/or underreaction anomaly. Several recent studies
provide evidence that information uncertainty (or value ambiguity), which refers
to the ambiguity of news implications on firm’s fundamental value, plays a role
in stock returns and short-term price continuation (momentum). Jiang, Lee, and
Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) among others document that stocks with high
information uncertainty are associated with larger price momentum and post-
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analyst forecast revision price drift (thereafter earning momentum)1. As they
argue, information uncertainty encourages investors’ underreaction to recent news
and leads to momentum.
This chapter testes whether investors with greater information uncertainty un-
derreact more to recent news, i.e. more information uncertainty should be asso-
ciated with higher expected returns following good news, while, stocks with more
information uncertainty should generate lower returns following bad news. This
study, firstly, offers support to the literature that assesses the profitability of mo-
mentum strategies in the UK stock market (for example, Dissanaike (2002) and
Hon and Tonks (2003)). This is of great interest to investors in order to devise ap-
propriate tactics since a trading strategy based on this information can be proved
quite profitable. Secondly, this is the first study of UK stock market exhaustively
using 5 different proxies to measure information uncertainty: firm capitalization,
firm age, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic volatility and dispersion in analyst fore-
cast. Although each of them might also capture other issues, the common element
of the five proxies is that they are exclusively measures of information uncertainty.
Thirdly, this study serves as an out of sample test on whether conclusions drawn
from the US experience can characterize other major markets and alternative trad-
ing environments such as the UK stock market.
In spite of extensive research on the underreaction anomaly, the rationale be-
hind its existence remains controversial2. Behavioral finance literature provides
several potential explanations based on psychological biases such as overconfi-
1McKnight and Todd (2006) show that European stocks with net upward revised forecasts
earn higher future returns than otherwise similar stocks.
2See for example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Hirshleifer (2001).
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dence about private information, disposition effect or neglected attention3. Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Jackson and Johnson (2006) argued that
price and earning momentum are closely related and attribute them to under-
reaction to recent public information. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam
(1998, 2001) developed a model of a representative investor who is overconfiden-
t about his private information and biased by self-attribution. They argue that
investors tend to be more overconfident when the feedback from new price or infor-
mation is inconclusive. Furthermore, Frazzini (2006) provides empirical evidence
that price/earning-announcement drifts are much larger when capital gains and
recent news have the same implications, which is consistent with disposition effect.
Moreover, limits of arbitrage, the second cornerstone of behavioral theory, is
plausibly greater as information uncertainty increases. First, it is likely for in-
vestors to lose time to assess new information when its implications are not clear.
(Mendenhall (2004)). Even an experienced arbitrageur may face the risk of the
news coming in between his trade actions and suffer a loss. The longer it takes
for the price to converge to its intrinsic value, the riskier the arbitrager’s posi-
tion. Second, information uncertainty may encourage noise trading since less solid
feedback can be obtained (Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
Alternative interpretation regarding incomplete information theory, considers
the information uncertainty as a source of parameter risks or risk of asymmet-
ric information. Stocks with high information uncertainty should be priced at a
discount compared to absolute information equilibrium as a compensation for un-
3See for instance, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Fama (1998) and Hirshleifer
(2001) for a comprehensive review.
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informed investors to hold such assets (Merton (1987), Easley and O’Hara (2004)).
Moreover, the rational Bayesian learning suggests that investors adjust the esti-
mates putting less weight on new information if this does not provide a clear
picture about stock’s fundamental value. Hence, when there is good news with
high uncertainty, investors initially under-estimate the underlying stock return-
s. Along with disappearance of information uncertainty on fundamental value,
investors update their beliefs rationally. Francis, Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper
(2007) argue that investors initially response less to information with high uncer-
tainty and large abnormal returns are mainly concentrated in portfolios with high
uncertainty stocks. This hypothesis seems to predict a similar relation between
information uncertainty and underreaction effect compared to behavioral theory.
However, this could not explain why the profitability from momentum strategy is
persistent over time and exists in the international market4.
Consistent with the predictions our results provide evidence that greater infor-
mation uncertainty leads to larger underreaction to recent news, as we find that
earning momentum among stocks with high information uncertainty is on aver-
age 1% per month higher than among stocks with low information uncertainty.
Similarly, the difference of price momentum between high and low information
uncertainty stocks is 1.7% per month. We also find that returns between high
and low idiosyncratic volatility (and dispersion in analyst forecast) portfolios are
significantly larger following bad news compared to those following good news.
This pattern suggests that these two proxies predict systematically lower future
returns. One possible explanation is that they both capture the effect of diver-
4If investors were aware of the systematic under-reaction and information uncertainty, they
would increase the profitability from price and earning momentum strategies, rather than waiting
until the information uncertainty disappears.
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gence of opinions among investors in the market5. According to Miller’s (1977)
theory, with large differences of investors’ beliefs and short-sale constraints, pes-
simistic traders are kept out of the market and securities prices are biased upwards
driven by the optimists who lead prices to unreasonable highs. Doukas, Kim, and
Pantzalis (2006) argue that previous tests on divergence of opinion theory by dis-
persion in forecasts are still mixed up as they do not exclude the uncertainty effect.
Finally, we do not find supportive evidence of incomplete information or rational
learning. The stock returns in our sample could not be explained by a four-factor
asset pricing model. Risk adjusted returns still illustrate the trends that high
abnormal returns from price or earning momentum strategy are associated with
high information uncertainty. In addition, robustness tests show the impact of
information uncertainty on the price and earning momentum are persistent across
the sub-periods and the difference between high and low information uncertainty
stocks are economically significant with high Sharpe ratios.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature
and sets the testable hypothesis; Section 3.3 describes the data and methodolo-
gy; Section 3.4 presents the results of the impact of information uncertainty on
cross-sectional stock returns, earning momentum and price momentum; Section
3.5 provides robustness tests; Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
5Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) use dispersion in analyst forecast to test Miller’s
(1977) theory while Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) measure divergence of opinion with
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL).
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3.2 Relevant Literature And Testable Hypothe-
sis
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) firstly find monthly stock returns persist within
an intermediate term, i.e. stocks with past higher returns continue to outperfor-
m those with past lower returns over six months to one year. This phenomenon
stands after controlling for other anomalies such as January or size effects. Fur-
thermore, additional studies show this phenomenon survives in an out of sample
period and in global markets, which strongly disputes the view of data-mining
(Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)). On the other hand, Bernard and Thomas (1989),
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Vuolteenaho (2002) use different
methodologies but find identical implications that investors initially underreac-
t to earnings announcement which are later absorbed into market price with a
short-term trend. These anomalies show that expected future stock returns are
predictable in time-series, which challenges the rational asset pricing models and
efficient market hypothesis (Barberis and Thaler (2003)).
Behavioral finance is built on two cornerstones: 1) investor sentiment (i.e.
psychological biases) and 2) limits of arbitrage. From the investors’ perspective,
recent evidence suggests that investors are likely to suffer more psychological biases
with large uncertainty (Hirshleifer (2001)). According to cognitive psychology
irrational investors are likely to put less weight on the news if its implication on
stock price is hard to assess (high uncertainty) and hence tend to be overconfident
about their private information or anchor too much on the previous value. In
addition, the gradual-information diffusion hypothesis argues that it takes more
time for private signals to travel across the market with more ambiguity if public
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traders irrationally infer the insider trader’s information and follow their strategy.
Behavioral models including Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001)
and Hong and Stein (1999) provide the theoretical implications of information
uncertainty on earning and price momentum.
On the other hand, more information uncertainty implicitly increases the arbi-
trage risk. Delong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argue that irrational
traders are likely to be encouraged by positive feedback from the market price, and
therefore arbitrageurs may simply follow the irrational trading rather than correct
it. The rationale of this mechanism is that it should be strong if the new feedback
is not clear and biases the irrational expectation with a larger magnitude. More-
over, cost of information acquisition increases with the information uncertainty,
which further delays the time for price to converge to fundamental value. Thus
arbitrageurs may just stay neutral to avoid undertaking period cost and liquidity
risk (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
Following the above discussion we can naturally set our hypothesis based on the
fact that greater information uncertainty produces relatively higher (lower) stock
returns following good (bad) news as: stocks with high information uncertainty
should experience i) larger price momentum and ii) larger earning momentum, due
to investors’ underreaction.
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3.3 Data And Methodology
3.3.1 Data Description
Our sample includes all stocks traded in UK market from February 1991 to
December 2003. There are a total of 542 securities in the sample starting in
February 1991, and as securities enter and leave the London Stock Exchange over
the next 12 years, there are over 2861 securities in total over the entire sample
period and an average number of 785 stocks for each month through the whole
period respectively.
To avoid survivorship bias dead companies are held in the sample until they
have no longer trading records. Monthly returns, market capitalization, firm age
(years from the first date that underlying stock is covered), are obtained from
Thomson Reuters DataStream. Analyst earning forecast, analyst coverage and
standard deviation of analyst forecast are quoted from I/B/E/S database. Consis-
tent with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), we exclude stocks with past performance
data less than twelve months to avoid IPOs effect.
The summary statistics in table 3.1 show that the average monthly return is
0.36% while firm’ market value varies from 0.2 to 213734.8 million pounds. Firm
age covers 1 to 228 months with a mean of 85 months (7.6 years) which indicates
a relatively large portion of young firms and delisted stocks. The stock market in
the sample period appears to an extent volatile with average DISP 4% and IVOL
10%.
Pair-wise correlation coefficients between each two variables are reported in
the second panel of table 3.1. We find the monthly returns do not appear to
have large correlation with other variables (from -0.05 to 0.076). We also observe
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positive coefficients among market value, firm age and analyst forecast, which is
reasonable given that large firms have longer history and more analyst coverage
compared to small ones. In addition, we observe that large firms are relatively less
volatile than small ones
3.3.2 Measures Of Earning Momentum And Price Momen-
tum
We track the post earnings announcements by analyst forecast revisions pro-
vided by I/B/E/S database. A positive (negative) revision means good (bad) news
and zero revision means no news respectively. Stock returns are sorted by previous
month’s revision. If earning momentum effect exists in the UK market, positive
(negative) return following positive (negative) revision is expected. Secondly, the
indicator of price momentum is measured by past eleven-month average return
with one-month lag. Stocks with past high returns would persistently outperform
stocks with past low returns, if investors underreact to historical return pattern.
3.3.3 Measures Of Information Uncertainty
For information uncertainty, we use firm’s market capitalization (MV), firm
age(AGE), analyst coverage (COV), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and dispersion
in analyst forecast (DISP). Firm size measured as firm’s market capitalization is a
common factor for limited information, as suggested by Barry and Brown (1984)
limited information hypothesis. They argue that small firms systematically have
larger uncertainty. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) also suggest that with fixed cost
of information acquisition, small firms would be less attractive to investors, which
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decrease the speed of information moving across the market. Pastor and Veronesi
(2003) build a model and show that holding other factors constant, individual
firm’s endogenous uncertainty decreases with its life time. We use the log of
(1+AGE) for proxy of information uncertainty as the marginal effect of years on
uncertainty should reasonably decrease. In the same context, we use as third proxy
the analyst coverage which is defined as the log (1+COV). More analysts covering
the news of a firm should provide more information and decrease the uncertainty.
Firm’s idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is measured as standard deviation of twelve
months’ excess returns over stock index, and dispersion in analyst forecast (DISP),
is measured as standard deviation of analyst forecast of following year earning
per share estimates scaled by prior year end stock price. Diether, Malloy, and
Scherbina (2002) report that I/B/E/S database contains stale analyst estimates
and has round split flaws. Hence, analyst forecast and coverage are drawn from
I/B/E/S detail history files.
3.3.4 Portfolio Construction
We adopt conventional portfolio strategy based on information uncertainty
proxy and underreaction signals Portfolio strategy is commonly used in financial
literature to test the effect of certain risk or characteristics factors on average stock
returns. The advantage of portfolio strategy is obvious that it reduces the noise by
averaging out the individual stock return variability. To test direct impact of infor-
mation uncertainty on stock returns, we firstly construct one-way sorted portfolios
by single information uncertainty proxy. In each month, we assign stock returns
into five quintiles according to previous month information uncertainty proxy and
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hold portfolios for one month. At the beginning of next month, we repeat the
assigning process so that there is no portfolio overlapping in any month. Portfolio
performance is calculated as equally weighted stock returns in each portfolio over
sample periods. To test interaction effect of information uncertainty and under-
reaction anomaly, we further construct two-way sorted portfolio. We first pool
stocks into three groups according to analyst forecast revisions or past one month
returns. In each group, we further rank stocks into five quintiles based on each
information uncertainty proxy. For example, The portfolio of Winner and Low
IU will contain stocks having highest previous month returns and bearing lowest
information uncertainty.
3.3.5 Regression Analysis
Risk-factor model regression is a general approach to test whether an anomaly
can be explained by a rational expectation theory. If the results of regressions
do not provide significant abnormal return, the anomaly is plausibly driven by
its sensitive to some potential risk factors. Otherwise, we may suggest the fail-
ure of the rational asset pricing model or efficient market hypothesis. Fama and
French (1996) argue that the three-factor model works well to explain a majority
of anomalies that can not be explained by CAPM. Their model includes two addi-
tional risk factors, size premium and value premium. The results of regression on
three-factor model show that different anomalies are driven by different loading or
sensitive to these risk factors (Fama and French (1996)). Moreover, since three-
factor model does not capture the momentum effect, Carhart (1997) uses a similar
methodology and generates a momentum factor. Hence, we use the Fama French
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three-factor plus Carhart (1997) momentum factor to test whether the price mo-
mentum and earning momentum effects can be explained by a rational approach.
In other words, if the enlarged anomalous returns are compliments to risk fac-
tors, there should be no significant intercepts after regression. The regression is
presented as:
Ri,t −Rf,t = α + βi,M(RM,t −Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +miUMDt + t (3.1)
Where Ri,t−Rf,t the excess return of portfolio i over risk-free rate in time t, RM,t−
Rf,t is the excess return of market index over risk-free rate and SMBt, HMLt and
UMDt represent the size, value and momentum premiums, respectively.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Information Uncertainty And Cross-Sectional Stock
Returns
In this section (table 3.2), we examine how information uncertainty is related
with the cross section of stock returns. High (low) information uncertainty stocks
are those with small (large) size, small (large) age, small (large) analyst coverage,
high (low) idiosyncratic volatility, and large (small) dispersion in analyst forecast,
respectively. The top (bottom) portfolio includes stocks with the lowest level of
information uncertainty. The results show that higher information uncertainty
(IU) leads to significantly lower average return. The average zero investment
portfolio (low minus high IU) is equal to 1.11% monthly returns (t-value 3.42). One
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potential explanation is that investors systematically over-estimate stock prices
when the information is inconclusive (Odean (1998)). Investor overconfidence and
excess trading are likely to be more pronounced within stocks with less feedback
or unclear information. Moreover, the proxies for information uncertainty are
commonly used as measures of arbitrage risk, which could further lead to persistent
mispricing6.
3.4.2 Information Uncertainty And Earnings Momentum
In table 3.3, we double sort stocks by previous news and information uncer-
tainty proxies. Stocks are firstly assigned into good news, no news and bad news
groups respectively and in each group we rank them in the same way as discussed
above. The results strongly support the earnings momentum effect for every infor-
mation uncertainty proxy. The portfolio strategy, which takes long position with
recent good news and short position with bad news, generates return of 0.41%
(t-value=2.08) for large firms and 1.42% (t-value=5.69) for small firms. The av-
erage differential of the zero-investment portfolio returns between extreme high
and low uncertainty stocks is 1%. Moreover, the results suggest that the strategy
that goes long the low uncertainty stocks and shorts the high uncertainty stock-
s is profitable with past bad news. For example, the low minus high portfolio
sorted by firm’s age earn 0.98% (t-value=2.91) with recent bad news, while that
following good news does not earn significant returns. This evidence shows the
earning momentum is more persistent with bad news or simply bad news passes
6Alternatively, information uncertainty may also lead to large disagreement among investors.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) documented
that IVOL and dispersion in analyst forecast are measurements of dispersion of opinion and that
high dispersion leads to lower future returns according to Miller’s (1977) theory.
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more gradually across the market according to Hong and Stein (1999) model. Last
but not least, we find that only the highest uncertainty portfolio sorted by IVOL
generates negative return following good news, which may be due to over-reaction
and optimistic trading upward bias to the price. All other portfolios support the
under-reaction hypothesis. To sum up we find that: 1) Portfolios with high in-
formation uncertainty have larger and significant earning momentum. 2) Return
differences between stocks with high and low uncertainty are relatively small with
recent good news compared to recent bad news.
3.4.3 Information Uncertainty And Price Momentum
To analyze the role of information uncertainty on price momentum, the returns
are double-sorted, firstly by past 11 months performance with one month lag and
then ranked into 5 quintiles from the lowest to highest uncertainty respectively. A
winner minus loser portfolio captures the momentum profits within each level of
information uncertainty. In addition, low minus high portfolio with past high or
low returns shows the effect of information uncertainty on past good or bad news
respectively.
The evidence from table 3.4 is quite similar to our previous findings: The in-
teraction effect between information uncertainty and momentum effect exists as
high uncertainty stocks are associated with large momentum profits within all
uncertainty proxies. Compared to the analyst forecast revision, we find that the
momentum strategy generates higher returns, which suggests investors are likely
to under-react more to market price signals than analysts’ recommendations. For
example, sorted by firm size, the winner minus loser strategy earns as twice as
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good-bad news. Overall, the average price momentum portfolios in the highest
uncertainty quintile earn 1.7% more than those in the lowest uncertainty quintile.
In addition, we also observe that low minus high uncertainty strategy is extremely
profitable with past bad performance with average 1.6% return, which suggests
that market reacts very slowly to past bad news with higher information uncer-
tainty. This could be due to disposition effect that investors tend to hold losses
and sell winners and information uncertainty just enhances this effect as investors
do not obtain solid feedback. The price continuation holds for all portfolios except
for the extreme low uncertainty stocks with poor past performance. This comes
in support to our hypothesis that investors react more rationally to recent signals
or arbitrageurs are willing to trade against the market when the uncertainty is
relatively low.
3.4.4 Results from Four Factor Time-Series Regression
Table 3.5 shows that stocks with high information uncertainty have much larger
loading on size premium. This finding suggests that stocks with high information
uncertainty are robust to the size effect as small firms tend to underperform large
ones in our sample. Fama (1998) suggests that some anomalies would reverse over
time. Hence, we cannot reject the rational expectation explanation as the large
lower returns for stocks with high uncertainty are probably due to large loading
to negative size premium.
Table 3.6 presents the intercepts of regressions on portfolio returns sorted by an-
alyst forecast revision and information uncertainty respectively. The risk-adjusted
return patterns are analogous to the raw portfolio return, which indicates that the
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rational expectation model does not capture the interaction effect between infor-
mation uncertainty and underreaction anomaly in our sample 7. Hirshleifer (2001)
and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) argue that stock returns may
be jointly determined by fundamental risk and investor behavior. This, in turn,
might be a potential explanation for the larger abnormal returns of stocks with
higher information uncertainty and inadequate risk loadings 8.
3.5 Robustness Check
3.5.1 Profitability Of Momentum Strategies With Differ-
ent Levels Of Information Uncertainty
In this section, we further test the profitability of different trading portfolios
implied by the above findings. Results in Section IV indicate that the drifts to
analyst earning forecast and past 11-month return are seriously interacted with
information uncertainty, thus leading to larger spreads of price or earnings momen-
tum. Following this evidence, we test whether this amplified effect is profitable.
We use the Sharpe ratio to analyze the profitability of portfolios. We examine the
profitability of price momentum by shorting past losers and buying past winners
(Strategy I) and the profitability of earning momentum by buying stocks with pos-
itive analyst forecast revision and selling stocks with negative revision (Strategy
II). Both strategies are compared between high and low information uncertainty
7We find that high uncertainty stocks are subject to large size premium and moderate value
premium while the stocks with recent good (bad) news have large (small) loading on momentum
factor. For space purposes we don’t report these results that are available upon request.
8For reasons of brevity, we don’t present the regression results of portfolio returns with un-
certainty and momentum which are similar to table 3.6
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portfolios.
Table tab:under7 shows the return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios of
portfolios in the lowest or highest level of information uncertainty. Momentum
strategies within the highest information uncertainty portfolios generate signifi-
cantly higher Sharpe ratios than the market portfolio, SMB portfolio, HML port-
folio and UMD portfolio. Moreover, the Sharpe ratios of portfolios within highest
information uncertainty portfolios are higher than those within the lowest infor-
mation uncertainty. Sharpe ratios of strategy we range from 0.30 to 0.42 in the
highest uncertainty quintile and from 0.14 to 0.21 in the lowest uncertainty quin-
tile. Comparing with the compensation to certain risk factors such as market
factor (Rm-Rf), size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML), the strategy in the high-
est uncertainty quintile is overwhelming. Consistent with Zhang (2006), we argue
that the profitability of such strategies indicate an obvious arbitrage opportunity,
which strictly violates the efficient market hypothesis.
3.5.2 Lag Of Portfolio Returns
Figure 3.1 depicts the lag of portfolio returns in order to test the persistence of
momentum effect and the speed of adjustment to past news. Firm’s market value
is used as proxy of information uncertainty. The first diagram shows that the
difference of returns between high and low uncertainty stocks is positive for past
winners and negative for past losers, which is consistent with the results in table
3.4. The difference is relatively large for the first three months due to speedily
diminishing excess returns from winner’s portfolio. This result provides evidence
that bad news is disclosed slowly across the market compared to good news. The
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second diagram shows that momentum strategy works continuously better when
there is high information uncertainty. Since we use market value as proxy of
information uncertainty, which does not vary significantly over several months,
this return pattern addresses the interaction between size effect and momentum
effect. Moreover, the speed of return adjustment is higher with high uncertainty. In
short, the results indicate a strong link between momentum effect and information
uncertainty.
3.5.3 Sub-Period Analysis
To examine whether previous analysis exists only within certain period, we
further provide sub-period evidence. We separate the analysis into two periods,
from February 1991 to June 1997 and from July 1997 to December 20039. Table
3.8 presents two strategies including 1) Low minus high uncertainty strategy with
past good or bad news and 2) past winner minus past lower strategy within low
and high information uncertainty. We find large and significant momentum profits
for high uncertainty portfolios while the same strategy following low uncertainty
portfolios does not generate significant abnormal returns. In addition, the return
difference between high and low uncertainty stocks is generally large with past
losers and stocks with bad news respectively. The results are therefore robust to
the sample-period bias.
9The reason to separating sample by the year 1997 is twofold. First, this is the middle point
of our sample period that separate subsamples evenly. Second, the Asian financial crisis burst
out and has global impact that may change the firms’ financial condition in our sample.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide further evidence from the UK stock market that
information uncertainty leads to relatively lower future stock returns following bad
news and relatively higher future returns following good news, suggesting that in-
formation uncertainty delays the flow of information into stock prices. Our results
show that greater information uncertainty leads to larger underreaction to recen-
t news, as we find that earning momentum among stocks with high information
uncertainty is on average 1% per month higher than among stocks with low infor-
mation uncertainty. Similarly, the difference of price momentum between high and
low information uncertainty stocks is 1.7% per month. Such results offer useful
implications to investors who can exploit momentum strategies and enjoy profits.
Our findings can be plausibly explained by the behavioral finance literature
which suggests that if the slow market response to information is due to psycho-
logical biases, these biases will be larger and therefore will be slower when there
is greater information uncertainty (ambiguity) about the implications of the infor-
mation for a firm’s value. The prediction power of information uncertainty is not
unimportant. Although there may be other alternative explanations, all five prox-
ies used, for first time in a UK study, to measure information uncertainty support
our hypothesis and enhance the predictions of value ambiguity to the creation of
marker anomalies and cross-sectional variations in stock returns.
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Figure 3.1: Lag in portfolio formation
Stocks are firstly sorted into past winners and past losers by past 11-month re-
turns with a certain lag. We further sort each group of stocks into five quintiles
based on information uncertainty proxy by firm’s market value. Each portfolio is
equally weighted and reconstructed monthly. The first diagram shows the strategy
of shorting low uncertainty stocks and buying high uncertainty stocks within past
winners and past losers, respectively. The second diagram presents the strategy of
shorting past losers and buying past winners within extreme high and low uncer-
tainty quintiles, respectively. The sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock
market from February 1991 to December 2003, except those listed within prior one
year.
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Table 3.2: Portfolio Returns by Information Uncertainty Proxy, Past returns and
Analyst Forecast Revision
This table presents average monthly portfolio returns sorted by each information uncertainty and
post-earnings-announcement drifts in our sample. In panel A, we sort stocks into quintiles based
on past month proxy, including MV, AGE, COV, IVOL and DISP. In panel B, we sort stocks
based on analyst forecast revision at the end of last month. All portfolios are equally weighted
and stocks are held for one month. Return is stock’s monthly return. Firm capitalization is the
market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at the end of month t. Firm age is the log of one
plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded by Thomson Financial DataStream. Analyst
coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S database. Idiosyncratic
stock volatility (IVOL) is calculated by standard deviation of monthly excess returns over FTSE
all share index over the year ending at the end of month t. Dispersion in analyst forecasts is the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t scaled by the prior year-end stock price. The
sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market from February 1991 to December 2003,
except those listed within prior one year. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. Returns one-way sorted by information uncertainty proxy
IU MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
u1(Low) 1.10% 0.73% 0.61% 0.91% 0.79%
u2 1.09% 0.35% 0.42% 0.85% 0.71%
u3 1.09% 0.46% 0.44% 0.57% 0.63%
u4 0.85% -0.01% 0.20% 0.16% 0.21%
u5(High) 0.16% -0.24% 0.15% -1.19% -0.26%
u1-u5 0.95% 0.97% 0.46% 2.10% 1.05%
(3.22) (3.46) (1.47) (4.96) (3.98)
Panel B. Returns sorted by analyst earning forecast
Good News
(Positive
Revision)
No News
(Flat Revi-
sion)
Bad News
(Negative
Revision)
Return 0.69% 0.29% -0.19%
(3.87) (1.81) (-0.44)
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Table 3.3: Portfolio Returns by Information Uncertainty Proxy and Analyst Forecasts Revision
small This table presents average monthly portfolio returns two-way sorted by analyst forecast
revision and information uncertainty proxy. We firstly categorize the stocks into 3 groups with
upward (good news), flat (no news) and downward revision (bad news) respectively. For each
group, we further sort the returns into five quintiles based on firm size, firm age, analyst coverage,
idiosyncratic stock volatility and dispersion in analyst forecasts. All portfolios are equally weighted
and stocks are held for one month. Firm size is the market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at
the end of month t. Firm age is the log of one plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded
by Thomson Financial DataStream. Analyst coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts
reported to I/B/E/S database. Idiosyncratic stock volatility (IVOL) is calculated by standard
deviation of monthly excess returns over FTSE all share index over the year ending at the end of
month t. Dispersion in analyst forecasts is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t
scaled by the prior year-end stock price. The sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market
from February 1991 to December 2003, except those listed within prior one year. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence
level, respectively.
Low IU2 IU3 IU4 High Low-High
Panel A. MV
Good News 0.78% 0.59% 0.92% 0.76% 0.88% -0.10%
(-0.26)
No News 0.54% 0.68% 0.54% 0.42% 0.04% 0.50%
(1.51)
Bad News 0.37% 0.01% -0.04% -0.30% -0.54% 0.91%
(2.23***)
Good-Bad 0.41% 0.58% 0.96% 1.06% 1.42%
(2.08**) (2.59***) (4.58***) (5.66***) (5.69***)
Panel B. AGE
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3continue from last page
Low IU2 IU3 IU4 High Low-High
Good News 0.88% 0.77% 0.91% 0.80% 0.61% 0.27%
(0.77)
No News 0.78% 0.47% 0.65% 0.22% 0.11% 0.67%
(2.11**)
Bad News 0.46% 0.08% -0.01% -0.51% -0.52% 0.98%
(2.91***)
Good-Bad 0.42% 0.69% 0.92% 1.31% 1.13%
(2.35***) (3.54***) (4.19***) (5.82***) (4.5***)
Panel C. COV
Good News 0.94% 0.72% 0.72% 0.82% 0.74% 0.20%
(0.53)
No News 0.62% 0.88% 0.28% 0.43% 0.01% 0.61%
(1.87*)
Bad News 0.33% 0.22% 0.07% -0.37% -0.76% 1.08%
(2.84***)
Good-Bad 0.61% 0.50% 0.65% 1.19% 1.50%
(3.01***) (2.34***) (3.26***) (5.63***) (6.3***)
Panel D. IVOL
Good News 1.10% 1.17% 1.05% 0.73% -0.12% 1.22%
(2.66***)
No News 0.95% 0.83% 0.94% 0.21% -0.68% 1.63%
(3.34***)
Bad News 0.56% 0.39% 0.10% -0.26% -1.31% 1.87%
(3.55***)
Good-Bad 0.54% 0.78% 0.95% 0.99% 1.19%
(4.15***) (4.82***) (5.6***) (4.16***) (3.85***)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3continue from last page
Low IU2 IU3 IU4 High Low-High
Panel E. DISP
Good News 1.00% 0.97% 0.84% 0.72% 0.42% 0.59%
(2.12**)
No News 0.84% 1.22% 0.68% 0.35% -0.21% 1.04%
(2.66***)
Bad News 0.44% 0.17% 0.25% -0.32% -0.90% 1.34%
(4.12***)
Good-Bad 0.56% 0.80% 0.59% 1.04% 1.32%
(3.68***) (3.94***) (2.96***) (4.09***) (4.4***)
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Table 3.4: Portfolios Returns by Information Uncertainty Proxy and Price Momentum
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns two-way sorted by price momentum and infor-
mation uncertainty proxy. We first sort stock returns into three groups (winners, medians, losers)
based on past 11-month returns with one month lag. For each group, we further sort the returns
into five quintiles based on firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic stock volatility and
dispersion in analyst forecasts. All portfolios are equally weighted and stocks are held for one month.
Firm size is the market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at the end of month t. Firm age is the
log of one plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded by Thomson Financial DataStream.
Analyst coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S database. Idiosyn-
cratic stock volatility (IVOL) is calculated by standard deviation of monthly excess returns over
FTSE all share index over the year ending at the end of month t. Dispersion in analyst forecasts is
the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t scaled by the prior year-end stock price. The
sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market from February 1991 to December 2003, except
those listed within prior one year. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the
significance at one, five and ten percent confidence level, respectively.
Low IU2 IU3 IU4 High Low-High
Panel A. MV
Winner 0.77% 1.02% 1.23% 1.57% 1.42% -0.65%
(-2.07**)
Median 0.63% 0.56% 0.43% 0.41% 0.47% 0.16%
(0.56)
Loser -0.29% -0.47% -1.06% -1.37% -1.47% 1.18%
(2.68***)
Winner-Loser 1.06% 1.49% 2.29% 2.94% 2.89%
(2.05**) (3.35***) (5.99***) (8.58***) (8.1***)
Panel B. AGE
Winer 0.99% 1.25% 0.96% 1.31% 1.51% -0.53%
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4–continued from previous page
(-1.82*)
Median 0.61% 0.61% 0.51% 0.55% 0.22% 0.39%
(1.76*)
Loser -0.12% -0.35% -0.80% -1.62% -1.76% 1.64%
(5.07***)
Winner-Loser 1.11% 1.60% 1.76% 2.93% 3.27%
(3.14***) (4.99***) (4.14***) (6.96***) (7.69***)
Panel C. COV
Winner 0.64% 0.93% 1.30% 1.46% 1.59% -0.95%
(-2.63***)
Median 0.75% 0.46% 0.54% 0.27% 0.49% 0.26%
(0.85)
Loser 0.13% -0.39% -0.77% -1.13% -0.80% 0.93%
(2.21**)
Winner-Loser 0.51% 1.32% 2.07% 2.59% 2.39%
(0.98) (2.81***) (4.99***) (6.49***) (7.01***)
Panel D. IVOL
Winner 1.21% 1.39% 1.28% 1.37% 0.79% 0.42%
(1.14)
Median 0.77% 0.85% 0.70% 0.43% -0.21% 0.98%
(3.63***)
Loser 0.29% -0.57% -0.67% -1.24% -2.50% 2.79%
(5.73***)
Winner-Loser 0.92% 1.96% 1.95% 2.61% 3.29%
(3.16***) (5.92***) (5.45***) (6.26***) (5.90***)
Panel E. DISP
Winner 1.23% 1.12% 1.20% 0.94% 1.13% 0.10%
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4–continued from previous page
(0.43)
Median 0.56% 0.78% 0.65% 0.40% 0.43% 0.13%
(0.56)
Loser 0.21% 0.15% -0.14% -0.74% -1.71% 1.93%
(4.47***)
Winner-Loser 1.02% 0.97% 1.34% 1.68% 2.84%
(2.87***) (2.50***) (3.39***) (3.59***) (5.09***)
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Table 3.6: Four Factor Regressions on Portfolios Returns by Information Uncertainty Proxy and
Analyst Forecast Revisions
This table shows the intercepts and loadings of the four-factor regression model for monthly portfolio
returns by analyst forecast revisions and information uncertainty proxy. The regression is: Ri,t −
Rf,t = α+ βi,M (RM,t −Rf,t) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +miUMDt + t Where Ri,t −Rf,t the excess
return of portfolio i over risk-free rate in time t, RM,t−Rf,t is the excess return of market index over
risk-free rate and SMBt, HMLt and UMDt represent the size, value and momentum premiums,
respectively.. We firstly categorize the stocks into 3 groups with upward (good news), flat (no news)
and downward revision (bad news) respectively. For each group, we further sort the returns into five
quintiles based on firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic stock volatility and dispersion
in analyst forecasts. All portfolios are equally weighted and stocks are held for one month. Firm
size is the market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at the end of month t. Firm age is the log of
one plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded by Thomson Financial DataStream. Analyst
coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S database. Idiosyncratic
stock volatility (Sigma) is calculated by standard deviation of monthly excess returns over FTSE
all share index over the year ending at the end of month t. Dispersion in analyst forecasts is the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t scaled by the prior year-end stock price. The
sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market from February 1991 to December 2003, except
those listed within prior one year. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate
the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence level, respectively.
IU MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
Panel A. Good News (Positive Revision)
Low -0.37%** -0.25% -0.03% 0.09% -0.02%
(-2.2) (-1.06) (-0.12) (0.48) (-0.1)
IU2 -0.28% 0.01% -0.24% 0.08% 0.25%
(-0.95) (0.05) (-0.91) (0.35) (0.97)
IU3 0.45%* 0.33% 0.31% 0.26% 0.42%*
Continued on next page
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IU MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
(1.65) (1.19) (1.14) (1.02) (1.76)
IU4 0.70%*** 0.81%*** 0.64%*** 0.61%** 0.51%
(2.55) (3.21) (2.41) (2.06) (1.8)
High 1.10%*** 0.71%** 0.90%*** 0.55% 0.07%
(3.49) (2.15) (2.77) (1.35) (0.21)
Panel B. No News (Flat Revision)
Low -0.25% 0.20% -0.12% 0.28% 0.04%
(-1.03) (0.8) (-0.48) (1.33) (0.15)
IU2 0.58%** 0.08% 0.72%*** 0.38% 0.75%
(2.24) (0.31) (2.68) (1.63) (3.37)
IU3 0.70%*** 0.65%*** 0.40% 0.74% 0.26%
(2.61) (2.49) (1.4) (2.80) (0.93)
IU4 0.71%** 0.40% 0.66%*** 0.30% 0.48%
(2.29) (1.63) (2.37) (1.03) (1.58)
High 0.22% 0.65%** 0.31% 0.30% 0.12%
(0.71) (1.91) (1.01) (0.78) (0.34)
Panel C. Bad News (Negative Revision)
Low -0.79%*** -0.14% -0.47%* -0.49%*** -0.34%
(-3.78) (-0.53) (-1.93) (-2.42) (-1.4)
IU2 -0.35% -0.25% -0.13% -0.31% -0.14%
(-1.13) (-0.79) (-0.46) (-1.26) (-0.51)
IU3 -0.14% -0.31% 0.00% -0.24% 0.30%
(-0.41) (-1.01) (0.01) (-0.81) (1.1)
IU4 -0.13% -0.63%** -0.45% -0.27% -0.46%
(-0.4) (-2.14) (-1.52) (-0.84) (-1.37)
High -0.07% -0.13% -0.43% -0.19% -0.76%**
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 continued from previous page
IU MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
(-0.21) (-0.41) (-1.33) (-0.44) (-2.24)
Table 3.8: Sub-period Analysis
This table reports the effect of information uncertainty on earnings and price momentum in two
sub-periods. The first period is from February 1991 to June 1997 and the second period is from July
1997 to December 2003. Panel A shows the portfolio return differential between extreme low and
high uncertainty stocks (Low-High) following upward and downward analyst forecast revision (Good
and Bad), respectively. It also shows the earning momentum strategy (Good-Bad) within extreme
low or high uncertainty quintiles. Panel B presents the portfolio return differential between extreme
low and high uncertainty quintile (Low-High) with past 11-month winners and losers, respectively.
Price momentum strategy (winner-loser) within extreme high or low uncertainty quintile follows.
Uncertainty proxies include firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic stock volatility and
dispersion in analyst forecasts. Firm size is the market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at
the end of month t. Firm age is the log of one plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded
by Thomson Financial DataStream. Analyst coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts
reported to I/B/E/S database. Idiosyncratic stock volatility (Sigma) is calculated by standard
deviation of monthly excess returns over FTSE all share index over the year ending at the end of
month t. Dispersion in analyst forecasts is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t
scaled by the prior year-end stock price. The sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market
from February 1991 to December 2003, except those listed within prior one year. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence
level, respectively.
MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
Panel A: Sub-period test of analyst forecast revision and information uncertainty
Sub-period from Feb 91 to Jun 97
Good Low-High -0.0004 -0.002 0.0036 -0.78%** -0.48%*
Continued on next page
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Table3.8–continued from previous page
MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
(-0.08) (-0.59) (0.71) (-2.18) (-1.73)
Bad Low-High 0.78%* 0.005 0.87%*** 0.003 -0.0009
(1.93) (1.57) (3.2) (0.71) (-0.23)
Good-Bad Low 0.62%*** 0.0021 0.70%*** 0.34%*** 0.54%***
(2.52) (1.2) (2.58) (2.35) (2.83)
Good-Bad High 1.38%*** 1.12%*** 1.20%*** 1.14%*** 1.08%***
(4.19) (3.41) (4.16) (2.55) (2.67)
Sub-period from Jul 97 to Dec 03
Good Low-High -0.0016 0.0073 0.0004 2.14%*** 0.78%*
(-0.29) (1.21) (0.07) (2.82) (1.75)
Bad Low-High 0.0088 1.15%*** 1.03%* 2.20%*** 1.46%***
(1.6) (3.1) (1.89) (3.37) (2.62)
Good-Bad Low 0.002 0.62%** 0.54%* 0.73%*** 0.58%***
(0.66) (2.02) (1.74) (3.44) (2.44)
Good-Bad High 1.47%*** 1.14%*** 1.80%*** 1.23%*** 1.55%***
(3.88) (2.99) (4.76) (2.88) (3.5)
Panel B: Sub-period test of past 11-month performance and information uncertainty)
Sub-period from Feb 91 to Jun 97
Winner Low-High -1.03%*** -1.13%*** -1.33%*** -0.78%** -0.48%*
(-4.97) (-4.60) (-5.23) (-2.18) (-1.73)
Loser Low-High 0.0038 0.0075 0.0066 0.94%*** 1.47%***
90.84) (1.55) (1.46) (2.33) (3.84)
Winner-Loser Low 0.0038 1.00%*** -0.0001 0.75%*** 1.12%***
(0.94) (2.79) (-0.03) (3.04) (3.71)
Winner-Loser High 1.99%*** 2.87%*** 1.89%*** 2.67%*** 2.26%***
(4.38) (6.94) (5.78) (4.29) (3.47)
Continued on next page
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Table3.8–continued from previous page
MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
Sub-period from Jul 97 to Dec 03
Winner Low-High -0.88%*** -1.46%*** -0.87%* -1.22%** -0.92%***
(-2.66) (-3.31) (-1.72) (-2.08) (-2.44)
Loser Low-High 1.49%** 2.12%*** 0.0083 3.37%*** 2.39%***
(2.14) (4.04) (1.29) (4.68) (3.64)
Winner-Loser Low 1.73%* 1.22%** 0.0102 1.09%** 0.0092
(1.83) (2.00) (1.11) (2.07) (1.43)
Winner-Loser High 3.79%*** 3.67%*** 2.88%*** 3.91%*** 3.43%***
(7.08) (4.95) (4.82) (4.23) (3.78)
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Table 3.7: Sharpe Ratios of Portfolio Strategies within Extreme Information Un-
certainty Portfolios
This table gives the Sharpe ratios of several strategies. The Strategy I shorts the past losers and
buys the past winners within extreme high and low information uncertainty quintiles, respective-
ly. The Strategy II shorts the stocks with downward analyst forecast and buys those with the
upward analyst forecast within extreme high and low information uncertainty quintile, respec-
tively. Return is the average monthly return, Std.Dev is the standard deviation of all monthly
returns, and Sharpe ratio is calculated by monthly portfolio excess return over FTSE all-share
Index return divided by standard deviation of portfolio returns. Market beta (Rm−Rf), SMB
and HML are the excess return of market index over risk-free rate, the size and value premium,
respectively. Firm size is the market capitalization (in millions of pounds) at the end of month
t. Firm age is the log of one plus the months since a stock was firstly recorded by Thomson
Financial DataStream. Analyst coverage is the log of one plus numbers of forecasts reported to
I/B/E/S database. Idiosyncratic stock volatility (Sigma) is calculated by standard deviation of
monthly excess returns over FTSE all share index over the year ending at the end of month t.
Dispersion in analyst forecasts is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in month t scaled
by the prior year-end stock price. The sample includes all stocks traded in UK stock market
from February 1991 to December 2003, except those listed within prior one year.
All Stocks Rm-Rf SML HML
Return 0.39% 0.20% -0.36% 0.49%
Std. Dev 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02
Sharpe Ratio 0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.27
MV AGE COV IVOL DISP
Strategy I: Price momentum strategy with extreme low information uncertainty
Return 1.25% 1.06% 1.11% 0.88% 1.35%
Std. Dev 0.076 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07
Sharpe Ratio 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.21
Strategy I: Price momentum strategy with extreme high information uncertainty
Return 2.79% 2.94% 2.73% 2.98% 2.81%
Std. Dev 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.1
Sharpe Ratio 0.38 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.3
Strategy II. Earning momentum strategy with extreme low information uncertainty
Return 0.18% 0.53% 0.69% 0.63% 0.53%
Std. Dev 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Sharpe Ratio 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.3 0.21
Strategy II. Earning momentum strategy with extreme high information uncertainty
Return 1.29% 1.05% 1.08% 1.46% 1.43%
Std. Dev 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05
Sharpe Ratio 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.28
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Chapter 4
Information Uncertainty, Growth
Options And Liquidity:
International Evidence
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, the evidence from UK stock market shows that information uncer-
tainty is positively associated with underreaction anomaly and leads the market to
underreact to recent news. The consequent research question is that whether the
influence of information uncertainty is prevalent in the global markets. Whether
investors in different countries would treat uncertainty differently? To answer these
questions, this chapter further investigates the impact of information uncertainty
within 30 major stock markets to draw a more general inference.
The first goal of this chapter is to examine the relationship between information
uncertainty and firms characteristics. Information uncertainty means ambiguity
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about a firm’s fundamental value, which may arise from two conventional sources.
1) characteristics of the business or industry, such as technical innovation and
high R&D expenditure; 2) the company’s disclosure policy, including account-
ing standards and management voluntary disclosure. Although both sources of
uncertainty would affect investment decisions of market participants, from the in-
vestors’ perspective the mechanisms and outcomes are quite different. We argue
that information uncertainty, unlike asymmetric information, is an endogenous
characteristic of companies with growth options.
The evidence from pooled sample regression shows that information uncer-
tainty is positively related to firm’s growth options. Specifically, young firms and
firms with higher market-to-book ratio tend to bear greater information uncertain-
ty. The results also show that information uncertainty is significantly positively
related to firm size, trading volume, and price impact, indicating that information
asymmetry is another non-negligible attribute to information uncertainty. More-
over, firms in the markets with better investor protection, such as cash flow rights,
are found to have lower information uncertainty. It confirms our conjecture that in-
formation uncertainty comes from two opposite source with diverged asset pricing
implications.
We further test whether information uncertainty has positive or negative pre-
diction power on cross sectional stock returns with the control of asymmetric
information effect and other firm characteristics. Regarding to asymmetric infor-
mation1, outside investors would be reluctant to hold those equities with private
1Easley and O’Hara (2004) modelled a multi-asset economy with public and private infor-
mation, and suggest that informed investors could always take advantage of the uninformed by
holding more stocks with good news and fewer stocks with bad news. Moreover, Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991) argue that market makers would be unwilling to provide liquidity for assets
with private information, hence asymmetric information would increase the bid-ask spread.
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information (Wang (1993); Admati (1985)). If information uncertainty generated
by growth options are mistaken for information asymmetry, firms with greater
information uncertainty will experience relatively higher stock returns to attract
investors.
On the other hand, if investors perceive information uncertainty stemming from
firm’s growth options, stocks with greater information uncertainty would labeled
as ’glamor’ and demand higher prices (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)).
Intuitively, high expected earnings are accompanied by high earning volatility,
otherwise, competitors from outside would eat out excess profits. In addition,
companies in young industries have higher R&D intensity and lower tangible assets
in hand. Contrary to the traditional viewpoint, Zhang (2005) argues that these
companies can more easily cut costs and dispose of unproductive assets, while
in good times they could invest more and become more productive. Moreover,
companies in young industries are relatively smaller and face fewer barriers to
switch to a more profitable business model. The negative relation of growth options
and required return is consistent with empirical evidence that value stocks earn
higher returns, especially in an economic downturn.
The portfolio strategy shows a negative relation between information uncer-
tainty and stock future returns shows , which is more significant in developed
markets. Moreover, this relationship seems to only exist in value-weighted portfo-
lio, and disappear in equally weighted portfolio. One plausible explanation is that
value-weighted portfolio putting more weights on big and mature firms, which
mitigate the adverse effect of information asymmetry. It also explains why we
find more significant negative correlation among developed markets, as investors
in these developed markets face less adverse selection problem of asymmetric in-
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formation. The results from Fama-Macbeth (1973) are consistent with findings in
portfolio strategy. The cross sectonal stock returns are significantly correlated to
information uncertainty even controlling risk exposure and other firm’s character-
istics, suggesting the impact of information uncertainty can not be explained by
existing rational risk factors.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we give the
international empirical evidence supporting the linkage between information un-
certainty and growth options in young and emerging industries consistent with the
rational learning model of Pastor and Veronesi (2003). Previous research about
uncertainty focuses on exogenous information process with different levels of im-
precision or asymmetric information. We postulate that uncertainty could be a
firm characteristic, along with potential high earning growth and volatility.
Second, our cross-country result is consistent with predictions of disclosure the-
ory and investor protection. There is in the context of corporate finance a rich
literature about disclosure policy, legal system and shareholder rights (La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998);Wurgler (2000); Black (2001); De-
fond and Hung (2004)). The result in this chapter shows that stricter law and
regulation and more transparency of disclosure can lower the cost of capital for
firms, especially those with high uncertainty of future profitability. In addition,
our result is consistent with John, Litov, and Yeung (2008), who find evidence
that risk-taking and firm’s growth rate is positively related to investor protection.
We further argue that markets with good protection are essential for high technol-
ogy innovation. With valuation uncertainty, the adverse selection problem is an
important one for firms in young industries and those with high R&D.
Third, this analysis is also related to several empirical puzzles in the literature.
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For example, with regard to increasing idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns,
Campbell et al. (2001) found increasing and counter-cycle firm-level idiosyncratic
volatility from 1960. Xu and Malkiel (2003) attributes this phenomenon to in-
creasing ownership of institutional investors, while Berrada and Hugonnier (2008)
suggest the earning surprise under the incomplete information setting drives up
idiosyncratic volatility with asymmetric response. Here we give an alternative ex-
planation, that idiosyncratic volatility is an indicator of unexplained future earn-
ing potential, and rises along with technical innovation. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006) make a similar suggestion, but their analysis is based on aggregate
level. We also provide evidence of value effect in favour of Zhang (2005) rational
expectation model. The stocks with higher potential earning and volatility are less
risky and generate lower returns compared to other stocks.
This chapter is organized as: section 4.2 provides a review of related literature
and develop main hypothesis; Data and methodology is described in section 4.3;
Empirical results are discussed in section 4.4 and conclusions are drawn in section
4.5.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Information Uncertainty, Future Profitability And
Equity Valuation
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) derive a model of stock valuation with uncertainty
of future profitability. The salient feature of their model is convex relation be-
tween market-to-book ratio and uncertainty about expected earning growth rate .
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They assume that the true growth rate of earning is not observable, while investors
learn from the idiosyncratic shock to individual firms. They further assume the
modelled company has a finite life cycle and is eventually liquidated with market
value, i.e. the book value equals to market value at a fixed time spot. This as-
sumption is somewhat unrealistic. The economic explanation behind it is that the
excess profitability would decrease over firm and industry life with market com-
petition, as would the earning multiplier. The implication is consistent with past
empirical findings that: 1) After controlling the expected returns and expected
profitability, M/B should increase with uncertainty about profitability; 2) M/B
should decline along the lifetime due to learning process and diminished excess
profitability; 3) The uncertainty effect should be stronger with younger firms and
firms that pay no dividends (c=0); 4) Uncertainty does not affect the expected
returns but does affect future cash flow; and 5) Uncertainty also increases the
idiosyncratic stock volatility. Their empirical test provides supportive evidence
with US stocks from 1963 to 2000. Pastor and Veronesi (2006) uses this model
to calibrate the returns and volatility in the US stock market, and suggests that
the peak of the technology bubble in the 1990s was driven by uncertainty of high
future profitability. At aggregate market level, Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) find
idiosyncratic volatility turns to stability after controlling firm’s growth opportuni-
ty. They use Galai and Masulis (1976) model in which managers prefer investment
opportunities that produce larger idiosyncratic volatility to increase shareholders’
wealth. A new project with high idiosyncratic risk would require relatively low
return, as it increases the expected future cash flow while having little impact on
systematic risk. Their finding holds for the whole market level as well as for ma-
ture industries. Mazzucato and Tancioni (2008) find a positive relation between
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idiosyncratic volatility with firm-level innovation and R&D expenditure, while at
industry level, this relation is mixed. They argue that investors have varied expec-
tations of innovation outcomes from industry sectors. For very new sectors, hopes
of individual firms’ innovation are high, while for mature industries innovation
shocks are not anticipated. Thus the effects of innovation on idiosyncratic risks
are more significant for these two kinds of industries. In contrast, innovation in a
high-tech but mature industry is already predicted by the market and thus has low
impact on idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand, innovation and R&D expenditure
is highly correlated to firm’s idiosyncratic volatility at individual level, which is
consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s hypothesis. Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008)
test the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and growth options at aggregate
market level using Galai and Masulis (1976) model. The logic behind this is that
managers, on behalf of shareholders, would choose investment opportunities with
high idiosyncratic volatility. As, intuitively, companies’ innovation has very low
correlation from one company to another, expenditure in R&D would increase the
idiosyncratic volatility along with the investment opportunity set for each individ-
ual firm. Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) use five proxies including an estimate of
Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value to book value, the debt to equity ratio, the
ratio of capital expenditures to fixed assets, and a direct measure of the present
value of growth options. Using daily data in the US stock market along with five
different measures of idiosyncratic volatility, the results confirm their hypothesis
that aggregate idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to both level and volatil-
ity of firm’s growth options. Other research concerns not idiosyncratic volatility
but the total volatility and firm’s investment opportunity. Schwert (2002) uses a
sample of high-tech industries in NASDAQ and finds that volatility of earnings
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predicts total equity return volatility. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001)
find that stock future return volatility is positively related to R&D intensity.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the relation between growth option
and stock valuation. Research in this area suggests that firms with high growth
opportunity have rationally high market valuation and lower conditional risks. A
firm’s assets can be roughly distinguished as assets in place and growth options.
Assets currently in place are generated past profits, while growth options are the
assets associated with net present value of future returns. Along the company’s
lifetime, positive cash flow from assets in place would decrease and new investment
opportunity would add to the firm’s fundamental value. In other words, turning
from assets in place to growth options would increase the firm’s market valua-
tion and decrease current cash flows. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) argues that
changes of composition of these two types of asset would alter the firm’s exposure
to systematic risks. Zhang (2005) suggests that asset in place is much riskier than
growth option, especially when economies decline. His model is based on costly
reversibility and countercyclical price of risk that differentiate the asset in place
and growth options. Costly reversibility means that cutting cost is much hard-
er than expanding cost. When the economy as a whole is going up, firms with
more growth options would need more adjustment cost to realize these investment
opportunities, while more mature companies with assets in place would find it
relatively easier to turn on full production. More importantly, when economies
decline, value firms which contain more unproductive assets would face more cost
to adjust their business model. Compared to growth firms, their valuation is more
related to economic conditions, and hence bears more systematic risk. In addition,
the price of risk is higher in bad times, which means that value firms would disin-
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vest. Zhang’s (2005) paper focuses on the value effect but is not bounded for other
phenomena. The implication could give a dynamic view of capital investment for
companies with diverse growth options.
Our research is also motivated by Daniel and Titman (2006). In their paper, in-
coming news is divided into tangible information and intangible information. The
tangible represents the solid accounting information such as accrued earnings and
cash flows, while intangible information comprises the other parts, not explained
by stocks’ performance. They suggest that expected stock returns are not deter-
mined by past accounting performance information, but are negatively related to
the intangible information. More particularly, intangible information is related
with firm’s growth options, while tangible information, such as earning growth per
share, is a measure of past performance. They further argue that taste for stocks
of a company with potential growth opportunity leads to overvaluation, and that
the bandwagon effect will reverse after such projects are realized. Although their
analytical framework is focused on value effect, it offers a potential explanation of
information uncertainty effect on stock returns, as intangible information is natu-
rally ambiguous, and more concentrated in growth companies and industries. This
provides another explanation of why information uncertainty is negatively priced.
4.2.2 Information Uncertainty And Corporate Governance
The seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that shareholder-
s have the residual rights on the company as their contract is open-ended. In
this sense, potential earning growth will give them more advantage compared to
creditors. With regard to corporate governance, research finds that the market
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worldwide could be classified into ”market oriented” and ”bank oriented” system-
s. The former refers to the Anglo-American market-based system, while the latter
is the Japanese-German financial system. The classification is based on the rel-
ative portion of company financing from shareholders and creditors. There is no
conclusion as to which system is better. However, since the Anglo-American sys-
tem relies more on the equity market for external financing, shareholder rights are
better protected in these markets. Cross-countries comparison shows the relatively
low cost of equity in the US and other markets, along with outstanding minority
shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).
With regard to firms with high earning growth and earning volatility, investors in
the Anglo-American system would put more trust in managers and their decisions
on investment projects. The success of NASDAQ for high-tech companies is a
good example. However, note that the Anglo-American market is critiqued by the
myopic view of market participants. Equity investors rely on quarterly and annual
accounting reports to estimate firm’s performance and reward managers with cor-
responding bonuses, while bankers usually establish a long-run relationship with
company managers. Therefore, in the market oriented system managers pay more
attention to short-term interests which may bias companies’ investment decisions.
This situation may be mitigated by option incentives or long-run contracts, which
bound managers’ incentive with a longer term goal.
Wurgler (2000) finds a close link between corporate governance and invest-
ment in growing industries in 65 countries. Developed financial sectors increase
investment in their growing industries, and decrease investment in their declining
industries, to a greater extent than do undeveloped financial sectors. The efficien-
cy of capital allocation is negatively correlated with the extent of state ownership
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in the economy, positively correlated with the amount of firm-specific information
in domestic stock returns, and positively correlated with the legal protection of
minority investors. In particular, strong minority investor rights appear to curb
over investment in declining industries.
Generally, a mature market should benefit and protect the investors in several
ways. First, the accounting standard is one of the most important means by which
investors, especially outsiders, can learn about the company’s performance. A bet-
ter accounting standard prevents asymmetric information and agency problems.
Second, restriction of ownership concentration, namely anti-director right, is an
efficient way to increase the cost of manipulation, as no controlling director or man-
ager can easily benefit from other shareholders by means of information or policy
advantage. Third, restriction on and punishment for manipulating trades and de-
livering illusive information are substantial considerations for investors. Although
these activities are illegal in almost all countries, different laws and exchange reg-
ulations may result in different levels of protection for investors. As presented by
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), common law generally
offers the strongest protection for investors, followed by German and Scandina-
vian civil law, with French civil law offering the weakest protection. Within the
common law system, as jurisprudence is established case by case, longer history
of the market may lead to better protection. The series paper of La Porta, et al.,
(1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) on global corporate governance further build up a bunch
of indices to measure the degree of investor protections and show that legal origin
is one of the dominant characteristics of corporate governance.
Recently, some commentators have gone as far as predicting a worldwide con-
vergence of corporate governance practice to the US model (see e.g. Hansmann
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and Kraakman (2000)). In a variant of this view, worldwide competition to attract
corporate headquarters and investment is envisaged, similar to the corporate law
competition between US states portrayed by Romano (1993). Such competition is
predicted to eventually bring about a single standard resembling the current law
in Delaware or, at least, securities regulation standards as set by the US SEC (see
Coffee (1999)).
4.2.3 Idiosyncratic Volatility
Idiosyncratic volatility, also known as unsystematic or diversifiable volatility,
represents the uncertainty of a single firm, which is not associated with market
or industry risk. Risk and return trade-off is the key issue of modern financial
economics. Portfolio theory, stemming from Markowitz (1952), argues that the
firm-specified volatility can be diversified away through constructing portfolios
with securities that are not fully correlated. Based on the statistical law of large
number, a conventional wisdom of investment is that holding over twenty stocks
could largely eliminate the portfolio volatility from firm-level shocks. The ra-
tional asset pricing theories such as Sharpe (1964),Lintner (1965) capital asset
pricing model, and Ross (1976) arbitrage pricing theory, point out that idiosyn-
cratic volatility should not be related to security return. With the assumption of
complete market, investing in securities is frictionless, which means the investor
can hold as many stocks as needed without transaction costs. Thus, a rational a-
gent can easily diversify idiosyncratic volatility away by well-constructed portfolio
and has no preference on high or low residual volatility. In the dynamic setting
of complete market, the situation is roughly the same. Idiosyncratic volatility is
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theoretically orthogonal to stochastic discounted factor, and irrelevant to expected
returns (Campbell (2000)). So in a complete market, agents should ignore the id-
iosyncratic volatility as it has no impact on portfolio payoffs and investors’ welfare.
However, the real markets are far from the perfect and complete assumption. Nex-
t, we collect the empirical evidence to find whether or not idiosyncratic volatility
has impact on expected return, both at market level and at individual stock level.
Previous empirical work does not provide conclusive evidence of the exact re-
lationship between firm-level volatility and expected returns. The empirical work
in this area extends to three different levels: aggregate market level, industry and
portfolio level and individual firms. In an early aggregate level study, Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) use the disaggregate methodology to measure id-
iosyncratic volatility. They find that after the 1990s, the total idiosyncratic volatil-
ity has an upward trend, while at the market and industry levels it is relatively
smooth and flat. Their analysis shows some potential reasons for such volatility
patterns, for example new listed firms, firms at early stage, and technical inno-
vation. Their findings suggest that to diversify these individual risks, a portfolio
requires more stocks to be efficient. It also indicates a relation between aggre-
gate volatility and counter-cycle movement and macro-economic growth. Goyal
and Santa-Clara (2003) find no predictability of market variance to market re-
turn. They support the time-varying view of risk premium that the individual
heterogeneity and market background risk are important factors for market re-
turns. However, Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005) argue against this result and
suggest the pattern is caused by equally weighted volatility. Using a value weighted
portfolio strategy, they show that such relation is statistically insignificant.
In the cross-sectional tests, Ang et al.,(2006, 2009) show that stocks with recent
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past high idiosyncratic volatility, based on the Fama-French three factor model,
have low future average returns in the US and other developed markets after
controlling for world market, size, and value factors. They explain the negative
relation as due to undiversified risk. Bali and Cakici (2008) test cross-sectional
relation between firm-level volatility and expected stock return. Interestingly, their
results indicate that previous empirical analysis may be biased by data-frequency,
weighting scheme and breakpoints. After controlling these factors, they find no
significant returns with high idiosyncratic volatility. At industry level, Bali and
Cakici (2008) uses the GARCH model to estimate industry and portfolio-based
idiosyncratic volatility to analyze conditional risk-return relationship.
Moreover, researchers also argue that idiosyncratic volatility is a proxy for in-
formation uncertainty. Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) establish a theoretical link
between growth options available to managers and the idiosyncratic risk of equity.
Empirically both the level and variance of corporate growth options are signifi-
cantly related to idiosyncratic volatility. Accounting for growth options eliminates
or reverses the trend in aggregate firm-specific risk. Zhang (2006) and Jiang, Lee,
and Zhang (2005) use idiosyncratic volatility as information uncertainty in the
context of behaviour finance. They suggest that high sigma means the signs ar-
riving at the market are comparatively noisy and carry limited arbitrage ability.
With high noise news about the fundamental stock value, investors are subject to
more behaviour biases, such as overconfidence and continuation. Kumar and Lee
(2006) supports this view with retail investors’ profiles, while Sadka (2006) argues
that idiosyncratic volatility is related to market liquidity but not for behavioural
reasons.
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4.2.4 Investment Opportunity Set
Investment opportunity set or, more specifically, growth option, means com-
panies’ access to future potential profitable projects (i.e. those projects that can
be exercised without the technology barrier). This characteristic attracted more
attention during the technology industry boom of the 1980s and 1990s. In the
economic sense, start-up companies have high future earning growth with high
earning volatility. Along the life and industry cycle, firms eventually enter a ma-
ture stage with average profits across the industry sectors and the whole economy.
The conventional wisdom tells us that potential earning is highest at the emerging
stage of an industry and then starts to diminish. Hence, firms in young industries
have larger investment opportunity set or growth potential. Meanwhile, in the
era of technology added-value economics, even those full-fledged firms in mature
industries need to adopt new technological innovations, such as IT systems, data
mining and e-business. If they do not, they will be washed out by fierce competi-
tion with high operation costs. The literature about growth options diverges into
two categories. The first regards corporate financing and focuses on the capital
structure of growth companies, while the second analyzes the market reaction to
those growth companies’ information.
Logically, managers make decisions according to firms’ available investment
options and macro-economic and market conditions. The next question would be
through which way and what instrument. Researchers have found that compa-
nies usually opt for a low debt ratio and prefer using equity rather than debt as
an external funding source. The underlying reason is simply that managers may
not know when any profit will be realized. To match the time and cost of future
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uncertain cash inflow, investors would rationally prefer to issue stocks, which is
open-ended. A higher debt ratio would also prevent the company from invest-
ing in the future, so those companies usually have a low debt ratio with a low
leverage value. Moreover, the capital needed for future investment may be costly.
Hence, borrowing today would lead to decreased incentive for managers to invest
tomorrow. If its leverage ratio and debt ratio is high today, the company may not
have sufficient financial capacity to borrow more money tomorrow in such million
pound business.
Empirical findings confirm the negative relationship between growth options
and leverage ratio and debt ratio. Smith and Watts (1992) seminal paper docu-
ments that firm’s leverage ratio, debt ratio and R&D expenditure are negatively
related to the investment opportunity. Research also finds that firms with higher
R&D expenditure would prefer to use equity issue rather than debt for external
finance. Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) finds that covenant is important for debt
issuing but prevents the information asymmetry. Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) and
Zhang (2005) provide evidence that in primary markets, investors respond differ-
ently to equity issuing by growth firms and by mature firms. For the growth firms
they do not observe a negative announcement effect, while in the sample of mature
firms this effect exists and is significant. They explain this according to market
investors’ views of the needs of different types of firm. For mature industries, IPO
or SEO carry a higher probability that the company does not operate well enough.
Another common factor related to growth option is market-to-book value. S-
ince market value is the consensus of valuation of market participants, it changes
over time. Growth companies with opportunity in hand would be much more
likely to realize the earnings. So, investors react differently according to type of
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investment set. Other proxies frequently used are earning per share, dividend per
share, R&D expenditure and its proportion to total assets.
4.2.5 Hypothesis Development
Past literature has documented that information uncertainty would influence
the investment decision of market participants. However, the source of uncertainty
is mixed. From the investors’ point of view, high uncertainty may be caused
by less publicly available information or by the lack of historical performance.
Without sufficient or precise information released by companies, investors face
large uncertainty of underlying firm’s valuation. A large literature of asymmetric
information would lower firm’s value and require higher premium to compensate for
higher unwanted risks (see Verrecchia (2001) for a comprehensive review).The first
hypothesis in this chapter is that information uncertainty is positively correlated
with information asymmetry.
However, research on information uncertainty is inevitably mixed with the
asymmetric information effect or incomplete information effect. Companies with
high growth opportunity also share some parallel characteristics, such as relatively
small size and young age, low past dividend payout, and coverage by fewer analysts.
Compared to mature companies, their mandated disclosure is of relatively low
quality and outsiders face more asymmetric information controlling other variables
(Core (2001);Verrecchia (2001)). Moreover, we also argue that in a less regulated
capital market2, this asymmetric information effect would further increase cost of
2Channelling funds to risky business is a key feature of the financial industry. However, the
efficiency of allocation is distorted by uncertain information. Compensation for uncertainty mo-
tivates investors to engage in rapid growth business. On the other hand, ambiguity of valuation
would discourage investment on the grounds of unforeseeable risk and potential loss. Interesting-
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capital for growth companies. The logic here is that although these companies
have incentive to disclose more information to attract external funding, markets
with high aggregate level of asymmetric information would discourage participants’
investing in high uncertainty business. This classic ’lemon market’ problem has a
significant effect on start-up companies, even though their potential earnings are
appreciable.
On the other hand, uncertainty may also arise from the nature of the busi-
ness and future earnings potential. Intuitively, firms in young industries or in
the early stages of the life cycle would have higher potential earnings and higher
earnings volatility. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) use a learning model and argue
that these firms would have higher market-to-book ratios, with other things the
same. Meanwhile, the value effect is robust that stocks with low (high) market-to-
book ratio tend to generate higher (lower) future returns. Meanwhile, the value
effect is robust that stocks with low (high) market-to-book ratio tend to generate
higher (lower) future returns. There are several possible explanations. First, firms
with growth potential have real options to adopt new investments when economies
are on an upward turn. Zhang (2005) suggests that growth companies are less
risky because it is easier for them to cut costs in bad times, compared to firms
with assets in place. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) argue that growth com-
panies are subject to future cash flow shocks, while firms with assets in place are
more sensitive to discount rate shocks. Our second hypothesis is that information
uncertainty is positively associated with firm’s growth options.
ly, with the development of financial markets and industry over many years, excess volatility to
stock fundamentals (Shiller (2000)) and firm-level idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001)) tend to increase rather than decrease. This phenomenon suggests that investors
face more uncertainty, notwithstanding the application of stricter regulation and the reduction
of information cost brought about by communication innovation during the last two decades.
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We further hypothesize that information uncertainty has mixed effect on under-
lying stock performance, depending on relative composition of information asym-
metry and growth options. When uncertainty derives from limited information
or asymmetric information, investors would treat it as a risk and require high-
er returns to hold underlying assets. According to Merton’s (1987) incomplete
information model, investors may require compensation for different information
endowment. In his model, some investors may be unaware of certain securities
or have limited information. Therefore, these assets are not widely held and bear
undiversified risks. In developed financial systems, there are more institutional
investors who face less information cost and transaction cost. Hence the premium
for undiversified risk should plausibly be lower in these markets.
In contrast, if the uncertainty is driven by firm-specific growth potential, it
would increase the stock value. Past empirical evidence is mixed as it is hard to
separate these two types of uncertainty. In this chapter, we try to control both
types of uncertainty and test the relation between uncertainty and cross-sectional
stock returns. The testable hypothesis is that, when controlling asymmetric in-
formation, uncertainty should predict lower future returns, while when controlling
firm’s growth potential, uncertainty would be dominated by limited information,
and positively priced.Therefore, we predict that in well developed markets, infor-
mation uncertainty leads to higher stock values and lower future returns. This
relation should be reversed in less developed markets.
Our hypothesis is summarized as following: After controlling the effect of lim-
ited information, information uncertainty is cross-sectionally concentrated in com-
panies with higher growth potential and leads to overvaluation of today’s price.
After controlling growth options, uncertainty captures the risk of incomplete in-
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formation or asymmetric information and requires higher returns. In developed
countries, information uncertainty is more negatively priced with lower hidden
information and better investor protection.
4.3 Data and Methodology
Our data sample, obtained by DataStream, includes both active and dead s-
tocks from January 1988 to December 2007, selected according to the same criteria.
There are 30 total market data in our sample period 3. We exclude the stocks with
less than one year performance history, and financial industry stocks. For indi-
vidual and market indices prices we use the DataStream return index (RI), which
is adjusted for past dividends. Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009),
we calculate daily and monthly returns in both local currency and US dollar, and
risk-free rate by three month US treasure bill. As DataStream choose stocks from
local markets and build each market index, each index contains fewer stocks than
the local market. For example, there are only 10 stocks in the China Total Market
Index, even though at the end of 2008 there were 1572 stocks in that market. Al-
though it loses some testing power, DataStream Total Market Index contains both
dead and live stocks, so it is free from survivorship biases. Moreover, it chooses
stocks with the same criteria and allows comparison across the countries.
Accounting information and firm’s characteristics are also given by DataS-
tream. We use market capitalization (MV) dominated in US dollar to make it
comparable across the countries. DataStream contains some flawed data. For
3DataStream provides 52 total market indices across the world. However, 22 out of 52 markets
have less than 20 stocks in their index constitution. We have to drop these markets without
enough number of stocks to prevent small sample problem
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example, the largest market capitalization from its database is a Brazilian stock
with unrealistic 2.97*1012 dollars. So we exclude stocks with market value in the
highest and lowest 1%. The average market capitalization in our sample is 20.4
million dollars and the median is 40.2 million dollars. We also winsorize the book-
to-market value (B/M) with 1% level. The average B/M is 0.72 and the median
is 0.53. Left skewness of MV indicates more small firms in the sample and right
skewness of B/M implies more growth companies.
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics of sample data. The second column
is number of stocks, including live and delisted stocks, appearing in each stock
market index during the sample period. FIRST OBS reports the starting date
of each index. If the market index is constructed before Jan 88, we take Jan-
88. MONTH is average months of firms traded during this sample period. It
implies the life length of individual stocks. RET is monthly lognormal return
calculated by return index (RI) from DataStream. SKEWNESS is average daily
skewness within each country. RAW VOL is average individual standard deviation
of monthly individual stock returns. IVAR is monthly average standard deviation
of residuals calculated from Fama-French three factor model. We exclude firms
in financial industries and firms without previous month market capitalization or
book-to-market value. In our sample, Japan contains the most stocks, with 943.
The latest starting date is Sept 7th 1993, in the Czech Republic. The average
observation period is around 150 months. Individual volatility and idiosyncratic
volatility appear to be higher in developing markets. Since these markets contain
fewer stocks in the local market, the firm-level volatility is likely to be caused by
under-diversification risks.
Figure 4.1 shows average idiosyncratic volatility within developed and emerging
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markets. The solid line represents developed markets and the dotted line represents
emerging markets. From the pattern, we find that before 1997, emerging markets
had more average idiosyncratic volatility than developed markets. This may be due
to the appearance of new stock markets in the early 1990s. Since new markets tend
to have relatively fewer listed stocks and investors have less historical information
to conduct estimation, these stock markets have higher volatility and are not well-
diversified. After 1997, we find that the two lines start to converge and co-move
correspondingly, which is partly a result of on-going globalization and contagions
among international markets.
4.3.1 Measure of Information Uncertainty
In this chapter, we use idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and dispersion in ana-
lysts forecast (DISP) as two measures of information uncertainty. The reason we
drop other three measures of information uncertainty used in last chapter is due to
firm characteristics clustering in different countries. For example, firms in devel-
oped countries, such as USA and UK are commonly large firms with longer trading
history and more analysts coverage. moreover, comparing firm size internationally
faces variability of exchange rate. For developing markets, exchange rate change
is non-trivial especially during 90’s Asian financial crisis. Analysts coverage is also
subject to development of financial markets. Firms usually have more analysts
estimates in well-developed markets. In contrast, idiosyncratic volatility and dis-
persion in analysts forecasts are more suitable proxies for firms in different market
as they depend less on individual market development. Meanwhile, they are scaled
measures that can be used indifferently across the markets.
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Following Zhang (2005), we use idiosyncratic volatility and analyst forecast
dispersion as proxies of information uncertainty. Analyst forecast dispersion is
measured as standard deviation of analyst forecast of following year earnings per
share estimates scaled by prior year end stock price. We follow Bali and Cakici
(2008) to construct monthly idiosyncratic volatility by 1) market model 4.1, 2)
CAPM 4.2, and 3) local Fama-French three factor model 4.14.
Ri,t = α + βMiRMt + i,t (4.1)
Ri,t −Rft = α +MiβMi(RMt −Rft) + i,t (4.2)
Ri,t −Rft = α + βMi(RMt −Rft) + βSiSMBt + βhiHMLt + i,t (4.3)
where Rft, RMt, SMBt and HMLt represent risk-free rate, market index return,
small-minus-big factor premium and high-minus-low factor premium, respectively.
The idiosyncratic volatility is the variance of residual i,t from firm-specific time
series regression within the previous month.
4.3.2 Control Variables
We use firm size, turnover, and price impact (measured by absolute returns
divided by trading volume) as proxies for limited information. Small firms usually
capture less attention and give out less information due to fixed cost of disclosure.
Barry and Brown (1985) use limited information to explain the size effects. Brown
and Ferreira (2004)provide evidence that idiosyncratic risk is more severe in small
4Idiosyncratic volatility has been calculated in three ways. The results, however, do not differ
significantly from each other. We only report the analysis of idiosyncratic volatility calculated
by local Fama-French three factor model
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firms. Price impact is commonly used for liquidity risk. Higher price impact
means less liquidity of underlying stocks. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argues
that more asymmetric information would increase the transaction cost of securities
as market makers would provide less liquidity due to potential hidden information.
Turnover (VO) is monthly trading volume over common stock outstanding.
Previous literature argues that information uncertainty would trigger more trading
by market participants. Investors tend to systematically over-estimate stock prices
when the information is inconclusive (Odean (1998)). Investor overconfidence and
excess trading are likely to be more pronounced within stocks with less feedback
or unclear information.
Price impact (PIM) is calculated by absolute return over trading volume. Kyle
(1985) constructed a pioneering market microstructure model and used market
depth to measure illiquidity. Amihud (2002) follows his model and suggests that
price impact measures change in the dollar prices per share traded. Intuitively,
investors may face a large loss to sell a stock when it is hard to find a trader to
buy. The higher PIM indicates more illiquidity of underlying stock.
To control firm’s growth potential, we use firm age, market-to-book ratio, cap-
ital expenditure over total assets and Tobin’s Q. These accounting ratios are com-
monly used in the literature. In addition, we test the relation between uncertainty
and stock returns across the industries. Intuitively, new and emerging industries
have a higher growth potential, while their future earnings are hard to predict.
Therefore, the uncertainty in mature industries would not have a positive impact
on stock price as firms have limited earning growth potential. In other words, the
over-valuation of uncertainty would not be valid without growth options.
Age takes natural log of the time span from first observation of this stock to
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current month. Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003) model suggests that intrinsic uncer-
tainty of a firm would diminish along its lifetime. Since there is more historical
performance available to investors, the parameter uncertainty (they focused on
earning growth rate) decreases. Intuitively, market participants know more and
are more confident about a firm with longer history than about new firms such as
IPOs. As our interest is on short-term uncertainty, regress on AGE controls the
uncertainty due to firm’s characteristics.
Leverage ratio is a firm’s debt over common equity. Jackson and Johnson
(2006) argues that firm-specific uncertainty can be considered as an option and
stock price is the strike price. Hence, firm specific volatility would increase the
delta of put option and increase the stock price. Johnson examined the relation
between uncertainty and firm’s return, and attributes the negative relation to
firm’s leverage ratio.
4.3.3 Method of Regression Analysis
We use pooled sample regression to test whether information uncertainty is
statistically correlated to information asymmetry and growth options. The form
of regression is as following:
IV OLi,t = α+β1AGEi,t−1+β2M/Bi, t− 1+β3SIZEi, t− 1+β4V Oi, t− 1 (4.4)
where independent variables include log of Firm’s age (AGE), the log of Market-
to-Book value (M/B), the log of total assets (SIZE), the previous month trading
volume over number of total stocks outstanding (VO). Pastor and Veronesi (2003)
report a negative correlation between firm’s idiosyncratic volatility and firm age,
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as well as a positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and market-to-
book ratio. By pooling all stocks together, our regression tries to explore such
prediction across the international markets. Moreover, if information uncertainty
is positively related to information asymmetry, the coefficients on SIZE and VO
are expected to be significantly positive.
Ferreira and Laux (2007) find that idiosyncratic risk is also related to investor
protection that greater investor protection would generate higher idiosyncratic
volatility 5. To control the difference in countries investors protection, we further
add several control variables in regression 4.4 and test expanded form:
IV OLi,t = α + β1AGEi,t−1 + β2MBi,t−1 + β3MVi,t−1 + β4V Oi,t−1
+β6ADRi,t−1 + β7ACCRi,t−1 + β8CFRi,t−1 + β9CRi,t−1 (4.5)
Where ADR is anti-direct measure; ACCR is accounting rating; CFR is cash flow
rights; CR is control right. In the context of corporate governance, The ADR and
CR are proxied for the benefits from exercising private information. All measures
are obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) seminal
paper on corporate governance and valuation.
We further adopt Fama-Macbeth (1973) methodology to test the cross-sectional
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and firm’s earning potential.The procedure
is as follows: 1) Estimate monthly risk exposures of each security to its local Fama-
French three factors using daily stock returns. 2)Regress idiosyncratic volatility
on constant, market beta loading, size and value factor loadings, firm’s age, firm’s
5with less anti-takeover and better protection of minority shareholder rights, outsider investors
have more incentive to collect and analyze company information. They could benefit from taking
control of badly performing firms and exercising their private information.
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market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, dividend payment dummy, leverage
ratio, capital expenditure over total asset and Tobin’s Q in the following form:
IV OLi,t = α + β1bMKRi,t + β2bSMBi,t + β3bHMLi,t
+β4AGEi,t−1 + β5SIZEi,t−1 + β6BMi,t−1 + β7DIVi,t−1
+β8LEV ERAGEi,t−1 + β9COAi,t−1 + β10TobinQi,t−1 (4.6)
3) Repeat step 2) and 3) and generate time series of each coefficients. 4) Each
time series of coefficients are tested by time-series corrected t-test to see whether
they are significantly different from zero.
4.3.4 Portfolio Construction
The second objective of this chapter is to examine the cross sectional relation-
ship between information uncertainty and stock returns. We construct portfolios
based on previous month idiosyncratic volatility and firm characteristics. This
is a common methodology to examine the relation between average stocks’ re-
turns and lagged information, as it lowers the impacts of other noisy factors. In
each month, we sort stocks into 5 quintiles based on previous month idiosyncratic
volatility, which is calculated by standard deviation of residuals by local CAPM
model. Within each portfolio, stocks returns are weighted by last fiscal year end
market capitalization, and rebalanced monthly.Bali and Cakici (2008) find that
this negative relation is significant in value weighted portfolios but not in equally
weighted ones, which means market capitalization plays a role. In respond to their
critique, we adopt both value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio strategy.
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Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) provide international evidence focusing
on developed markets. Their findings are subject to two shortcomings. First, their
test contains only value weighted portfolios. This raises the possibility that their
results are driven by large firms’ impact. Second, as some countries have limited
number of stocks, they pool the stocks across regions and the world. Nevertheless,
countries with fewer stocks would be given less weight in regional portfolios and lose
certain information of market characteristics. Therefore, we conduct the portfolio
test within each country and region separately.Our regional portfolios are classified
by geographic continents. For example, Europe portfolio contains all stocks traded
in European stock exchanges. As markets in the same continent are not identically
developed, we further classify the countries into G7 group and Non-G7 group. The
former group includes France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United
States, while other countries are left in Non-G7 group.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Determinants of Firm-Specific Uncertainty
The first purpose of this study is to examine how uncertainty is distributed
in the market, and its relation with other firm characteristics. Table 4.2 reports
the regression on information uncertainty measures across the global stock mar-
kets. The regression 4.4 on model 4.4 shows that AGE is negatively correlated
with idiosyncratic volatility, which is consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003)
findings. The positive coefficient on M/B suggests that growth companies have
more firm-specific uncertainty. There is a large literature about growth options
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and asset in place. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) suggest that growth com-
panies are subject to future cash flow beta shocks while value firms are subject
to discount rate factor shock. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated by past indi-
vidual stock performance relative to market performance. It can be regarded as
the unexplained part of stock valuation. Therefore, growth companies have higher
idiosyncratic volatility as there is less correlation to past performance. Both load-
ings on TRADE and PIM are significantly positive with 4.50 and 2.87. It shows
that information uncertainty is sensitive to firm’s liquidity. When firm’s stock is
frequently traded, more information would be inferred and absorbed into market.
In the regression 4.6, we further control the investor protection proxies at mar-
ket level. The coefficients on cash flow right (CFR) are significantly negative (-5.72
with t-stat -4.95 and -2.40 with t-stat -2.54). It is plausible that better protection
of cash flow right motivate outside investors to explore underlying firm’s perspec-
tive, resulting greater information transparency. The loadings on control right, on
the opposite, are significant positive, suggesting that greater protection of existing
shareholders discourage the information digging and collection by potential new in-
vestors. These observations are consistent with Ferreira and Laux’s (2007) findings
that idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to firm’s openness to the takeover
market, and investor protection. The coefficients on anti-director right (ADR)
is significantly positive in regression of idiosyncratic volatility, and significantly
negative to dispersion in analysts forecasts. One explanation of this seemingly
questionable result is that the anti-director right weaken the ability of account-
ing manipulation by corporate directors (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998)). More ’clear accounting treatment’ will lower market investors’
information risks. On the other side, Jensen (2003) argue that corporate tend to
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artificially boost up earnings to meet analysts forecasts in order to maintain high
market valuation. With stronger anti-director rights and lower ability of corporate
directors, firms’ earning could be less smooth in history and more hard to predict.
Table 4.3 shows that worldwide, uncertainty is positively insignificantly related
to market beta and size factor loadings, while it is negatively related to value premi-
um loading. Coefficients on age and size are significantly negative, confirming that
younger and smaller firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility. Guo and Savickas
(2010) finds that negative pricing of idiosyncratic volatility co-varies with value
effects in G7 countries. In our sample, book-to-market ratio is significantly posi-
tively related to idiosyncratic volatility. Stocks with past year dividend payment
have lower idiosyncratic volatility. Dividend is usually considered as signals to the
market, so the exercise of dividend distribution lowers the uncertainty. From an-
other aspect, firms with potential growth opportunities usually pay lower, or zero,
dividend. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) pecking order theory argues
that internal funds are least costly for firm’s investment. Therefore firms tend
to keep more retained earnings if they have potential projects in view. Leverage
worldwide and in North America is negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility.
This relation may be dominated by the US stock market. The US financial system
is commonly believed to be stock market driven, while in other countries such as
Japan and Germany, firms rely more on the long-term relationship with banks. It
is reasonable to assume that higher leverage ratios in the US market require a more
certain future cash flow to avoid bankruptcy costs. Hence, these companies face
less volatility of profitability and have lower uncertainty, while in other markets it
is hard for companies in the early stage to finance in the stock market. Instead,
they may seek funds from banks to lower the financing cost. Capital expenditure is
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a measure of firm’s investment. Higher capital expenditure level means that firms
have adopted more investment projects during the last fiscal year. Also, capital
expenditure is higher for growing companies seeking to expand their business. To-
bin’s Q is positively related to idiosyncratic volatility. High Tobin’s Q means a
high market valuation of firm’s value over book value. This estimate captures the
growth potential from the market participant’s perspective.
The result first of all confirms the view that information uncertainty, prox-
ied by idiosyncratic volatility, is positively related to firm’s growth options. Cao,
Simin, and Zhao (2008) finds that market aggregate idiosyncratic volatility in-
creases along with growth options. Our findings provide supportive evidence in
the cross-sectional analysis. Another interesting result is from the comparison
across the countries. Although idiosyncratic volatility is generally correlated to
firm’s growth potential, it has different degrees in each region. For example, in
G7 countries, the coefficient on Tobin’s Q is 3.43 with t-value 3.91, while this
loading in non G7 countries is only 0.92 with insignificant t-value 0.34. Overal-
l, it appears that idiosyncratic volatility captures more growth potential in G7
countries and North America. For non G7 countries, this relation is insignifican-
t, probably due to noise from limited information and lack of disclosure. On the
other hand, innovation and R&D expenditure is highly correlated to firm’s idiosyn-
cratic volatility at individual level, which is consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s
hypothesis.Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) test the relation between idiosyncratic
volatility and growth options at an aggregate market level, using Galai and Ma-
sulis (1976) model. They use daily data in the US stock market along with five
different measures of idiosyncratic volatility. The results confirms their hypothesis
that aggregate idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to both firm’s level and
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volatility of growth options. Other research concerns not idiosyncratic volatili-
ty, but total volatility and firm’s investment opportunity. Schwert (2002) uses a
sample of high-tech industries in NASDAQ and finds that volatility of earnings
predicts total equity return volatility. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001)
find that stock future return volatility is positively related to R&D intensity.
4.4.2 Performance Of Portfolios Sorted By Previous Month
Idiosyncratic Volatility
Table 4.4 reports dollar dominated portfolio returns in major markets around
the world6. The first (fifth) column contains the portfolio returns with lowest
(highest) idiosyncratic volatility and high-low portfolio takes the strategy of buy-
ing the highest and shorting the lowest.In contrast to Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang’s (2009) finding, the portfolio returns suggest that idiosyncratic volatility
does not consistently predict negative one month future returns across the mar-
kets. In particular, only the high-low portfolio has a -1.37% value weighted return
with robust t-value (-2.33). Other markets, including the UK, Canada, France,
Netherlands, Switzerland and Mexico have negative but insignificant future re-
turns. For example, France has a negative high-low portfolio return (-0.24%) but
the t-value is -0.39. Moreover, it seems that negative arbitrage portfolio returns
are attributed to extreme low returns of the highest volatility quintile. For the US
and Canada, the best performance is given by the middle portfolio, with 1.66% and
6As DataStream select a part of stocks in each market to construct its Market Index, there are
fewer stocks than in the real market. In order to avoid small sample bias, we construct portfolios
in individual markets with at least 50 observations in each month. For example, although there
are 73 firms in the Brazil Market Index, the average and median numbers of observations are only
46 and 31. Hence we have 15 major markets which meet the minimum observation requirement.
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1.34%. Portfolio performance in other markets suggests a positive relation between
lagged idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. For example, in all Asian mar-
kets, high-low arbitrage portfolio gives positive returns with 2.78% (Hong Kong),
2.53% (Korea), 2.41% (Malaysia), 0.78% (Japan) and 0.18% (Australia). With
the exception of Australia, these zero investment returns are significantly different
from zero. The return patterns show an economically significant positive relation
as both high-low 4-2 quintiles generate a positive return. It seems that in these
Asian markets, stock returns increase along with idiosyncratic volatility.
This interesting finding has several implications. First, it rejects Ang et al.’s
(2006) hypothesis that idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced. They argue
that idiosyncratic volatility could be a hedge against market innovation of aggre-
gate volatility in line with Merton’s (1973) intertemporal CAPM. However, in our
sample, this argument has only weak validity in North America and Britain. Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) provide further supportive evidence in developed
markets of a negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future return-
s. Compared to their results for G7 countries, we find contradictory evidence in
Germany, Italy, and Japan. Since they construct the portfolios across regions,
their results may lose information of individual markets. Moreover, covering dif-
ferent sample periods and excluding financial industry stocks might generate this
opposite result.
Second, it seems contrary to Merton’s (1987) hypothesis of undiversified risk
premium. His model argues that investors dislike securities with less information
and hence require higher premium to hold these assets. Idiosyncratic volatility
measures the firm-specific risk unabsorbed in the market. Higher idiosyncratic
volatility indicates more asymmetric information and underlying assets are riskier
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for uninformed investors. Nevertheless, investors in different countries tend to
have opposite tastes for this firm-specific risk. One plausible reason is that Asian
investors are more conservative than investors in the US and UK. Since the time
span of the study covers the 1990’s, when crisis hit most Asian financial systems,
it is reasonable to expect that conservatism would be prevailing in these stock
markets. To control this effect, we conduct a sub-sample test in section V.
Third, idiosyncratic volatility is a common proxy for divergence of opinions
among investors. Higher idiosyncratic volatility may indicate more disagreement
among investors. In the context of Miller’s (1977) theory, stock prices reflect the
most optimistic investor view, and pessimistic opinions are not exercised if short
sale is not allowed or is limited. More disagreement leads to higher optimism in
expectation of stock price, and hence lowers the stock returns. Although we do not
have short sale data across the market, this view is not supported in our results
as the US and UK have better mechanisms of short selling compared to other
countries. If Miller’s premium hypothesis is true, we should observe much larger
negative future returns in other countries relative to the US and UK markets.
However, be aware that our results are based on idiosyncratic volatility, which is
a noisy proxy for both divergence of opinions and asymmetric information.
Table 4.4 panel B shows that most equally weighted portfolios have negative
returns, but these returns are statistically insignificant. The only two significant
values appear in Japan, at -0.50% (t-value -1.74), and the Netherlands, at -0.91%
(t-value -1.88). Taking account of value weighted returns, we argue that these
negative results are driven by small firms which have little weight but have negative
idiosyncratic volatility - return correlation. This finding is consistent with Bali and
Cakici (2008) empirical results. They report that in the US market, idiosyncratic
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volatility only has negative prediction power when portfolios are value weighted.
We confirm their argument with international evidence that idiosyncratic volatility
is negatively priced among small stocks. The difference here is that, for large firms,
idiosyncratic volatility may predict opposite one-month future returns in different
markets. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) use Fama and Macbeth (1973)
cross-sectional regression on excess returns by idiosyncratic volatility, risk factors
and firm characteristics. This methodology gives the same weight to each stock in
the regression and is not free from small firm biases.
Portfolios return patterns alone show a decreasing trend of idiosyncratic volatil-
ity. In each market, higher volatility has lower returns among quintiles. For exam-
ple, the high to low quintiles of the Netherlands are 0.46%, 0.56%, 0.91%, 1.05%,
1.37%, showing a clear negative correlation between one month future returns and
idiosyncratic volatility. This finding is consistent with past literature. However,
we need to exercise caution when interpreting this return pattern as idiosyncratic
volatility is also strongly correlated to firm characteristics, such as firm size and fir-
m age. Brown and Ferreira (2004) find that idiosyncratic volatility is significantly
priced in small firms controlling illiquidity and other factors. Their finding sup-
ports Merton’s (1973) theory that idiosyncratic volatility could be a hedge against
market volatility. Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003) rational learning model suggests
that young firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility, and along company’s life, this
firm-specific volatility would diminish to average level. Meanwhile, size effect is
well documented in the literature, and its premium seems to change over time.
Hence it is also likely that small (young) firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility
and lower returns in our sample.
To test whether positive return and idiosyncratic volatility in the Asian market
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are driven by financial crisis, we further conduct a sub-sample test by splitting the
sample period into ante-1997 and post-1998. The portfolio methodology is the
same: sorting stocks based on previous one month idiosyncratic volatility. The
result is slightly different from the whole sample performance. Before 1997, the
Asian stock markets, except Japan, still have a positive relation between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and future returns, although this relation becomes insignificant
(probably due to smaller sample size). After 1998, all high-low arbitrage return-
s turn to negative and insignificant at 5% confidence level. Other markets keep
almost the same condition with lower robust t statistics.
Another proxy we use for information uncertainty is analyst forecast dispersion,
which is measured by standard deviation of earning forecast deviation scaled by
mean forecast estimate. We follow Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) adjust-
ment to raw forecast estimates, which contain the stale data problem. Analogous
to the previous portfolio methodology, we assign each stock into 5 quintiles based
on previous month divergence of analyst forecast. The low (high) quintile con-
tains stocks with lowest (highest) disagreement. Dispersion in analyst forecast
is, intuitively, a good proxy to measure uncertainty. Since earning forecasts are
given by expert analysts, their disagreement could represent a common ambiguity
about firms’ fundamental value. However, this proxy is not free from shortcom-
ings. First, analysts themselves may suffer belief biases or career concerns. Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000) argue that analysts providing optimistic estimates could
enhance their career and promotion prospects. Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006)
construct a proxy of information uncertainty from divergence of opinions. Their
empirical findings suggest that dispersion in analyst forecast alone is a noisy mea-
sure of market disagreement. As I/B/E/S has more analyst coverage over firms in
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the US and other developed markets, this may place more weight on mature mar-
kets and hence bias our results. Therefore, we use dispersion in analyst forecast
as a complementary proxy for information uncertainty.
Table 4.5 panel A shows that the United States markets have the most signif-
icant negative returns in the high-low zero investment portfolio (average -1.12%
with t-value -1.93). Other portfolios give different signs of returns. Again, in most
Asian markets, arbitrage portfolio returns are positive but not significant. For
example, in Hong Kong, the portfolio with the lowest uncertainty generates an
average 1.14% return and that with the highest uncertainty has an average 0.81%
return. The arbitrage portfolio has a return of 0.47% with insignificant t-value -
0.43. Table IV panel B reports equally weighted portfolio returns. We observe that
the UK, Canada and Switzerland have a positive relation between disagreement
and one-month future returns. This relation is economically significant as returns
consistently increase along with higher divergence of opinions. Other markets con-
tain both positive and negative zero investment portfolio returns with insignificant
t-value.
According to Miller’s theory, uncertainty alone cannot predict future returns
without short-sale constraints. However, according to Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu
(2007), the US exerts the least constraints on short-selling. Comparing across the
markets, if Miller’s theory is true, markets with less short-sale feasibility should
generally have higher future returns with the same level of uncertainty (Statistics
of Dispersion across the Market). Our test fails to support this story of stock
overvaluation based on market friction and investors’ disagreement.
The above portfolio effects within each individual country indicate that there
is no identical relation between one month future return and lagged uncertainty
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proxied by idiosyncratic volatility and dispersion in analyst forecast. However, we
do observe some common patterns across the countries within one continent. High
uncertainty always predicts negative future returns in North America and Britain,
while a positive relation is found in Asian stock markets. Following Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2009), we construct intra-country portfolios within each region.
We split Europe into west Europe, east Europe and north Europe. There are
three reasons for this partition. First, most east Europe markets were established
after 1993 and are relatively small and illiquid. Second, north Europe comprises
countries commonly regarded as welfare societies with highly strict legal systems
and investor protection (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).
Last but not least, west Europe has close intra-country links among states sharing
the same currency. It is safe to consider their markets are highly open to other
European Union member states.
The regional value weighted portfolio returns in Table 4.6 show that idiosyn-
cratic volatility significantly predicts portfolio returns in North America and west
Europe. The zero investment strategy of buying high uncertainty and shorting
low uncertainty generates -0.78% and -1.07%, with t-value -1.76 and -1.96, respec-
tively. In other regions, this relation is insignificantly positive, which is consistent
with prior portfolio performance in individual markets. For example, performance
of the highest to lowest uncertainty quintiles in North America ranges from 0.56%
to 1.34%, while in Asia it decreases from 0.71% to 0.26%. In east Europe and
north Europe, these are no clear trends as the highest portfolio performance ap-
pears in the middle quintile. To compare with Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang’s
(2009) result, we combine all stocks in Europe to construct portfolios. The result
shows a similar portfolio return pattern to that of west Europe. This is plausible
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as west Europe has larger market capitalization relative to new eastern markets
and the four north markets. So, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang’s (2009) finding is
probably driven by west Europe stock markets7. Panel B in table 4.6 reports the
regional portfolios sorted by dispersion in analyst forecast. Only North America
shows significant negative return (-1.01%, with t-value -1.83) in high-low return.
In sum, the portfolio analysis yields several findings. First, investors in differ-
ent countries have divergent tastes for uncertainty. In North America, and in west
Europe including Britain, value weighted portfolios sorted by prior one month id-
iosyncratic volatility exhibit negative relation between uncertainty and future one
month returns. In contrast, stocks with higher firm-specific uncertainty require
higher future returns in Asia and east Europe. The finding is confirmed at both
country-level and regional-level. We argue that differing tastes regarding uncer-
tainty are due to different levels of market development, investor protection, and
market structure.
7Another potential explanation is given by uncertainty tolerance across the countries. The
working hypothesis of this paper is that countries characterized by high uncertainty aversion grow
disproportionately more slowly in industrial sectors where information is less available. The hy-
pothesis is motivated by Rigotti, Ryan, and Vaithianathan (2008) theoretical model, which shows
that tolerance of uncertainty is essential to the growth of emerging sectors about which little
is known. The authors argue that Information opaqueness create obstacles for entrepreneurs,
workers and investors to enter into high growth industries. It would further lower the allocation
efficiency of social resources if the market is unable to provide prompt and accurate signals to
investors. Comparative statistics of the model suggest that scarcity of this personality trait in
the population leads to slower diffusion rates of new technologies and slower growth rates of
opaque sectors.
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4.4.3 Portfolio Returns Controlling Illiquidity And Growth
Options
Previous analysis shows that information uncertainty is cross-sectionally relat-
ed to both illiquidity and firm’s growth options. In this sector, we control these
two factors using portfolios. In each sub-test, we first sort stocks into 5 quintiles by
control variable, and within each quintile, we further sort stocks based on idiosyn-
cratic volatility into 5 sub-groups. Then we take average returns of each level of
uncertainty across the five control quintiles. For example, to control size effect, we
first sort stocks into size (1) to size (5). In each size quintile, we double sort stocks
by idiosyncratic volatility into 5 sub quintiles. Then we have 25 portfolios. For
each portfolio, we take value weighted returns based on individual stocks’ market
capitalization. Then we construct lowest uncertainty portfolio by average returns
of lowest idiosyncratic volatility quintiles across 5 size groups. Table 4.8 report-
s the portfolios’ returns by idiosyncratic volatility controlled with size, turnover,
price impact, book-to-market ratio, Tobin’s Q and capital expenditure over total
asset.
Firm size is a widely used, although noisy, factor for limited information. If
idiosyncratic volatility is only driven by limited information, we should observe no
prediction of idiosyncratic volatility on future returns. In the sample of the whole
world market, size does eliminate part of the uncertainty effect on future returns.
The 5-1 portfolio difference becomes insignificant except for the Europe market.
However, the pattern of returns does not change as highest uncertainty predicts
lowest returns. One potential reason is that firm size also captures the uncertainty
level . This double sorted portfolio eliminates the uncertainty as well as the level
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of asymmetric information. So the negative relation becomes insignificant in the
sub-test.
Turnover and price impact capture the market liquidity. Higher trading volume
provides more liquidity in the market. Price impact indicates the cost to sell a
stock. The higher the price impact, the lower the market liquidity. We find that
with control of liquidity, idiosyncratic volatility still has stronger negative relation
with future returns. This is consistent with our hypothesis that when controlling
the effect of illiquidity or risk of incomplete diversification, idiosyncratic volatility
is more negatively priced. Moreover,
In panel B of Table 4.8, we control the firm’s growth options. Generally, we
find that the prediction power of idiosyncratic volatility for one month future
returns turns to insignificant. For example, with control of book-to-market ratio,
the 5-1 portfolio becomes insignificant across all samples. There are two possible
explanations. One is from our hypothesis that information uncertainty is linked
with growth opportunity. With control of potential growth, the higher valuation of
uncertainty is bounded. Another explanation is closely related to value effect. Guo
and Savickas (2010) suggests that idiosyncratic volatility co-varies with market
level value effects. Hence high minus low idiosyncratic volatility may capture
difference between growth companies and value firms. In that case, the correlation
is decreased.
4.4.4 Fama-Macbeth Regression On Excess Stock Returns
We further examine whether future risk-adjusted returns are correlated to infor-
mation uncertainty with or without control of asymmetric information and growth
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options. In the first step, we regress the cross-sectional firm excess returns on
analyst forecast dispersion and idiosyncratic volatility with local, regional and in-
ternational market excess returns. We further extend the regression with growth
options proxies including one-lag market-to-book ratios, ROA, volatility of earn-
ings per share, leverage ratio, and size, bid/ask spreads and trading volumes as
asymmetric measurement. The testable hypothesis is whether coefficient on un-
certainty proxies is significantly different from zero with and without controlling
growth options measures and asymmetric information measures.
Table 4.7 reports the result from Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional re-
gression. The tests are conducted in two steps. In the first step, we use time series
regression of daily excess stock returns over market premium, size premium and
value premium. Based on this regression, we obtain the idiosyncratic volatility as
standard deviation of residuals from this model. In the second step, we regress
next month excess returns in cross section. The independent variables include
previous month idiosyncratic volatility; current month factor loadings, following
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009); firm’s market capitalization at the end of
last month; book-to-market ratio at last fiscal year end; lagged six months returns
with one month lag; last month turnover, which is trading volume over total s-
tock outstanding; price impact measured by absolute returns over trading volume
during last month; and individual stock skewness during the last three months
with one lag. The estimated coefficients are reported and corresponding t-values
are adjusted for autocorrelation by Newey and West (1987) test with lag three.
Adjusted R-square takes the average of value, and number is average number of
dependant variables over test periods. Equation (1) shows the relation between
future returns and idiosyncratic volatility with control of firm’s characteristics. We
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find that only in Europe does idiosyncratic volatility predict significant negative
future returns. In Asia, idiosyncratic volatility is positively priced and in North
America, it is negative but not significant. This is consistent with our hypothesis
as information uncertainty captures both asymmetric information effect and value
effects. The investor protection level in Asia is lower than in any other region.
Therefore, asymmetric information dominates in these markets, requiring higher
returns. At a global level this effect is mixed, as idiosyncratic volatility is positive
but not significant. Coefficients on factor loadings on regional market premium
are not significant. As these betas are measured within the short run, it is hard
to persist for the next time periods. The coefficient of value beta in Asia is sig-
nificantly positive, which suggests a strong value effect during this sample period.
This finding seems reasonable as our sample covers the period of financial crisis,
while value effect is usually considered as premium for financial distress risk (Fama
and French (1996)).
In equation (2) we further control for the lagged returns, turnover and price
impact. We find momentum effect prevails over other risk factors across all mar-
kets. Several papers have found that momentum effect is much stronger with
higher information uncertainty. Investors tend to under-react to past information
with higher idiosyncratic volatility (Zhang (2006),Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005)).
So uncertainty effect is driven by momentum effect, we would observe that there
would be no negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future returns
after controlling the past several months’ returns. Turnover here is a rough mea-
sure of trading activities by market participants. High trading volume may be
triggered by more disagreement among investors or more overconfidence from in-
vestors. So we use turnover to control for market disagreement. The price impact
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is the liquidity of underlying asset. Larger price impact means less liquidity. The
last control variable is idiosyncratic skewness, following the test of Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2009). In Barberis and Huang (2008) behavioural pricing model,
the skewness may be priced according to objective preference. Han and Kumar
(2010)also use skewness to indicate speculative characteristics. Higher skewness
implies long right tails in payoff distribution, thus motivating more speculative
trading.
The first finding in regression (2) is that the negative relation of idiosyncratic
volatility is more severe after controlling these variables. Some coefficients in
equation (1) turn from positive to negative, as in the sample in Asian markets. In
North America, the idiosyncratic volatility becomes significantly negatively priced.
We interpret this changing as indicating that turnover and price impact both
control the liquidity in the market, which is linked to asymmetric information level.
So, for the same asymmetric information level, higher information uncertainty
predicts lower returns. Moreover, we find that European countries generally have
stronger relation between idiosyncratic volatility and future returns. This may
be partly due to good investor protection and efficient law systems. The scandal
of US companies such as World.com and Enron lowered the credibility of market
information during the late 1990s.
4.4.5 Subsample Test
Table 4.9 reports the value-weighted portfolio performance in each country
in subsample periods. The whole sample is divided evenly by the year of 1997.
The high minus low uncertainty portfolio performance shows similar pattern in
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both sub-periods. Stock portfolios with high uncertainty are associated with lower
future returns in mature economies, while in developing countries, stock portfolio
with high uncertainty have higher future returns. For example, the high minus low
uncertainty portfolio returns in UK and US are -0.71% and -0.69% between 1988
and 1997,respectively. The same portfolios generate -1.13% and -1.48% for UK and
US from 1998 to 2007. It is consistent with the finding of table 4.3 in the whole
sample periods. Note that most Asian markets experienced the financial crisis in
1997. This continental event, however, seems to have no impact on the relationship
between information uncertainty and future stock returns in our sample. The
positive correlation between uncertainty and future stock returns in Malaysia,
Hong Kong and South Korea is significant before and after the crisis.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we find that information uncertainty, which is proxied by id-
iosyncratic volatility, captures both limited information effect and value effect.
Our international evidence shows that in well developed markets with good in-
vestor protection, information uncertainty leads to lower future returns, while in
less mature countries, future stock returns are higher following more uncertainty.
The cross-sectional regression on idiosyncratic volatility shows that this measure
of uncertainty is positively related to firm’s growth options and level of market
opaqueness across the world markets. Younger and smaller firms, companies pay-
ing no dividend and companies with higher capital expenditure and higher Tobin’s
Q all have higher level of uncertainty. On the other hand, we also find that stocks
with higher illiquidity, lower trading volume and higher price impact have high-
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er idiosyncratic volatility. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that
uncertainty derives from both potential growth options and limited disclosure.
We provide the international empirical evidence supporting the linkage between
information uncertainty and growth options in young and emerging industries.
Our evidence is contrary to Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009), who find
that idiosyncratic volatility is significantly negatively priced across all markets.
Our country level evidence shows that this negative relation is valid only in the
United States, with -1.37% (t-value -2.33). In other countries it turns out to be
insignificant and, especially in Asian markets, becomes positive and significant. In
the regional based portfolio test, we find idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced
in Europe and North America. This might be due to market development. The
results in our test support Wurgler’s (2000) finding that better market development
would motivate more efficient allocation of capital to growing companies.
The cross-sectional regression shows that idiosyncratic volatility is positively
related to factor loading on value premium. Negative correlation between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and future stock returns becomes more severe after controlling
the illiquidity and limited information factor. On the other hand, with control of
book-to-market loadings, this relation becomes insignificant. This evidence shows
a clear link whereby idiosyncratic volatility captures both firm-specific uncertainty
and undiversified risks. The fact that previous literature found mixed results may
be due to the conjunction of both side effects. We also find no support for Miller’s
(1977) premium theory of uncertainty. The markets with short-sale feasibility are
usually better developed. In these markets, idiosyncratic volatility is negatively
related to future returns. However, we cannot reject this theory as we do not
directly test the uncertainty with short selling.
108
Figure 4.1: Trends of Idiosyncratic Volatility between Developed and Emerging
Market
This figure reports the trend of idiosyncratic volatility of developed and emerging
market in our sample form jan 1988 to mar 2007. The classification of developed
and emerging market is based on World Bank 2007’s annual report.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents market statistics of all countries in the sample, which includes both active
and dead stocks in DataStream world market constituents between Jan, 1988 to Dec, 2007. NUM
is the total number of stocks and FIRST OBS is the date of first stock price in each country.
MONTH is the average number of months of individual stocks. RET is the mean returns domi-
nated in local currency. RAW VOL is aggregated monthly firm-level total volatility. SKEWNESS
is adjusted based on size of sample. IVOL is monthly idiosyncratic volatility calculated by Fama
French three factor models with daily stocks and market index returns during previous month.
Country NUM First OBS Month RET RAW VOL SKEW IVOL
NORTH AMERICA
CANADA 299 Jan-88 153.5 1.05% 12.84% -0.02 2.49%
MEXICO 97 Jan-88 136.4 1.53% 12.92% -0.13 2.32%
USA 758 Jan-88 183.5 1.25% 10.99% -0.27 2.16%
EUROPE
AUSTRIA 41 Jan-88 144.3 1.19% 9.45% 0.28 1.80%
BELGIUM 81 Jan-88 155.2 0.85% 8.82% 0.03 1.94%
FRANCE 248 Jan-88 161.3 0.93% 11.55% -0.22 2.07%
GERMANY 234 Jan-88 164.4 1.03% 10.48% 0.1 2.14%
IRELAND 54 Jan-88 154.6 0.30% 13.17% -0.01 2.74%
ITALY 139 Jan-88 146.9 0.65% 9.94% 0.06 1.97%
LUXEMBOURG 20 Mar-91 145.5 0.53% 11.63% -0.05 3.21%
NETHERLANDS 139 Jan-88 173.5 0.58% 10.90% -0.23 2.18%
PORTUGAL 38 Jan-88 151.3 0.65% 10.76% 0.74 2.15%
SPAIN 86 Jan-88 166 0.95% 15.41% -0.01 3.01%
SWITZERLAND 98 Jan-88 172.7 1.22% 9.07% -0.14 1.78%
UK 324 Jan-88 170.8 0.93% 10.46% -0.33 1.87%
GREECE 43 Jan-88 140.4 1.66% 12.90% 0.68 2.38%
SLOVENIA 52 Jan-88 183.3 1.90% 10.77% -0.25 2.10%
HUNGARY 27 Jan-91 117.1 0.73% 17.68% 0.44 3.22%
DENMARK 47 Jan-88 189 1.15% 9.43% -0.04 1.85%
FINLAND 56 Jan-88 161.9 1.26% 9.89% -0.15 2.05%
NORWAY 55 Jan-88 138.5 1.18% 8.92% 0 1.99%
SWEDEN 48 Jan-88 169.7 1.30% 10.09% 0.08 1.97%
ASIA
AUSTRALIA 163 Jan-88 148 1.41% 10.35% -0.07 2.02%
HONG KONG 110 Jan-88 132.2 2.05% 14.11% 0.18 2.85%
INDONESIA 77 Jan-90 150.6 3.00% 14.93% 0.36 2.72%
JAPAN 943 Jan-88 199 0.13% 10.71% 0.03 2.10%
MALAYSIA 86 Jan-88 186.9 1.09% 12.04% 0.22 2.79%
NEW ZEALAND 67 Jan-88 128.5 1.33% 12.53% -0.27 2.53%
SINGAPORE 61 Jan-88 143.4 1.77% 11.86% 0.14 2.61%
SOUTH KOREA 115 Jan-88 156.7 0.98% 10.44% 0.28 1.90%
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Table 4.2: Panel Regression of Information Uncertainty Proxy on Firm’s and Mar-
ket Characteristics
This table presents the estimates of coefficients of monthly time-series cross-sectional firm-level
regression. IV OLi,t = α+ β1AGEi,t−1 + β2MBi, t− 1 + β3SIZEi, t− 1 + β4TRADEi, t− 1 +
β6ADRi
+β7ACCRi +β8CFRi +β9CRi DISPi,t = α+β1AGEi,t−1 +β2MBi, t− 1 +β3SIZEi, t− 1 +
β4TRADEi, t− 1 + β6ADRi
+ β7ACCRi + β8CFRi + β9CRi
Information uncertainty is proxied by (IVOLt) idiosyncratic volatility of month t in panal A
and (DISPt) analyst forecast deviation over last year end stock price. Idiosyncratic volatility is
calculated as variance of residuals in time-series regression of individual returns on market returns
over past one month. Dependent variables include: log of Firm’s age (AGE), the log of Market-to-
Book value (MB), the log of total assets (SIZE), the previous month trading volume over number
of total stocks outstanding (VO). Control variable of countries’ characteristics use La Porta et al
(1998)’s data of anti-director right (ADR), accounting rating (ACCR), and La Porta et al(2002)’s
measure of cash flow rights (CFR), and control rights (CR). M/B and Size are winsorized top
and bottom 1% level. The sample period is from January 1988 to December 2007 for 43 countries
and stocks in other 9 countries are included whenever they are covered by DataStream. Financial
industry is omitted, and stocks with less than one year previous history are excluded. T-statstics
are in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence
level, respectively.
Panal A regression on IVOL Panal B regression on DISP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.02** 0.02*** 0.54* 2.14***
(2.21) (2.48) (1.68) (6.36)
AGE(t-1) -2.23** -2.59*** -1.59*** -1.42***
(-8.45) (-9.05) (-12.20) (-9.90)
MB(t-1) 0.86* 0.77 -4.10* -4.30*
(1.90) (1.62) (-1.87) (-1.75)
SIZE(t-1) 0.7 0.84 6.27*** 12.79***
(1.43) (1.25) (3.64) (4.41)
VO(t-1) 4.50*** 2.40***
(7.60) (5.20)
PIM 2.87*** 1.88**
(4.19) (3.04)
ADR 1.02*** -3.80***
(29.31) (-2.39)
ACCR -0.09 -1.90***
(-0.95) (-4.83)
CFR -5.72*** -2.40***
(-4.95) (-2.54)
CR 2.44*** 1.11***
(4.87) (2.31)
Adj-R2 7.49% 8.24% 3.02% 4.66%
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Table 4.3: Regression on Idiosyncratic Volatility
This table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression on idiosyncratic volatility t over 1) intercept,
2) risk factors loading on time t, 3) firm age, 4) firm size(SIZE) , 5) the log of Market-to-Book
value (MB), 6) dividend dummy (DIV), which equals to 1 if firms pay dividend in the past one
year, otherwise, it takes zero., 7) firm leverage (LEVERAGE) measured by firm’s book liability
over total assets, 8) capital expenditure over total asset (COA) 9) Tobin-Q which is calculated
by sum of equity market value and book liability divided by book equity plus book liability.
Sample is constructed with stocks in DATASTREAM total market index and period covers from
Jan 1988 to Dec 2007. T statistics are adjusted with Newey-West(1987) with lag 3 and reported
in brackets. R2 is average adjusted R2 and NUM is average observations over tested periods.
World Asia Europe America G7 NON-G7
intercept 4.69*** 3.69*** 5.24*** 7.48*** 5.78*** 5.62***
(9.80) (3.72) (4.29) (5.24) (5.67) (2.69)
bMKR 7.48 4.32 7.69 1.99 1.37 26.13*
(1.49) (0.66) (1.45) (0.34) (0.34) (1.89)
bSMB 2.27 7.71 -1.21 0.57 3.09 -4.38***
(0.57) (1.14) (-0.23) (0.09) (0.85) (-0.32)
bHML -7.52* -2.39 -3.58 -17.86 -9.43 -2.09**
(-1.77) (-0.47) (-0.39) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.16)
AGE -4.69*** -1.39 -1.18 2.19 -2.83 -5.62*
(-3.47) (-0.73) (-0.77) (0.41) (-0.13) (-1.85)
SIZE -3.96*** -4.16* -5.25*** -3.71*** -2.01*** -2.26
(-4.13) (-1.73) (-2.88) (-2.45) (-2.77) (-1.35)
MB 7.37*** 10.58*** 10.62*** 13.28* 10.85*** 21.83***
(3.13) (2.38) (2.36) (1.88) (2.32) (3.37)
DIV -2.51*** -1.73*** -3.27*** -3.19*** -3.34*** -5.10***
(-4.88) (-4.17) (-3.74) (-5.12) (-7.62) (-3.11)
LEVERAGE -2.76 2.98 10.73 -14.87*** 1.5 4.57
(-1.10) (0.41) (1.00) (-2.37) (0.30) (0.23)
COA 0.07 0.04 0.2 0.16 0.2 0.04
(1.22) (0.23) (1.61) (0.66) (0.99) (0.17)
TOBINQ 1.88*** 2.09 0.27 1.24 3.43*** 0.92
(6.47) (1.36) (0.13) (0.91) (3.91) (0.34)
adj-R2 13% 23% 17% 22% 18% 36%
Num 3317.3 1058.3 1234.65 812.3 2169.7 418.5
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Table 4.4: Portfolios Sorted by Idiosyncratic volatility
This table reports the value weighted and equally weighted portfolio returns sorted by idiosyncratic
volatility over previous month. Portfolios are rebalanced each month and held for one month. All
returns are dominated in US dollar. Idiosyncratic volatility is measured with Fama French three-
factor model by daily returns within previous month: Ri,t−Rft = αi+βM,i(RMt−Rft)+βs,iSMBt+
βh,iHMLt + βu,iUMDt + i,t Where R(i, t) is individual daily stock returns, Rft is risk free rate,
RMt, SMBt, HMLtare market returns, size premium and value premium respectively. Idiosyncratic
volatility is calculated by standard deviation of (i, t) . The column 1 (5) is the portfolio of stocks
with the lowest (highest) idiosyncratic volatility. Column 5-1 is the monthly difference between
highest and lowest portfolio returns. The T statistics are adjusted with Newey-West (1987) with lag
3 and reported in brackets. The average differences in column 5-1 are followed by ***,**,* if it is
significant different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. Sample is constructed with stocks
in DATASTREAM total market index and period covers from Jan 1988 to Dec 2007.
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
Panel A. Value Weighted Portfolio returns Sorted By IVOL
UNITED STATES 1.03%*** 1.53%*** 1.66%*** 1.24%*** -0.33% -1.37%**
(3.34) (4.51) (4.27) (2.63) (-0.51) (-2.33)
CANADA 0.22% 1.13%*** 1.34%*** 0.75% -0.71% -0.93%
(0.73) (3.01) (3.20) (1.48) (-0.90) (-1.23)
NETHERLANDS 0.45% 1.19%*** 0.65%* 0.85%* -0.23% -0.68%
(1.61) (3.72) (1.77) (1.79) (-0.28) (-0.86)
SWITZERLAND 1.02%*** 0.79%** 0.84%** 0.91%** 0.51% -0.52%
(3.11) (2.35) (2.02) (2.02) (0.61) (-0.63)
FRANCE 0.37% 0.90%** 1.04%*** 1.00%*** 0.14% -0.24%
(1.10) (2.43) (2.73) (2.47) (0.21) (-0.39)
MEXICO 0.94%* 0.62% 0.17% 1.11%* 0.72% -0.22%
(1.88) (1.09) (0.27) (1.67) (0.85) (-0.35)
continue on next page
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Table 4.4 continued from previous page
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
UNITED KINGDOM 0.50% 0.64%* 0.64%* -0.05% 0.32% -0.18%
(1.42) (1.82) (1.91) (-0.15) (0.55) (-0.31)
AUSTRALIA 0.50% 0.79%** 0.25% 0.33% 0.68% 0.18%
(1.34) (1.97) (0.61) (0.69) (0.93) (0.28)
JAPAN 0.06% 0.08% 0.27% 0.49% 0.82% 0.76%**
(0.15) (0.19) (0.65) (1.15) (1.49) (1.96)
ITALY 0.27% -0.12% 0.59% 1.12%** 1.36%* 1.09%*
(0.62) (-0.29) (1.19) (2.08) (1.94) (1.89)
GERMANY 0.70%* 0.98%** 1.21%* 0.69% 2.05%** 1.36%**
(2.28) (2.88) (2.56) (1.41) (3.05) (2.16)
SPAIN -0.80% -0.19% 0.98% 1.19% 0.68% 1.48%*
(-1.36) (-0.30) (1.30) (1.51) (0.78) (2.06)
MALAYSIA -0.31% -0.11% 0.03% 1.04% 2.10%** 2.41%***
(-0.59) (-0.18) (0.05) (1.31) (2.08) (2.91)
SOUTH KOREA 0.34% 0.70% 0.92%* 1.01%* 2.87%*** 2.53%***
(0.72) (1.38) (1.84) (1.92) (4.47) (4.02)
HONG KONG 0.51% 0.80%* 0.65% 1.08%* 3.29%*** 2.78%***
(1.33) (1.76) (1.35) (1.94) (4.09) (3.77)
Panel B. Equally Weighted Portfolio returns Sorted By IVOL
UNITED STATES 1.05%*** 1.11%*** 1.02%*** 1.18%*** 1.03%** -0.02%
(4.60) (4.37) (3.80) (3.60) (2.19) (-0.05)
CANADA 1.17%*** 1.20%*** 0.98%** 0.92%** 1.16%** -0.01%
(3.45) (2.95) (2.30) (2.14) (2.04) (-0.02)
NETHERLANDS 1.37%*** 1.05%*** 0.91%** 0.56% 0.46% -0.91%*
(3.67) (2.86) (2.25) (1.21) (0.79) (-1.88)
SWITZERLAND 1.53%*** 1.64%*** 1.26%** 0.65% 0.91% -0.61%
continue on next page
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Table 4.4 continued from previous page
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
(3.46) (3.77) (2.62) (1.21) (1.44) (-1.07)
FRANCE 1.33%*** 1.17%*** 1.25%*** 1.28%** 0.76% -0.57%
(3.60) (3.30) (3.01) (2.64) (1.29) (-1.32)
MEXICO 1.53%** 1.12% 0.93% 1.51%* 1.01% -0.52%
(2.03) (1.41) (1.13) (1.89) (1.17) (-0.89)
UNITED KINGDOM 1.11%*** 1.19%*** 0.58% 0.74%* 0.46% -0.65%
(3.00) (3.21) (1.53) (1.74) (0.84) (-1.41)
AUSTRALIA 0.86% 1.22%** 1.35%*** 0.48% 0.67% -0.19%
(1.06) (2.39) (2.74) (0.82) (0.97) (-0.22)
JAPAN 0.34% 0.19% -0.11% 0.01% -0.17% -0.50%*
(0.70) (0.37) (-0.21) (0.02) (-0.28) (-1.74)
ITALY 0.97%** 0.57% 0.54% 0.28% 0.74% -0.22%
(2.08) (1.14) (1.06) (0.49) (1.22) (-0.58)
GERMANY 1.10%*** 1.14%*** 0.81%* 1.04%** 0.44% -0.65%
(3.18) (3.05) (1.81) (2.16) (0.76) (-1.40)
SPAIN -0.32% 0.38% 0.15% 1.47% -0.05% 0.38%
(-0.42) (0.46) (0.17) (1.58) (-0.05) (0.60)
MALAYSIA 0.10% 0.54% -0.28% -0.30% 0.75% 0.65%
(0.14) (0.68) (-0.35) (-0.32) (0.73) (0.88)
SOUTH KOREA 0.09% 0.18% 0.57% 0.38% 0.78% 0.68%
(1.50) (0.35) (1.17) (0.72) (0.17) (-1.49)
HONG KONG 0.72% 0.42% 0.57% 1.05% 0.83% 0.11%
(1.26) (0.71) (0.83) (1.40) (0.98) (0.18)
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Table 4.5: Portfolio Sorted By Dispersion in Analyst Forecast
This table reports the portfolio returns sorted by dispersion in analyst forecast measure by standard
deviation of analyst forecast over mean forecast estimate over past one month. Portfolios are value
weighted and equally weighted separately, and are rebalanced monthly. The column 1 (5) is the
portfolio of stocks with the lowest (highest) idiosyncratic volatility. Column 5-1 is the monthly
difference between highest and lowest portfolio returns. The T statistics are adjusted with Newey-
West (1987) with lag 3 and reported in brackets. The average differences in column 5-1 are followed
by ***,**,* if it is significant different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level. Sample is
constructed with stocks in DATASTREAM total market index and period covers from Jan 1988 to
Dec 2007.
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
Panel A. Value Weighted Portfolio Returns
UNITED STATES 1.57%* 1.05%* 0.50%* 0.98%* 1.06%** -1.12%*
(1.80) (1.87) (1.71) (1.92) (2.40) (-1.93)
FRANCE 0.86% 1.44% 0.93%* 0.88%* 0.16% -0.73%
(1.17) (1.59) (1.93) (1.95) (0.28) (-1.06)
AUSTRALIA 1.01%** 0.88%* 1.30% 0.56% 0.29% -0.68%
(2.17) (1.65) (1.53) (1.52) (0.35) (-1.35)
JAPAN 0.41% 0.21% 0.05% -0.07% 0.54% -0.66%
(0.63) (0.49) (0.15) (-0.16) (0.81) (-1.47)
GERMANY 0.41% 1.05%** 1.20%** 1.11%** 0.05% -0.53%
(0.92) (1.98) (2.51) (2.29) (0.07) (-0.63)
HONG KONG 1.14%** 0.52% 1.74%** 1.20%* 0.81% -0.47%
(2.24) (0.75) (2.62) (1.87) (0.80) (-0.43)
ITALY 0.61% 1.16% 1.35%* -0.23% 0.22% -0.46%
(1.08) (1.03) (1.84) (-0.30) (0.34) (-0.81)
SPAIN 0.28% 0.67% 0.07% 0.19% 0.07% -0.21%
continue on next page
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COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
(0.40) (0.90) (0.11) (0.29) (0.09) (-0.37)
MALAYSIA 0.60% 0.70% 0.87% 0.18% 0.66% 0.06%
(1.09) (1.24) (1.13) (0.25) (0.83) (0.13)
NETHERLANDS 0.23% 0.22% 0.76% 1.16%*** 0.51% 0.48%
(0.56) (0.61) (1.69) (3.26) (0.86) (0.92)
SWITZERLAND 0.48% -0.03% 1.10%* 0.86% 1.02%** 0.55%
(1.37) (-0.07) (1.90) (1.58) (2.02) (1.48)
MEXICO 0.56% 1.00%* 0.78% 1.64%** 1.02% 0.96%*
(0.83) (1.65) (1.36) (2.80) (1.45) (1.69)
UNITED KINGDOM 0.34% 0.57% 0.73% 0.79%* 1.30%** 0.96%***
(0.61) (1.18) (1.36) (1.70) (2.01) (3.15)
CANADA 0.45% 0.63% 0.97%*** 0.35% 1.27% 1.23%
(0.69) (1.30) (3.19) (0.92) (1.03) (1.20)
SOUTH KOREA 0.16% 1.43% 0.73% 1.37% 1.49%* 1.55%**
(0.37) (1.23) (1.32) (1.38) (1.67) (1.91)
Panel B. Equally Weighted Portfolio Returns
AUSTRALIA 1.27%** 0.71%* 1.19%** 0.98%* -0.08% -1.28%*
(2.64) (1.97) (2.78) (1.93) (-0.16) (-1.71)
FRANCE 1.06%* 1.24%*** 0.74%* 0.93%** 0.70% -0.45%
(1.67) (2.70) (1.76) (2.64) (1.50) (-0.70)
SPAIN 0.35% 0.52% 0.66% 0.50% 0.19% -0.16%
(0.52) (0.76) (1.00) (0.73) (0.26) (-0.33)
ITALY 0.41% 0.61% 0.82% 0.73%* 0.23% -0.13%
(0.84) (1.25) (1.37) (1.78) (0.36) (-0.31)
JAPAN 0.14% 0.12% 0.09% 0.08% 0.39% -0.12%
(0.30) (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) (0.64) (-0.60)
continue on next page
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Table 4.5 continued from previous page
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
GERMANY 0.48% 0.44% 0.87%*** 0.91%*** 0.41% -0.07%
(1.15) (1.44) (2.75) (2.70) (0.69) (-0.12)
UNITED STATES 1.23%*** 0.85%*** 0.84%*** 1.21%** 1.32%*** 0.03%
(3.56) (2.66) (2.78) (2.62) (3.33) (0.08)
MALAYSIA 0.92% 0.87% 1.12% 0.53% 0.98% 0.14%
(1.60) (1.60) (1.52) (0.78) (1.21) (0.32)
NETHERLANDS 0.20% 0.73%** 0.66%* 0.88%** 0.45% 0.38%
(0.56) (2.07) (1.89) (2.55) (0.97) (1.32)
HONG KONG 0.72% 1.11%* 1.95%*** 1.56%** 1.40% 0.59%
(1.43) (1.86) (3.11) (2.50) (1.52) (0.87)
SOUTH KOREA 0.41% 0.65%* 0.71%* 0.88% 0.96% 0.62%
(0.91) (1.73) (1.81) (1.57) (1.52) (1.02)
MEXICO 0.59% 0.95%* 0.76% 1.44%*** 0.89% 0.78%
(0.92) (1.77) (1.35) (2.79) (1.52) (1.53)
SWITZERLAND 0.47% 0.40% 0.89%* 0.78%* 1.23%** 0.79%**
(1.29) (1.01) (1.74) (1.94) (2.57) (2.52)
UNITED KINGDOM 0.36% 0.44% 0.98% 0.76%** 1.19%** 0.83%**
(1.22) (1.28) (1.77) (2.05) (2.53) (2.64)
CANADA 0.24% 0.51%* 0.79%*** 0.68%** 1.21%* 1.70%*
(0.62) (1.77) (2.75) (2.14) (1.80) (1.73)
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Table 4.6: Regional Portfolio Performance
This table reports the regional portfolio returns sorted by idiosyncratic volatility(IVOL) and
dispersion in analyst forecast(DISP). Idiosyncratic volatility is measured by standard deviation
of residual from regional Fama French three factors model using daily returns over previous
month. Dispersion in analyst forecast is the standard deviation of analyst forecast in previous
month scaled by mean analyst forecast given by I/B/E/S. The column 1 (5) is the portfolio of
stocks with the lowest (highest) information uncertainty. Column 5-1 is the monthly difference
between highest and lowest uncertainty portfolio returns. The T statistics are adjusted with
Newey-West (1987) with lag 3 and reported in brackets. The average differences in column 5-1
are followed by ***,**,* if it is significant different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level.
Sample is constructed with stocks in DATASTREAM total market index and period covers from
Jan 1988 to Dec 2007.
Panel A. Regional Portfolio Performance sorted by idiosyncratic volatility
Region 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
North America 1.34%*** 1.18%*** 0.77%* 0.90%** 0.56% -0.78%*
(4.07) (2.98) (1.78) (2.03) (0.91) (-1.76)
West Eruope 1.25%*** 0.40% 1.16%*** 0.91%* 0.18% -1.07%***
(3.42) (1.10) (2.88) (1.93) (0.32) (-1.96)
North Europe 1.09%** 1.24%** 1.68%** 0.54% 1.21% 0.12%
(2.24) (2.30) (2.55) (0.81) (1.39) (0.14)
East Europe -0.14% 1.41%* 0.84% 0.93% -0.10% 0.04%
(-0.16) (1.78) (0.93) (1.05) (-0.09) (0.04)
Asia 0.26% 0.43% 0.52% 0.41% 0.71% 0.45%
(0.65) (0.94) (1.09) (0.73) (1.05) (0.79)
Europe All 1.10%** 0.81%* 0.80% 1.18%** 0.28% -0.82%
(2.50) (1.82) (1.52) (2.19) (0.46) (-1.31)
Panel B. Regional Portfolio Performance sorted By Dispersion Among Analysts Forecasts
Region 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) H(5)-L(1)
North America 1.51%*** 0.63%* 0.58% 0.93%* 1.24%** -1.01%*
(4.76) (1.88) (1.23) (1.93) (2.26) (-1.83)
West Eruope 0.54% 0.78%** 0.89%** 1.17%*** 1.06%** 0.76%
(1.42) (2.34) (2.46) (3.41) (2.05) (1.31)
North Europe 1.21%** 0.77% 1.05%* 1.65%*** 1.61%*** 0.39%
(2.05) (1.61) (1.93) (2.71) (3.27) (0.60)
East Europe 1.01% 1.05%* 0.49% 0.60% 0.67% 0.31%
(1.15) (1.91) (0.70) (0.77) (0.73) (0.44)
Asia 0.06% 0.42% -0.13% 0.51% 2.02%*** 1.92%***
(0.16) (1.01) (-0.27) (0.98) (2.75) (2.82)
Europe All 0.39% 0.92%*** 0.71%** 1.10%** 0.26% 0.28%
(0.87) (2.82) (1.97) (2.55) (0.24) (0.32)
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Table 4.7: Fama-MacBeth Regression on Monthly Returns
This table presents the cross-sectional regression on one month future returns using Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973)’s methodology. The dependant variable is one month future returns Ri,t+1. Dependant
variables include: 1) intercept, 2) idiosyncratic volatility measured by standard deviation of residual
from regional Fama French three factors model using daily returns over previous month, IVOLi,t-1,
3) beta and factor loadings at t+1, 4) previous month end firm size (SIZE) and book to market ratio
(B/M), 5) lagged returns over previous six months, 6) turnover measured with previous month trad-
ing volume divided by total common shares outstanding, 7) Price impact (PIM) following Amihud
(2002) is measured by absolute returns over trading volumes. 8) (iSKEW) is skewness of individual
stocks over previous 3 months. The (1) regression takes 1)-5) independent variables in regression
and regression (2) includes all variables. Sample is constructed with stocks in DATASTREAM total
market index and period covers from Jan 1988 to Dec 2007. T statistics are adjusted with Newey-
West(1987) with lag 3 and reported in brackets. R2 is average adjusted R2 and NUM is average
observations over tested periods.
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
continue on next page
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Table 4.7 continued from previous page
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A ASIA North America Europe
Intercept -1.54 -4.39* 7.97*** 1.21 7.28*** 2.3
(-0.49) (-1.72) (3.53) (0.55) (3.20) (1.02)
IVOLt-1 0.21* -1.01 -0.6 -1.22* -1.2 -2.54*
(1.94) (-0.95) (-0.53) (-1.73) (-1.62) (-1.91)
bMKRt+1 -0.125 -0.312* -0.198 -0.288 -0.171 -0.108
(-1.28) (-1.71) (-0.85) (-1.43) (-0.70) (-0.48)
bSMBt+1 0.4 1.13 0.54 1.17 0.42 -0.97
(0.02) (0.08) (0.35) (0.87) (0.23) (-0.06)
bHMLt+1 0.246* 0.247** -0.176 -0.114 -0.116 -0.113
(1.95) (2.24) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-0.78) (-0.84)
SIZEt-1 0.88 1.67** 8.04** 8.52** 4.74 5.16
(1.07) (2.20) (2.23) (2.55) (1.07) (1.15)
B/Mt-1 1.25*** 1.17*** 0.90*** 1.04*** 0.70*** 7.14***
(6.31) (6.98) (4.40) (5.75) (4.55) (4.58)
lagged Ret t-7 t-1 1.09** 1.68*** 1.94***
(2.30) (5.42) (5.47)
VO t-1 1.46 2.08** -3.82
(0.85) (2.28) (-0.54)
PIM t-1 -0.01 -0.15 9.28
(-0.05) (-1.03) (0.37)
iSKEWt-4 t-1 -2.56* -3.24 -2.60*
(-1.67) (-1.58) (-1.81)
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.21
NUM 1122.23 1122 760.64 760.6 1141.7 1141.7
continue on next page
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Table 4.7 continued from previous page
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel B WORLD G-7 NON G-7
Intercept 1.42 -5.11** 3.92* -1.72 6.30*** 1.22
(0.61) (-2.86) (1.66) (-0.81) (2.70) (0.57)
IVOLt-1 0.2 -2.19 -0.21 -1.14* -0.51 -2.33**
(0.34) (-1.37) (-0.36) (-1.84) (-0.55) (-2.32)
bMKRt+1 -0.42 -0.102 -0.75 -1.47 0.76 0.22
(-0.30) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-1.26) (0.45) (0.14)
bSMBt+1 0.65 -0.73 -0.75 -2.51 -0.11 -0.69
(0.06) (-0.10) (-1.00) (-0.38) (-0.94) (-0.65)
bHMLt+1 -1.04 0.31 -0.31 0.108 -0.34 -1.18
(-0.90) (0.42) (-0.43) (0.02) (-0.29) (-1.05)
SIZEt-1 7.44* 1.02*** 4.36 1.00*** 6.52 8.94
(1.96) (3.52) (1.29) (3.32) (1.27) (1.48)
B/Mt-1 0.80*** 8.75*** 0.90*** 0.953*** 0.74*** 0.854***
(4.69) (6.16) (4.76) (6.51) (4.84) (6.34)
lagged Ret t-7 t-1 1.47*** 1.60*** 1.83***
(4.62) (4.47) (4.66)
VO t-1 1.88*** 1.62** 6.18
(2.63) (1.98) (0.72)
PIM t-1 -6.09 -2.26* -1.34
(-0.69) (-1.83) (-0.68)
iSKEWt-4 t-1 -3.63*** -2.89* -2.64*
(-5.09) (-1.83) (-1.86)
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.2 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.19
NUM 3336.03 3336 3024.57 3024.6 1003 951.5
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Table 4.9: Sub-Sample Portfolio Performance
This table reports the sub-sample portfolio returns which is split the sample period into pre and post
1998. Portfolios are constructed by idiosyncratic volatility measured with Fama French three-factor
model by daily returns within previous month. Portfolios are rebalanced each month and held for
one month. All returns are dominated in US dollar. The column 1 (5) is the portfolio of stocks with
the lowest (highest) idiosyncratic volatility. Column 5-1 is the monthly difference between highest
and lowest portfolio returns. The T statistics are adjusted with Newey-West (1987) with lag 3 and
reported in brackets. The average differences in column 5-1 are followed by ***,**,* if it is significant
different from zero with 1%, 5%, 10% confidence level.
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) 1-5
Panel A. Value Weighted Portfolio sorted by IVOL during Feb 1988 to Dec 1997
SWITZERLAND 2.16%*** 2.83%*** 1.44%* -0.50% 0.20% -1.96%*
(2.68) (3.85) (1.73) (-0.63) (0.20) (-1.90)
AUSTRALIA 0.96% -0.14% 0.98% -0.39% -0.34% -1.29%
(1.37) (-0.21) (1.21) (-0.39) (-0.29) (-1.21)
UNITED KINGDOM 1.62%** 1.54%** 0.49% 0.63% 0.91% -0.71%
(2.31) (2.42) (0.84) (0.96) (1.16) (-0.92)
UNITED STATES 1.65%*** 1.26%** 1.60%*** 1.91%*** 0.96% -0.69%
(3.74) (2.27) (3.18) (3.42) (1.66) (-1.33)
JAPAN 0.27% -0.01% -0.49% -0.32% -0.36% -0.63%
(0.33) (-0.01) (-0.58) (-0.36) (-0.39) (-1.52)
NETHERLANDS 1.98%*** 1.95%*** 1.20%** 1.68%** 1.85%*** -0.13%
(3.47) (3.66) (2.29) (2.44) (2.99) (-0.20)
FRANCE 0.97% 1.44%** 0.94% 1.27%* 0.91% -0.07%
(1.53) (2.20) (1.17) (1.73) (1.25) (-0.13)
ITALY 0.72% -0.12% 0.94% -0.02% 0.66% -0.07%
(0.90) (-0.14) (1.01) (-0.02) (0.78) (-0.11)
continued on next page
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Table 4.9 continued from previous page
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) 1-5
HONG KONG 0.29% 0.22% 0.19% 0.99% 0.64% 0.35%
(0.30) (0.23) (0.18) (0.83) (0.54) (0.38)
CANADA 0.97%** 1.38%** 1.33%** 1.69%** 1.32%* 0.35%
(2.05) (1.98) (2.23) (2.33) (1.75) (0.46)
SPAIN -1.56% -1.56% -2.04% -0.45% -1.11% 0.70%
(-1.53) (-1.27) (-1.63) (-0.39) (-0.80) (0.65)
MALAYSIA -0.32% -0.18% -1.49% -1.67% 0.39% 0.70%
(-0.33) (-0.18) (-1.18) (-1.23) (0.31) (0.69)
GERMANY 1.56%*** 1.50%** 0.65% 1.04% 2.28%*** 0.72%
(2.69) (2.37) (0.98) (1.50) (2.94) (1.13)
MEXICO 1.62% 1.70% 2.14% 2.27% 2.68%* 1.06%
(1.22) (1.08) (1.41) (1.60) (1.78) (0.99)
SOUTH KOREA -0.89% -0.54% 0.84% 0.80% 0.52% 1.41%*
(-0.88) (-0.57) (0.99) (1.03) (0.64) (1.67)
Panel B.Value Weighted Portfolio sorted by IVOL during Jan 1998 to Dec 2007
CANADA 1.63%*** 1.16% 1.30% 0.66% -0.68% -2.32%**
(2.96) (1.90) (1.62) (0.75) (-0.60) (-2.19)
FRANCE 1.59%*** 1.83%*** 1.33%** 0.20% -0.09% -1.68%*
(2.80) (3.51) (2.35) (0.25) (-0.08) (-1.69)
UNITED STATES 1.17%*** 1.02%* 0.09% 0.00% -0.31% -1.48%*
(2.46) (1.68) (0.15) (0.00) (-0.30) (-1.67)
MEXICO 2.68%*** 1.19% 1.60% 1.00% 1.42% -1.27%
(3.37) (1.31) (1.81) (1.05) (1.28) (-1.48)
GERMANY 1.19%* 1.38%** 1.58% 1.92%* 0.06% -1.13%
(1.80) (2.24) (1.41) (2.02) (0.05) (-1.06)
UNITED KINGDOM 1.18%** 1.06%** 0.84% 0.83% 0.05% -1.13%
continued on next page
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Table 4.9 continued from previous page
COUNTRY 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) 1-5
(2.06) (2.64) (1.50) (1.28) (0.05) (-1.27)
NETHERLANDS 0.90%* -0.05% 0.83% -1.75% -0.12% -1.02%
(1.91) (-0.09) (1.11) (-1.25) (-0.10) (-0.83)
JAPAN 0.36% 0.31% 0.13% -0.27% -0.64% -1.00%
(0.75) (0.54) (0.22) (-0.45) (-0.76) (-1.57)
ITALY 1.43%** 0.60% 1.60% 1.23% 0.55% -0.88%
(2.47) (0.86) (1.97)* (1.43) (0.52) (-0.93)
AUSTRALIA 1.88% 1.33% 1.93% 1.76% 1.37% -0.51%
(3.20) (1.86) (3.07) (2.39) (1.22) (-0.53)
SPAIN 0.95% 0.73% 0.75% 1.25% 0.48% -0.47%
(0.66) (0.49) (0.51) (0.84) (0.28) (-0.28)
MALAYSIA 1.08% 0.67% -0.09% 0.67% 1.76% 0.68%
(0.92) (0.59) (-0.08) (0.49) (1.45) (1.27)
HONG KONG 0.11%* 0.43% 1.74%* 0.59% 1.85%*** 1.76%**
(1.80) (0.42) (1.81) (0.56) (2.78) (2.15)
SOUTH KOREA 0.49%** 0.89% 1.31% 0.65% 1.47%* 0.98%**
(2.57) (1.55) (1.59) (0.94) (1.83) (2.03)
SWITZERLAND 1.00%** 1.12% -0.01% 1.04% 1.69% 0.69%
(2.58) (1.45) (-0.01) (1.17) (0.99) (0.40)
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Chapter 5
Information Uncertainty and
Equity Financing Decisions
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 3 and 4, we have documented the non-trivial role of information
uncertainty in stock market valuation. As managers are found to exploit favor-
able market condition in financing and investment decision (Baker (2009)), we
further conjecture that information uncertainty would also affect manager’s de-
cision making. More specifically, we ask whether information uncertainty would
affect manager’s equity financing decision. Plenty of empirical evidence shows
that market valuation has a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that corporate managers prefer to issue equity
when the prior stock valuation is high and repurchase stocks when they believe
the stocks are undervalued. If the short-term stock price fluctuation is unrelated
to the fundamentals of the underlying firm, managers may time the market and
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issue stocks to gain from the temporal low cost of equity. Although much empirical
work has shown the positive relationship between market valuation and the net
supply of corporate equity, little effort focuses on the role of information uncer-
tainty in equity issuance. Information uncertainty or ambiguity refers to when the
information is too ambiguous to imply the firm’s fundamental value. Many paper-
s have shown that information uncertainty is significantly associated with stock
mispricing, which may in turn substantially affect the firm’s financing decisions.
This chapter addresses the question of how information uncertainty affects cor-
porate financing decisions. The market timing theory argues that managers issue
equity following high market valuation to exploit short-term stock mispricing. In-
formation uncertainty may enlarge the short-term market fluctuations through
amplifying investor biases. Hirshleifer (2001) suggests that information uncertain-
ty leaves more room for psychological biases, and misvaluation effects are expected
to be stronger in firms with higher uncertainty. Zhang (2006) and Jiang, Lee, and
Zhang (2005) find supportive evidence that stocks with more information uncer-
tainty tend to be overpriced on average. Moreover, Zhang (2006) also finds that
short-term price continuation is positively related to the uncertainty level of un-
derlying stocks. It implies that investors tend to under-react to the news of stocks
with high information uncertainty. Therefore, managers should perceive more
market misvaluation, if their firms are subject to more information uncertainty.
Previous literature has mainly focused on the impact of stock returns on the
firm’s financing decisions, whilst little is known about whether information uncer-
tainty plays a role in corporate finance. Since market valuation and stock returns
are not a clean proxy for investor sentiment, the studies based on market valuation
and stock returns cannot distinguish between behavioral and rational expectation
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interpretation. Firstly, uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects increases the
estimated present value through Jensen’s inequality (Pastor and Veronesi (2003)).
Secondly, higher uncertainty of future payoffs benefits shareholders in a levered
company (Johnson (2004)). Thirdly, managers and investors are more overconfi-
dent and optimistic when the outcomes are difficult to value.
The univariate test confirms the findings of market timing behavior in equity
offerings that equity issuers tend to exploit the ’window of opportunity’ by selling
overpriced stocks to new shareholders. Firms also tend to conduct more equity
offerings when market valuation is higher and post-stock performance is poor. The
test of long-run post-issue stock performance confirms their prediction that firms
with a poor long-run performance have a higher probability of equity issuances.
The relationship between information uncertainty and equity offerings deci-
sions was also further tested. Within all industry firms, the evidence shows that
firms with higher information uncertainty tend to issue more seasoned equity offer-
ings (SEOs). The probability of an issuer in the highest information uncertainty
quantile is 5.4 percent, which is approximately three times higher than an issuer
in the lowest information uncertainty quantile (1.8%). Zhang (2006) discovered
an interaction effect between information uncertainty and stock returns. To guar-
antee that this pattern is not contaminated by past stock valuation, all firms are
double sorted by information uncertainty and prior stock returns. The evidence
shows that controlling prior stock returns, firms with higher information uncer-
tainty consistently have a higher likelihood of issuing equity. Both the maximum
issuance and highest probability of equity issuance appear in the quantile of high-
est prior stock returns and highest information uncertainty. This finding suggests
that managers tend to time the market not only by stock market valuation, but
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also by the information uncertainty to which outside investors are subject.
Using the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the SEOs, it is found
that firms with the highest information uncertainty have lower CARs. This indi-
cates that equity issuance is a poorer signal when outsiders have more difficulty
evaluating the underlying stock. The evidence also suggests that issuers with more
information uncertainty have a higher valuation than other issuers. In addition,
they suffer more wealth loss during the short window of announcement period-
s. This further confirms that information uncertainty captures the magnitude of
stock mispricing, rather than growth options in the pecking order theory.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, there is an
ongoing debate between behavioral and traditional finance theories on the market
timing phenomenon in equity financing. Behavioral finance argues that market
timing behavioral is due to the failure of market efficiency, as a result of either
irrational market participants or irrational managers. On the other hand, several
neoclassic finance models suggest that market timing can be simply explained
by rational expectations or a change in risk-adjusted returns. The test in this
study shows that the market timing of equity issuance is more severe when the
information uncertainty of the issuer is higher, which confirms the view of market
inefficiency.
Second, financial economics theory offers two different interpretations of infor-
mation uncertainty affecting investors’ expectations and utility. From the view
of the subjective utility theory, investors with ambiguity aversion interpret the
new uncertain information as a worst-case scenario, and require compensation for
bearing ambiguity. The market should respond more negatively to stock issuance
with more information uncertainty. On the contrary, the literature of behavioral
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finance suggests a positive relationship between behavioral biases and information
uncertainty. When the underlying information is too vague to interpret, investors’
expectations incorporate more behavioral biases, they are overconfident about their
private information, and they under-react to recent news. In the theory of rational
managers responding to an irrational market, Stein’s (1996) seminal work argues
that two market conditions are necessary for managers to successfully exploit the
opportunity of market mispricing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews
the literature of SEO studies and builds up the hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes
the sample of the test used in this study, and the main proxies of information
uncertainty. The main empirical results are reported and analyzed in Section 4.4,
and the conclusion follows in Section 4.5.
5.2 Literature Review And Hypothesis Develop-
ment
5.2.1 Previous Literature About Seasoned Equity Offer-
ings
Many financial studies have documented that there are notable stock price run-
ups right before firms issue seasoned equities, and a poor long-term performance
follows the SEOs. Several explanations have been proposed for the ’anomalous’
price performance, which can be classified as either behavioral or neoclassic. Be-
havioral finance argues that stock price run-up reflects the investors’ over-valuation
for non-fundamental reasons, and managers are motivated to issue equity to take
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advantage of the temporal low cost of external equity. The neoclassic finance sug-
gests that high stock valuation is the consequence of a firm’s decreased risk. In
the real-option pricing models, firms exercise their growth options in operating
projects. Since growth options are riskier than the existing assets, the realization
lowers the fundamental risks of the underlying firm, and therefore inflates the stock
price.
In the famous survey study of Graham and Harvey (2001), the authors found
that CFOs consider the prior stock price performance as the third influential factor
to make equity financing decisions in the United States. Bancel and Mittoo (2004)
also conducted a similar survey in seventeen European markets. Over 50 percent
of the CFOs who responded to their questionnaire ranked the ’high stock price’ as
the second factor of the common stock policy, higher than the target debt ratio,
ownership dilution, etc.
The empirical study of stock price run-ups prior to SEOs dates back to 30 years
ago. Early studies, including Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar
(1986), have shown that the stock market valuation of SEO firms is much higher
than non-issue firms, and SEO firms undergo a significant downward price revision
when releasing the news of equity issuance. Asquith and Mullins (1986) also
analyzed a sample of 531 SEOs in the utility and industry sections and reported
a -2.7 percent stock price drop on the announcement day. Masulis and Korwar
(1986) constructed a sample of SEOs from the Wall Street Journal during the
1960s and 1970s. They found the announcement effect similar to the former study,
although industry firms have a worse short-run performance than utility firms.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) also reported superior stock returns the year be-
fore SEOs. In their seminal paper, they find, more importantly, the long-run
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underperformance of SEO firms three to five years after the equity issuance. The
authors provide two explanations. One is the ’market timing’ hypothesis in which
managers are aware of the current market overvaluation of the firm’s stocks, and
anticipate a subsequent price drop. To benefit from the ’window of opportunity,
managers sell overpriced equity before the price downward correction. Alterna-
tively, they suggest that the ’New Issue Puzzle’ may be not at all anomalous if the
benchmark to SEO firms is not correctly chosen.
The literature provides several interpretations to explain why issuers tend to
outperform before the issuance and underperform afterwards. One possibility is
that the empirical findings of abnormal returns are due to the incorrect benchmark
or misspecified asset pricing models. As suggested by Loughran and Ritter (2000)
and Fama (1998), the test of abnormal stock performance is a joint test of market
equilibrium and the correct asset pricing model. The findings of abnormal stock
returns may be attributed to either the failure of market efficiency, or misspecifica-
tion of the asset pricing model. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) argue that SEO
issuers have a significant change of their systematic risk because of a lower leverage
ratio. They use a six-factor asset pricing model to adjust raw returns, and find no
abnormal stock performance. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) also constructed
the benchmark portfolio with non-issuers only, and found that abnormal returns
only remain within small capitalization and low market-to-book SEO firms.
The agency cost hypothesis offers another explanation for the patterns of stock
performance concerning SEO issuance. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) argue that
managers may purposely or unknowingly manipulate accounting information be-
fore SEOs. They find that issuers with a higher use of accruals right before SEOs
have poorer future returns. Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) compared the SEOs
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with different Tobin’s Q, which is the conventional proxy for a firm’s investment
opportunity. They found that SEO issuers with a higher Tobin’s Q generated an
insignificant announcement return. Their findings suggest that issuers with no sol-
id investment opportunities are subject to higher agency costs because managers
try to control more financial resources whenever the market condition is good.
Loughran and Ritter (1997) offer an alternative interpretation based on overop-
timistic managers and investors. When prior stock performance is good, both
managers and investors tend to believe that the price run-up is the consequence
of effective operations and superior profitability rather than irrational stock over-
pricing. Kim and Weisbach (2008) also found that most equity issuers worldwide
tend to invest more after SEOs, which reflects the manager’s optimistic view of
a firm’s outlook. Fu (2010) further investigated the capital expenditure after the
SEOs, finding that equity issuers tend to overinvest more than non-issuers. He
also found that firms investing more heavily after SEOs tend to have a lower fu-
ture stock performance with the control of the firm’s characteristics and pre-issue
performance.
The first hypothesis of this chapter is to retest the market timing behavior of
SEO issuance in this study’s sample. The researcher tested whether prior stock
valuation and price run-ups are positively related to the probability of equity
issuance, and whether future stock performance predicts a lower probability of
equity issuance. The previous empirical methodology of testing the stock price
pattern around SEO issuer usually involves the sample of issuers or comparing
the difference between equity and debt issuance. This study includes all industry
firms, both issuers and non-issuers, to test whether, and to what extent, equity
financing decisions are affected by market valuation and a firm’s characteristics.
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Schultz (2003) argues that the firms may have long-run underperformance when
their previous stock price is high, regardless of issuing equity decisions. This
methodology avoids this ’pseudo market timing problem’ using logistic regression
on all industry firms. If non-issuers have a similar stock price pattern as issuers,
the pre- and post-stock performance has no significant prediction power over equity
issuance decisions.
Hypothesis 1: The probability of equity issuance should be positively associated
with prior stock valuation and price run-up, and negatively associated with future
stock performance.
5.2.2 Information Uncertainty And Corporate Market Val-
uation
Recent studies have found that information uncertainty plays a significant role
in stock valuation. Subjective utility theory stemming from Savage (1954) suggests
that representative investors should be averse to Knight (1921) uncertainty, and
they require compensation to hold an asset with greater uncertainty. In line with
this literature, Epstein and Wang (1994), and Uppal and Wang (2003) derive
the asset pricing models, taking the ambiguity aversion into account. Epstein
and Schneider (2008) argues that when information does not provide a clear and
conclusive implication about the underlying value of a firm, investors will assume
the worst-case scenario and discount the firm’s evaluation as a result of uncertainty.
On the other hand, behavioral financial theory suggests that investors tend
to be more optimistic about the firm’s fundamental when the market informa-
tion is subject to more uncertainty. Hirshleifer (2001) suggests that information
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uncertainty amplifies the psychological biases amongst investors. One reason is
that information uncertainty may cause obstacles for investors to adjust their ex-
pectations correctly. According to Black (1986) and Delong, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990) model, investors with a na?ve feedback trading strategy or
’noise’ investors will survive in the market if the signal of a true firm’s fundamental
is not strong enough. Moreover, information uncertainty also increases the cost
of arbitrage, which makes stock mispricing more persistent. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) posit the possibility of bankruptcy of a professional arbitrager when the
cost of arbitrage is high. In addition, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) show that it is
more costly and riskier for an arbitrager to trade a security with higher information
uncertainty.
Moreover, Pastor and Veronesi (2003, 2005) suggest that information uncer-
tainty can inflate the stock price in a rational way because of Jensen’s inequality.
The uncertainty of a firm’s profitability appears in the reciprocal of their standard
discounted cash-flow model. When the volatility of a firm’s future growth rate or
profitability transfers from the reciprocal to the expectations of a firm’s present
value, the evaluation of the firm’s fundamentals will be higher than that with
no information uncertainty. Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003) model also predicts an
increasing and convex relationship between the firm’s valuation and information
uncertainty. In an alternative treatment of uncertainty within valuation model-
s, Johnson (2004) posits that information uncertainty increases the shareholders’
value depending on the firm’s leverage ratio.
Miller (1977) models the stock pricing mechanism with a divergence of opinion
and short sale constraints. He shows that when information uncertainty is higher,
investors have greater disagreement about the firm’s fair valuation. If the market
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is perfect (i.e. stocks are traded frictionless and investors are able to trade any
amount, positive or negative and as much as they want), there will be no impact
on the stock price. However, if the short sale is limited or banned, even though
the market consensus remains unchanged, pessimistic investors cannot reveal their
lower evaluation. Hence, the stock price with short-sale constraints will be in-
flated by optimistic investors. His theory predicts that information uncertainty is
positively related to stock overpricing in an imperfect market.
5.2.3 Information Uncertainty and Equity Financing De-
cisions
Given the previous empirical evidence and the findings from Chapter 3 and
4, firms with greater information uncertainty tend to be more overpriced. One
can hypothesize that if the market timing behavior of SEO firms is the result of
stock market inefficiency, firms with higher information uncertainty have a higher
probability of issuing equity (Hypothesis 2).
Stein (1996) also points out that managers are motivated to time the market
if they observe the stock overpricing, and they believe that overpricing will not
be corrected in the transaction of equity offerings. These two conditions should
exist simultaneously; otherwise, selling the equity to new shareholders will not
benefit the issuing firms. As reported in Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang
(2006), information uncertainty causes a slow reaction to the new information and
increases the cost of arbitrage. Hence, one can further hypothesize that information
uncertainty predicts a higher probability of SEO issuance, even controlling for the
prior stock valuation (Hypothesis 3).
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To ensure that information uncertainty is an indicator of stock mispricing,
this study further examines the announcement effect of SEOs. The pecking order
theory suggests that growth firms have higher uncertainty and use more equity
financing. The reason is that growth firms tend to obtain credible investment
opportunities and investors feel more confident in their usage of proceeds from
SEOs. The proxies of information uncertainty may capture the characteristics of
growth firms instead of stock mispricing. This theory also predicts that growth
firms are subject to less adverse selection cost and generate better announcement
stock performance. In contrast, market timing behavior suggests that information
uncertainty is associated with stock mispricing, and firms with a higher uncertain-
ty level will generate poor announcement returns. The competing test was run on
the announcement effect between the pecking order theory and the market timing
hypothesis. Hypothesis 4: information uncertainty will be negatively associated
with the announcement returns of SEO issuers if managers try to time the mar-
ket; information uncertainty will be positively associated with the announcement
returns of SEO issuers if uncertainty stems from the growth options of issuing
firms.
5.3 Data And Methodology
This sample of seasoned equity offerings was obtained from Thomson One
Banker (SDC) database. The sample period covers the period of 1970 to 2008,
which allows for at least one year’s post-issue performance in the analysis. All
equity issuers remaining in the sample should meet the following criteria:
1. The SEO issuer must be a listed firm on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ
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stock exchange, and be incorporated in the United States (domestic firms).
2. Issues other than common stocks are excluded, such as rights, preferred
stocks, and unit trusts. Pure secondary offerings in which current sharehold-
ers instead of the underlying company receive all of the proceeds are also
excluded. For combined offerings, only the proceeds of the primary offerings
are kept and the proceeds of the secondary offerings are subtracted from the
total amount of cash raised in the issue.
3. The SEO issuer must not be in the financial industry (SIC code between 6000
and 6999), or in the regulated utility industry (SIC code between 4910 and
4949). Financial companies normally have a different corporate structure
than industry firms, which will distort the leverage statistics and profitabili-
ty measures (Fu (2010)). Public utility firms are also heavily regulated, thus
making their investment and financial decision-making less discretionary.
Hence, the managers of utility firms have more difficulty and less motiva-
tion to time the market.
4. The SEO issuer must have a non-missing book value and market value from
merged COMPUSTAT and CRSP in the fiscal year prior to issuance.
5. If an issuer conducts multiple offerings within a one-year time interval, all of
the proceeds are combined into one observation, and only the first announce-
ment date is used as the equity issuance date of those multiple issuers.
After filtering the raw data of SEOs with the above five criteria, there are
5134 observations remaining in the sample. Table 5.1 reports the distribution of
SEO issuers in each year from 1970 to 2008. The number of equity issuance varies
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widely in different fiscal years and co-varies with the macroeconomic condition.
For example, during the technical bubble from 1991 to 2000, the average number
of issuances was approximately 238 per year, whereas after the bubble collapsed in
2001, the average number dropped to 80 issuers per year. The highest number of
issuances appears in 1983, which is largely due to the inclusion of NASDAQ issuers
in the American SEOs market. This is consistent with the findings of Brav, Geczy,
and Gompers (2000), that the equity offerings in NASDAQ significantly change
the issuers’ characteristics, lowering the average offering size and increasing the
equity issue volume.
The proceeds of SEOs reported here have been adjusted by the CPI in 2001,
which keeps them comparable across the entire sample period. The sum of the
annual proceeds co-varies with the number of issuances. The mean of the proceeds
also shows an inverse pattern of issue numbers in which the average proceeds of
the SEOs appear to be greater in the year of a smaller number of SEOs and vice
versa. The median of the proceeds over the market value of the issuer measuring
the relative market impact of the SEOs was approximately 10 percent in the 1970s,
and 15 percent afterwards. The median of the proceeds over the issuer’s asset is
positively correlated with the number of SEOs across the sample periods.
The level of information uncertainty can be measured using three main prox-
ies: idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), stock turnover by volume(VO), and firm age
(AGE)1. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residue returns, calcu-
1Each proxy has been recalculated using different methods, and reanalysed in the following
empirical tests. For example, IVOL was calculted by 52 weeks of residual returns, and 12 months
of residual returns in addition to daily residual returns, adjusted by the market model, CAPM,
four-factor models in addition to Fama-French three-factor model. The results are consistent with
those tabulated in this chapter. Hence, the main results are only reported here for parsimony.
Nevertheless, all unreported results are available upon request.
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lated by regressing daily returns on Fama-French’s three risk factors. The median
monthly idiosyncratic volatility of issuers increased from approximately 2 percent
in the 1970s to 4 percent in the 2000s, which is consistent with the upward trend
of idiosyncratic volatility in the United States market (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001)). The turnover by volume is calculated by the average monthly
trading volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The median
turnover ratio of issuers also increased from 33 percent in 1970 to 243 percent in
2008, which reflects the innovative information techniques and improved trading
system that lower the cost of transactions (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu
(2001),Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)). Firm age is the number of
years since the first date that the firm is reported in the CRSP database to the
year in question. The median age of issuers is four years, showing that young firms
conduct more SEOs in this sample.
All of the industry firm-year observations from CRSP and COMPUSTAT were
then downloaded to calculate the probability of SEO issuance amongst the cor-
responding listed firms. Following DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), the
firm-year observations of both the issuer and non-issuer should meet the following
conditions
1. industry firm only (SIC code is outside of 6000-6999 and 4910-4949
2. ordinary common stock only (CRSP stock code 10 and 11)
3. company stock listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (CRSP exchange
code 1,2, and 3)
4. incorporated in the United States
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5. non-missing book value from COMPUSTAT and market value from CRSP
6. firm-year observation between 1970 to 2008.
These conditions ensure that the sample of industry firms is consistent with the
selection criteria for the SEOs.The logistic regression of SEOs on information un-
certainty, market valuation and other control variables as following equation.
SEO Dummy = α1IV OL+ α2TurnOver + α31/AGE + β1Prior12AR
+β2Post12AR + γ1LogAsset+ γ2Z − Score
+γ3BookLeverage+ γ4Tangibility + Constant (5.1)
where IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility) is the residual return volatility, calculated by
regression daily returns on Fama-French three factor model. Turnover is average
monthly trading shares volume divided by number of shares outstanding. 1/Age
is the reciprocal of number of years since the firm was firstly recorded in CRSP
database up to the year in question. Prior12AR and Post12AR are prior and
post 12 month adjusted stock returns by CRSP value-weighted stock index. Log
Asset is the natural logarithm of firm’s book asset value in the previous fiscal
year end. Book leverage is long term debt minus the debt within one year due
divided by book asset value. Tangibility is the tangible asset divided by total
asset. Altman’s Z-score is calculated byZ = 0.012WC
TA
+ 0.014RE
TA
+ 0.033EBIT
TA
+
0.006 MV
BookLiability
+ 0.999Sales
TA
where WC, TA, RE, MV are working capital, total
asset, retained earnings and market value of equity, respectively.
144
5.4 Empirical Results
5.4.1 Univariate Test On Market Valuation And Probabil-
ity Of Issuance
Table 5.2 reports the SEO issuers’ characteristics and probability of issuance
partitioned by the market-to-book ratio, and pre- and post-adjusted returns. Fama
and French (1993) is followed to calculate the market-to-book ratio using the
previous year-end market valuation divided by the last fiscal year end’s book equity
value. Panel A rank the firms into five quantiles according to their market-to-book
ratio within each calendar year. Take year firms in 2001 and 2002 as an example.
The market-to-book ratio of all industry firms is first calculated in these two
years. Then all of the firms are ranked according to their market-to-book ratio in
2001 and 2002 separately, so that some firms may be in the first quantile (lowest
M/B ratio) in 2001, and in the second or third quantile in 2002. Panel B to G
further calculates the stock returns adjusted by their value weighted CRSP index
to measure their pre- and post-stock performance. The adjusted stock returns
are then partitioned into eight quantiles within each calendar year. The firm-year
observation is excluded if there are less than 7, 14 and 21 monthly stock returns
in the previous or post 12, 24 and 36 month periods, respectively.
Consistent with the market timing phenomenon of equity offerings (Baker and
Wurgler (2002)), firms with a high stock market valuation tend to issue more SEOs
in the sample. In Panel A, firms in higher market-to-book quantiles issue more
seasoned equities than those in lower quantiles. In addition, firms in the lowest
market-to-book subgroup have only 253 SEO issues, compared to 1623 offerings in
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the highest subgroup. The percentage of total proceeds shows a consistent pattern
that firms in higher valuation quantiles raise more funds compared to those with
lower market valuations. Approximately 57 percent of the total proceeds are raised
by firms in the fourth and fifth market-to-book quantiles. However, all quantiles
have similar median proceeds of approximately 26 million dollars, indicating that
the offering size of the individual issuers is not affected by the valuation. The
difference of the total proceeds amongst the quantiles is attributed to the frequency
of SEOs, as firms with a higher market valuation are more likely to use equity
financing.
The median of idiosyncratic volatility is 2.96 percent in all market-to-book
quantiles. The highest market-to-book quantile has a slightly higher idiosyncratic
volatility. Except for the lowest market valuation quantile, the median IVOL
increases along with the market valuation. The median of a firm’s age is eight
years, and is lower for the highest valuation quantile. This pattern is reasonable in
that they both measure the information uncertainty of the underlying firms. This
evidence is consistent with the empirical findings of Pastor and Veronesi (2003).
They argue that information uncertainty will increase the firm’s valuation because
of Jensen’s inequality. In their empirical test, they also found a positive relation
between idiosyncratic volatility and market-to-book ratio, and a negative relation
between firm age and market-to-book ratio.
The median monthly turnover ratio by volume of all issuers is approximately
0.51. Issuers in higher market-to-book ratio quantiles have a higher turnover ratio.
The highest quantile has a monthly turnover ratio of 0.93, whereas the lowest one
only has a ratio of 0.25. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) suggest that trading
volume is a suitable indicator of investor sentiment. A higher turnover ratio indi-
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cates that investors are more optimistic about the underlying stock performance,
which may lead to the overpricing of a firm’s stock. The results in Column 7,
Panel A show that turnover ratios are positively correlated to market valuation.
Unsurprisingly, the probability of SEOs in a given year (Column 8) further in-
dicates that firms tend to conduct more equity offerings when the previous market
valuation is high. The average probability of equity issues amongst all industry
firms is 3.61 percent, which is similar to the findings in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Stulz (2010). The probability of SEO issuance in the lowest market-to-book quan-
tile is only 0.85 percent. This suggests that firms with low market valuations are
unlikely to raise proceeds by equity financing. The highest quantile of market-to-
book ratio has a 5.63 percent probability of issuing equity, thus indicating that 1
out of 17 firms in the highest quantile conduct SEOs every year.
In addition to the market-to-book ratio, prior adjusted stock returns are also
used to test the relation between the probability of equity issuance and stock
valuation. The market-to-book ratio not only captured the market valuation, but
also measures the growth opportunity of the underlying firms. Myers and Majluf
(1984) suggest that growth companies have more growth opportunities and face
less adverse selection cost. Compared to other mature companies, firms in the
growing phrase have more investment opportunities and are more likely to raise
and invest the proceeds of SEOs in positive NPV projects. Therefore, investors
expect that the SEOs of growth firms are more valuable than the equity issues of
mature firms. In equilibrium, the market would react more positively to the SEO
announcement by growth firms. Therefore, growth companies tend to conduct
more SEOs in equilibrium because of the lower cost of equity financing. This
rational neoclassical model does not rely on market misvaluation and investor
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sentiment. To prevent the results of this study from the different costs of equity
between growth and value firms, price performance was used as an additional proxy
of the market valuation.
Panels B to D use pre- and post-stock performance to investigate the market
timing behavior and equity offerings. To measure stock performance within a
certain time interval, average monthly stock returns are adjusted by the CRSP
value-weighted index. Panel B, C and D all show that firms conduct more equity
offerings when the prior price run-up is higher. For example, for the prior 12-
month adjusted stock returns, the number of equity issuances increased from 51
with the lowest prior returns (less than -75%) to 839 in the highest adjusted
return quantile (higher than 75%). The probability of equity issues is also higher
(lower) amongst previous greater (poorer) stock performance. The same pattern is
found when partitioning the sample based on prior 24 and 36 months of adjusted
stock returns (Panel C and D). The evidence confirms the findings in Graham
and Harvey’s (2001) survey that firm managers consider previous stock price run-
up as an important factor in equity offering decisions. When the previous price
significantly increases, managers tend to believe that the current market condition
is superior, and issuing equity will benefit the firm as a result of the low cost of
equity.
Columns 5 to 7 in Panel B, C and D indicate that stocks with greater abnormal
stock returns, both positively and negatively, have higher information uncertainty.
For example, in Panel B, Column 5, the idiosyncratic volatility decreases from
4.43 percent (RET¡-75%) to 2.20 percent (-25%¡RET¡0), and then climbs up to 6.21
percent (RET¿75%), showing a rough U shape. The other two proxies, firm age and
turnover, generate the same pattern. Zhang (2006) argues that higher uncertainty
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increases the magnitude of stock mispricing because uncertainty amplifies investor
biases. Consistent with his suggestion, the evidence in this study shows that
extreme stock performance, either positive or negative, is accompanied by higher
information uncertainty.
The previous literature of seasoned equity offerings documents that the stock
returns following the issuance are much poorer than the benchmark portfolios.
Panels E, F and G report similar patterns of long-term abnormal returns after
equity issuance. This downward post-performance trend is even more significant
when the testing periods are extended. The number of issuers with extreme poor
post-issuer returns (RET¡-75%) is 371 after one year, whilst this figure increases to
1535 after three years. However, the probability of SEO issuance has no significant
change, suggesting a corresponding increasing number of industry firms with ex-
tremely poor performance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that managers may
knowingly sell overvalued stocks before the market valuation turns downward-
s, thus benefiting the current shareholders through the ’window of opportunity’.
The results of long-run post-issue stock performance support their prediction that
firms with a poor long-run performance have a higher probability of equity is-
suances. A possibility is that this evidence may be also due to the endogenous
consequence of an over-valued equity issuer (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). For ex-
ample, if the firm equity is currently overpriced, the stock valuation will drop to
the fundamental in the long run, regardless of whether the company issues equity.
If the managers naively react to the previous market valuation and issue equity
after a high market valuation, poor long-run returns of equity issuers will also be
observed. In addition, Fama and French (2000) suggest that the profitability of
firms and industries is mean reverting because of market competition. Even a high
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market valuation is rationally derived from the temporary superior profitability of
the underlying company. Hence, the operating performance should return to the
market or industry average level. This provides an alternative explanation that
managers may foresee the future of decreasing profitability, and sell equity without
making any market mispricing assumptions.
In short, the above univariate test provides supportive evidence of the market
timing theory that firms issue equity to exploit the ’window of opportunity’. Firms
tend to conduct more equity offerings when their market valuation is higher and
their post-stock performance is lower. Moreover, issuers with a higher number of
absolute abnormal returns tend to be the firms with higher information uncer-
tainty. However, the univariate test cannot clearly prove alternative explanations,
since the market timing hypothesis, pecking order theory and other neoclassical
corporate finance theories have all offered interpretations about the pattern of
stock performance involving equity offerings.
5.4.2 Double-Ranked Portfolio Test On Information Un-
certainty, Market Valuation, And Equity Offerings
In the previous section, the evidence shows that information uncertainty is cor-
related to the magnitude of abnormal returns. Since the stock performance has
a significant impact on equity offering decisions, the univariate test fails to dis-
tinguish the influence of information uncertainty in equity offerings. This section
uses a double-sorted portfolio to isolate the effect of price inflation, and investi-
gate how information uncertainty affects equity offering decisions. First, all of the
industry stocks are sorted according to their prior 12 months of abnormal returns
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and adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted stock index. The abnormal returns
are then partitioned into eight groups. The stocks of each group are then further
sorted into five groups according to their information uncertainty level, using id-
iosyncratic volatility, turnover and age as proxies. For each proxy, a total of 40
groups are obtained with ranked information uncertainty and different ranges of
prior abnormal stock returns.
Table 5.3 reports the number of equity issuances and the probability of the issue
in each subgroup. Panel A uses idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy of information
uncertainty. Column 9 reveals that information uncertainty increases the number
and probability of equity issuance without controlling the prior stock returns. In
each column (1 to 8) with the same range of prior abnormal stock returns, firms
with higher information uncertainty have a greater tendency to issue equity. For
example, when prior abnormal returns are between 0 and 25 percent (Column 5),
the lowest uncertainty quantile has a 1.66 percent probability of equity issuance,
whereas the highest quantile has a probability of 3.63 percent.
The evidence supports the hypothesis that firm managers prefer to issue equi-
ty when information uncertainty of the firm is higher. The reason is that when
outside investors face more information uncertainty, they may be subject to more
behavioral biases. Kumar and Lee (2006) found that investors are more optimistic
about future returns when the stock is difficult to value. Zhang (2006) also provides
evidence that investors are more overconfident when the stocks contain more infor-
mation uncertainty. In recent corporate finance development, Baker (2009) points
out that those company managers may make financing decisions by responding to
capital market conditions. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) also found evidence
that investor sentiment plays a role in the firm’s financing decisions. The evidence
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of this study indicates that information uncertainty affects investor sentiment and
further influences the managers’ market timing behavior.
The evidence also indicates that managers time the market to offer seasoned
equity not only by the price run-ups or market valuation, but also by investor
sentiment. In each row with the same uncertainty level, the probability of equity
issuance increases along with prior abnormal stock returns. For example, in the
third row with a median uncertainty level, the probability of equity issuance is
approximately 1 percent and 2 percent amongst all firms with negative prior ad-
justed returns, and this number rises gradually with the increasing prior returns.
The group with the highest prior returns and information uncertainty (Column 8,
Row 5) also has the largest number and probability of equity issuances (273 SEOs
and 9.42%).
Moreover, since information uncertainty increases stock mispricing, it sends a
signal to managers that their stock is currently mispriced. Managers may issue
equity in response to this mispricing signal if the current stock valuation is high,
expecting a future downward adjustment of the stock price. Third, Jiang, Lee,
and Zhang (2005) also argue that information uncertainty increases the cost of
arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the limit of arbitrage may
cause long-lasting security mispricing. Hirshleifer (2001) posits that if the market
is subject to systematically psychological biases, irrational investors may ’arbitrage
away the arbitrageurs’.
In a nutshell, the pattern of the number of SEOs and the probability of equity
issuance in a given year clearly shows that information uncertainty is an impor-
tant determinant of a firm’s equity financing decisions. Firm managers prefer to
issue equity when information uncertainty of the firm is higher. Meanwhile, it is
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consistent with Table 5.2 that stock market valuation has prediction power of SEO
issuance.
5.4.3 Logistic Analysis Of SEO Issuance Decisions Based
On Information Uncertainty, Market Valuation And
The Firm’s Characteristics
Logistic regression was run on all of the industry firms to test whether the
probability of SEO financing decisions is positively related to the firm’s information
uncertainty or prior stock performance, and negatively related to their post-stock
performance after controlling for common factors in the SEO studies. Idiosyncratic
volatility, turnover, and firm age were used as proxies of information uncertainty,
and the SEO issuance on these proxies was regressed separately and jointly. The
dependent variable equals one if the industry firm conducted a SEO in a given year,
and zero otherwise. The prior stock performance is measured by the previous 12
months of abnormal stock returns adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted index,
whilst the post-stock performance uses 12 months of abnormal stock returns.
In untabulated results, the logistic regression was also run using other stock
performance measures, including raw stock returns, abnormal stock returns adjust-
ed by the CRSP equally-weighted index and the Standard & Poor’s stock index.
The results are consistent with those reported here, indicating that the choice of
stock return adjustment method does not change the pattern of the market timing
phenomenon. In addition, several control variables that are frequently used in
testing SEO determinants were included in the logistic regression. A log of the
total assets in dollars of the firm’s 2001 purchasing power was used to control firm
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size. Large firms tend to have more tangible assets and use more debt financing
instead of equity offerings. To control the leverage effect, the book leverage ratio
was used, which is the long-term debt minus the debt due within one year divided
by the book asset value. The market leverage ratio was not used, as the market
value is correlated with the prior stock valuation. Firms with a higher leverage
ratio and lower debt capacity prefer to raise funds by equity offerings. Tangibility
and Altman’s (1968) Z-score are used to control for a firm’s debt capacity. Tangi-
bility is the tangible assets divided by the total assets. Altman’s (1968) Z-score is
calculated using the following formula:
Z = 0.012
WC
TA
+ 0.014
RE
TA
+ 0.033
EBIT
TA
+ 0.006
MV
BookLiability
+ 0.999
Sales
TA
(5.2)
where WC, TA, RE, and MV are working capital, total assets, retained earnings
and the market value of equity, respectively. Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003)
argue that firms with a lower debt capacity rely more on equity financing. The
logistic regression was run as follows:
SEO Dummy = α1IV OL+α2V O+α31/AGE+β1Prior12AR+β2Post12AR+γ1LogAsset+γ2Z−Score+γ3BookLeverage+γ4Tangibility+Constant
(5.3)
Table 5.4 reports the logistic regression on all industry firms from 1970 to 2008.
Columns 1 to 3 tabulate the results using separate information uncertainty, whilst
Column 4 includes all of the proxies in a single regression. The logistic regres-
sion shows that all information uncertainty proxies have significant coefficients,
indicating that the probability of SEO issuance is positively related to the firm’s
information uncertainty level. The coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is 13.7,
154
with a z-statistics of 14.8. Turnover and the reciprocal of age have positive coef-
ficients of 0.15 (z-statistics 16.60) and 4.84 (z-statistics 27.55). This confirms the
results in Table 5.3 that even after controlling for market timing factors and the
firm’s characteristics, information uncertainty still has a strong predictive power
over SEO issuance. When these three proxies are combined into a single regression
(Column 4), they still have a significant relation to SEO issuance.
The evidence is consistent with the market timing hypothesis documented in
the SEO literature that SEO issuers tend to have a higher prior stock perfor-
mance and poor post-issue performance. The coefficients on the prior 12 months
of abnormal returns are all significantly positive, whereas the post 12 months of
abnormal returns are negatively related to the probability of SEO issuance. For
example, in Column 4, the coefficient on prior stock performance is 0.28 with a
z-statistics of 18.22, and the post-stock performance has a coefficient of -0.32 with
a z statistics of -8.91. Both loadings are statistically significantly below the 0.1
percent confidence level.
Consistent with the previous literature, Table 5.4 also shows that the loadings
on the book leverage ratio are positively significant (z statistics from 4.90 to 7.60).
If firms with a higher debt ratio need to raise external funds, they are more likely
to issue equity rather than debt, as debt financing will further increase their lever-
age ratio and bankruptcy costs. The loadings on the log asset are also significantly
negative, as predicted. Large firms usually have a higher debt capacity and fewer
growth opportunities than small firm. The pecking order theory by Myers and Ma-
jluf (1984) argues that firms with fewer growth opportunities face higher adverse
selection costs. Hence, these firms use equity financing only after running out of
debt capacity. The tangibility measure also supports the pecking order model in
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that firms with a higher tangibility ratio tend to conduct fewer SEOs.
5.4.4 Logistic Regression On SEO Issuance In The Groups
Partitioned By Information Uncertainty
The previous section reveals that information uncertainty is positively related
to the probability of SEO issuance. Hence, one can further hypothesize that the
market timing phenomenon of SEOs should be more significant within industry
firms with a higher level of information uncertainty. Information uncertainty also
amplifies investor behavioral biases, leading to higher stock mispricing. If man-
agers perceive their stock to be mispriced, they are more likely to benefit from
stock overpricing by issuing seasoned equity. On the contrary, firms with less
information uncertainty are less subject to misvaluation. If managers observe a
high market valuation but less information uncertainty, they may believe that the
high stock valuation reflects the firm’s superior fundamental, which should persist
in the future. In that case, managers have fewer motives to sell correctly priced
stocks.
Therefore, the testable hypothesis is that prior stock performance should pre-
dict SEO issuance more significantly when the uncertainty level of the underlying
firms is higher. To test the hypothesis of interaction between information un-
certainty and stock performance in predicting SEO issuance, all of the industry
firms first have to be ranked into five groups from lowest to highest information
uncertainty. Then the logistic regression is run in each subgroup of industry firms.
Table 5.5 reports the logistic regression in the subgroups sorted by the infor-
mation uncertainty level. In Panel A, all of the industry firms are partitioned by
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idiosyncratic volatility into five groups. From the lowest to highest information
uncertainty subgroups, the equity issuance probability becomes more sensitive to
the prior 12 months of adjusted stock returns. The loading of prior stock returns is
0.71 (t-statistics 10.06) in the highest uncertainty subgroup, which is three times
higher than the loading in the lowest uncertainty subgroup (0.2 with t-statistics
4.54). The evidence of increasing equity issuance probability along with infor-
mation uncertainty suggests that equity financing decisions are more sensitive to
previous stock performance when the price signals contain more noise. This find-
ing is consistent with the view of Loughran and Ritter (1995) that managers tend
to issue equity in order to exploit stock overpricing. Since information uncertainty
increases the likelihood of mispricing, they presume a good window of opportunity
when good stock performance is accompanied by noisy signals. The loadings on
post-issue stock performance further confirm the mispricing interpretation that
higher uncertainty issuers have more negative and significant coefficients of post-
12 months of returns. The coefficient of post-issue returns is -0.33 (t-statistics
-3.48) in the lowest uncertainty group, whereas the highest uncertainty group has
a coefficient of -0.45 (t-statistics -4.91). Taking both the pre- and post-issue stock
performance into account, the evidence suggests that the probability of equity
issuance is more sensitive to the ’window of opportunity’ when information uncer-
tainty is high.
In addition, Rows 1 and 2 in Panels B and C report the sensitivity of equi-
ty issuance probability to the pre- and post-12 months of adjusted stock returns
grouped by turnover ratio and the firm’s age, respectively. The results show simi-
lar loading patterns and significance as the results in Panel A. From the lowest to
highest turnover ratio groups, the coefficients on the previous 12 months of adjust-
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ed stock returns increase from 0.21 (t-statistics 3.66) to 0.51 (t-statistics 6.16), and
the loadings on post-stock returns decrease from -0.32 (t-statistics -1.74) to -0.49
(t-statistics -4.10). In the youngest firm group (Row 5 in Panel C), the probability
of equity issuance has a coefficient of 0.52 (t-statistics 12.69) on the previous 12
months of returns, whilst the oldest firms have a coefficient of 0.28 (t-statistics
8.73). The evidence using all three proxies of information uncertainty gives a con-
sistent implication that, when firms have a higher level of information uncertainty,
they are more likely to time the market to issue equity. The evidence here supports
the hypothesis that stock misvaluation is associated with information uncertainty,
and managers tend to issue equity when the underlying stock is overpriced.
In the logistic regression, several control variables such as the firm’s assets,
z-score, book leverage, and tangibility were included. The firm’s assets are shown
in a log of the firm’s assets value adjusted by the 2001-based CPI index. The
loadings on firm assets and book leverage are all negatively significant, which is
consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003)Frank et al.’s (2003) empirical findings.
Interestingly, no correlation was found between the Z-score and the probability
of equity issuance. Since the Z-score captures the bankruptcy likelihood of the
underlying firms, one may expect that firms with a higher Z-score would depend
more on equity financing rather than issuing debt (Altman (1968)). Although
the Z-score has insignificant coefficients on the probability of equity issuance in
this study, it is reasonable, as firm size, book leverage, and tangibility, which all
measure the likelihood of bankruptcy, were included.
In short, the logistic regression on equity issuance probability amongst industry
firm groups partitioned by the information uncertainty level is consistent with the
results in Section 5.4.3. Information uncertainty and market valuation has an
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interactive effect on SEO issuances. Firms with a higher valuation uncertainty level
are more sensitive to stock market valuation to make equity financing decisions.
5.4.5 Announcement Effect Around Seos Issuance Parti-
tioned By Information Uncertainty Proxies
Two days of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)2 around the SEOs announce-
ment dates were used to test the hypothesis that information uncertainty is as-
sociated with stock mispricing in equity issuance. The abnormal returns are the
individual stock returns adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted index:
ARi,t = Ri,t −MRt (5.4)
where Ri,t is individual firm i in date t, and MRt is the CRSP value-weighted index
return on day t. The abnormal returns from two days before the announcement
date to two days after were then summed. The CARs of each SEO issuer is
calculated as follows:
CARi =
t+2∑
t−2
ARi,t (5.5)
Table 5.6 reports the two-day CARs of SEOs issuers partitioned by the information
uncertainty proxies. In Column 1, the average announcement returns gradually
decrease from the lowest IVOL groups (Row 1) to the highest IVOL group. The
highest IVOL group has significant -2.95 percent CARs (t-statistics -9.98), which
is three times higher than the CARs in the lowest uncertainty group (-0.94% with
t-statistics -4.35). The SEO issuers partitioned by turnover ratio and firm age
2CARs were also tested in different windows, including (-1,+1), (-5, +5), (-10, +10), producing
similar results.
159
perform the same pattern of the announcement effect. Higher information uncer-
tainty is associated with more significant negative CARs around the announcement
of SEOs. This confirms the hypothesis that information uncertainty is an indicator
of stock mispricing.
Following Campbell et al. (1997), the daily CARs from -5 to +5 day were
constructed around the SEOs announcement date. Chart 1 shows an obvious
downward trend of abnormal stock returns of SEOs with high idiosyncratic volatil-
ity before the announcement date. In contrast, SEO issuers with low idiosyncratic
volatility have much flatter and more positive announcement returns. The discrep-
ancy of CARs between the high and low uncertainty group appears consistently in
Chart 2 and 3. In Chart 2, the SEOs with a higher mean turnover ratio underper-
form those with a lower turnover ratio from three days before the announcement
to the announcement date. In Chart 3, younger firms generate lower CARs than
mature firms before the announcement dates of the SEOs. It is important to note
that the short-run market reaction to younger SEO firms is lower than mature
firms, which is inconsistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory. This
theory suggests that young firms with more investment opportunities are subject
to lower adverse selection costs, which contradicts the findings of this study.
In short, the announcement effect is more negative for SEO firms with higher
information uncertainty. The evidence suggests that investors have a lower evalu-
ation of SEOs when firms are subject to higher uncertainty. Given that firms with
higher uncertainty tend to have a greater probability of SEO issuance, the possible
interpretation is that information uncertainty indicates greater stock mispricing.
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the role of information uncertainty in the firm’s equity
financing decisions. Idiosyncratic volatility, shares turnover ratio, and firm age
were all used as proxies for information uncertainty. Most of the previous empirical
tests of SEO issuance focus only on the issuers, whereas this study included all
industry firms, both issuer and non-issuer, in the sample test. By comparing
the characteristics of issuer and non-issuer, not only can one examine whether
information uncertainty and stock valuation affect the SEO decisions, but one can
also test to what extent these factors have a influence in terms of equity financing.
Furthermore, one can hypothesise that information uncertainty is an indicator of
the magnitude of stock mispricing; firms with higher information uncertainty are
subject to greater misvaluation. To test this hypothesis, CARs were used for the
short-run announcement effect of SEOs, and to examine the discrepancy of CARs
amongst information uncertainty quantiles.
The empirical findings of this study can be concluded as follows. First, the
market timing phenomenon of SEO issuance documented in the literature has
been confirmed. Firms with a previous high market valuation and price run-ups
tend to issue more SEOs than their counterparts. Firms with a future lower
stock performance also have a higher probability of SEO issuance. Second, the
probability of SEO issuance is positively related to information uncertainty. Hence,
firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility, shares turnover ratio, and younger firm
age tend to carry out more equity financing.
The empirical results from the double-sorted portfolios also show that the im-
pact of information uncertainty on SEOs is persistent with control of the stock
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valuations. Thirdly, the short-run announcement effect is more significantly nega-
tive for SEO firms with higher information uncertainty. This supports the conjec-
ture that information uncertainty serves as an indicator of investor sentiment, as
higher information uncertainty reflects a more optimistic view of investors. Given
that information uncertainty is positively associated with stock overpricing, the
evidence suggests that the market timing behavior of SEOs is the result of market
inefficiency, in that managers sell stocks to benefit from temporal stock overpricing.
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Table 5.1: Sample Description and Median Information uncertainty Proxies of SEO Issuers
This table reports the sample distribution of SEOs in each year from 1970 to 2008. The number of
SEO issues includes both pure primary offerings and combined offerings, but exclude pure secondary
offerings. SEO proceeds are adjusted by CPI index based on year 2001. If a SEO is combined
offerings, we only report the proceeds of primary offering in this issuance. MV is firm’s market value
at the end of last fiscal year. Asset is asset value previous fiscal year. Both market value and asset
value are adjusted by CPI index based on year 2001. Turnover is average monthly trading shares
volume divided by number of shares outstanding. Age is the number of years since the firm was
firstly recorded in CRSP database upto the year in question. IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility) is the
residual return volatility, calculated by regression daily returns on Fama-French three factor model.
SEO issues are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database. Accounting and stock data
is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively.
Year Number Sum of Mean Median Median Median Median Median
Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Turnover Age IVOL
Over MV Over Asset
1970 33 2323.42 70.41 7.30% 10.18% 33.40% 4 2.64%
1971 77 4595.9 59.69 9.23% 10.83% 47.71% 5 2.41%
1972 146 5589.74 38.29 11.66% 13.68% 49.17% 1 2.21%
1973 27 1465.8 54.29 15.30% 15.12% 54.24% 1 2.81%
1974 16 1093.43 68.34 10.45% 9.91% 11.49% 2 2.54%
1975 26 3471.64 133.52 9.72% 8.54% 26.73% 3 2.33%
1976 54 6391.83 118.37 10.71% 7.97% 31.36% 5 2.02%
1977 25 2665.28 106.61 13.04% 10.08% 27.78% 5 2.00%
1978 55 1354.73 24.63 13.16% 11.49% 57.87% 6 2.34%
1979 57 1668.91 29.28 12.88% 15.87% 60.73% 7 2.44%
1980 168 6928.16 41.24 12.68% 22.35% 70.71% 8 2.83%
1981 172 7844.78 45.61 18.16% 23.43% 46.15% 6 2.76%
continue on next page
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Table 5.1 continued from previous page
Year Number Sum of Mean Median Median Median Median Median
Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Turnover Age IVOL
Over MV Over Asset
1982 136 6732.89 49.51 11.92% 18.34% 87.83% 5 2.54%
1983 400 18808.87 47.02 15.31% 20.52% 77.14% 11 2.63%
1984 74 2124.18 28.71 16.13% 18.51% 58.81% 5 2.32%
1985 136 5250.61 38.61 14.22% 21.42% 92.68% 5 2.50%
1986 146 8270.59 56.65 15.64% 18.61% 94.44% 4 2.87%
1987 131 8731.33 66.65 24.14% 24.51% 102.05% 5 3.45%
1988 56 2139.68 38.21 17.00% 14.29% 70.12% 4 2.45%
1989 96 3350.88 34.91 16.70% 26.02% 117.77% 4 2.83%
1990 87 4074.88 46.84 17.96% 21.17% 100.48% 6 3.31%
1991 248 19055.7 76.84 14.36% 24.57% 138.05% 6 3.44%
1992 213 13713.92 64.38 15.33% 22.45% 117.19% 6 3.37%
1993 287 13209.14 46.02 16.43% 25.27% 129.42% 4 3.46%
1994 202 11637.4 57.61 15.37% 22.47% 126.11% 4 3.18%
1995 277 20129.22 72.67 15.59% 32.79% 170.16% 3 3.41%
1996 338 24349.44 72.04 16.70% 33.97% 158.52% 4 3.77%
1997 269 18434.74 68.53 15.35% 26.51% 163.08% 4 3.37%
1998 180 17766.56 98.7 15.47% 22.17% 147.55% 3 3.86%
1999 195 28001.7 143.6 10.76% 28.63% 242.21% 4 4.61%
2000 173 33660.59 194.57 17.69% 37.05% 287.44% 4 6.34%
2001 94 12852.17 136.73 11.94% 18.17% 207.01% 6 4.11%
2002 92 10434.96 113.42 16.49% 12.21% 160.55% 9 3.14%
2003 111 11811.97 106.41 10.29% 17.99% 173.17% 7 3.39%
2004 76 6713.55 88.34 13.34% 12.49% 168.09% 11 2.60%
2005 73 7480.92 102.48 11.28% 19.07% 178.11% 11 2.39%
continue on next page
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Table 5.1 continued from previous page
Year Number Sum of Mean Median Median Median Median Median
Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Proceeds Turnover Age IVOL
Over MV Over Asset
2006 62 5150.03 83.07 11.61% 16.13% 165.75% 9 2.69%
2007 90 9167.22 101.86 14.43% 18.89% 212.36% 5 3.06%
2008 36 3872.41 107.57 19.90% 17.41% 243.76% 7 5.25%
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Figure 5.1: CARs around SEOs announcement date
This figure shows the abnormal returns of SEO issuers 5 days around announce-
ment date. We partitioned our sample issuers into two subsamples according to
information uncertainty level. Chart 1 shows CARs of firms with the highest
and lowest idiosyncratic volatility. Chart 2 shows CARs with highest and lowest
turnover ratio. Chart 3 shows the CARs of young and mature firms. SEO issues
are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database. Accounting and stock
data is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively.
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Table 5.5: Logistic regression on SEO decision within portfolios partitioned by information uncer-
tainty level
This table reports the logistic regression of SEOs partitioned by information uncertainty level. We
use idiosyncratic volatility, turnover and firm age as proxies for information uncertainty. IVOL (id-
iosyncratic volatility) is the residual return volatility, calculated by regression daily returns on Fama-
French three factor model. Turnover is average monthly trading shares volume divided by number
of shares outstanding. Age is the reciprocal of number of years since the firm was firstly recorded in
CRSP database up to the year in question.SEO Dummy = α1IV OL+α2TurnOver+α31/AGE+
β1Prior12AR + β2Post12AR + γ1LogAsset + γ2Z − Score + γ3BookLeverage + γ4Tangibility +
Constant Where prior12AR and Post12AR are prior and post 12 month adjusted stock returns by
CRSP value-weighted stock index. Log Asset is the natural logarithm of firm’s book asset value
in the previous fiscal year end. Book leverage is long term debt minus the debt within one year
due divided by book asset value. Tangibility is the tangible asset divided by total asset. Altman’s
Z-score is calculated by Z = 0.012WCTA +0.014
RE
TA +0.033
EBIT
TA +0.006
MV
BookLiability +0.999
Sales
TA where
WC, TA, RE, MV are working capital, total asset, retained earnings and market value of equity,
respectively. SEO issues are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database. Accounting and
stock data is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. t-statistics is reported in
parenthesis and ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence level,
respectively.
Low Uncertainty (2) (3) (4) High Uncertainty
Panel A IVOL
pre12vwadj 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.50*** 0.71***
(4.54) (8.87) (8.24) (8.39) (10.06)
post12vwadj -0.33*** -0.39*** -0.41*** -0.53*** -0.45***
(-3.48) (-3.91) (-3.56) (-3.65) (-4.91)
Log Asset -0.30*** -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.14***
(-5.68) (-3.91) (-5.03) (-2.59) (-4.43)
continue on next page
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Low Uncertainty (2) (3) (4) High Uncertainty
Z-score 0 0 0 0 0
(-0.24) (-0.77) (0.47) (-0.33) (-0.61)
Book Leverage -1.82* 0.71** -1.66*** 0.16 -1.63***
(-4.27) (2.25) (-4.71) (0.57) (-5.60)
Tangibility -0.02 -1.08*** -0.08*** -0.33 -0.04
(-0.05) (-4.76) (-2.8) (-1.47) (-0.16)
Constant -4.57*** -4.79*** -3.96*** -3.79*** -3.43***
(-21.12) (-22.49) (-21.69) (-21.30) (-21.38)
Pseudo−R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
Panel B Turnover
pre12vwadj 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.51***
(3.66) (4.43) (5.56) (6.02) (6.16)
post12vwadj -0.32* -0.27** -0.37*** -0.25*** -0.49***
(-1.74) (-2.21) (-2.42) (-4.04) (-4.10)
Log Asset -0.22*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(-3.62) (-1.54) (-0.68) (-0.59) (-1.08)
Z-score 0 0 0 0 0
(-0.25) (-0.38) (-1.02) (0.87) (-0.04)
Book Leverage 0.63 0.07 -0.34 -0.3 -1.27***
(0.94) (0.18) (-1.00) (-1.10) (-5.89)
Tangibility 0.08 0.57* 0.91*** 0.12 0.68***
(0.14) (1.77) (3.49) (0.54) (3.74)
Constant -6.26*** -4.33*** -3.73*** -3.07*** -2.19***
(-16.66) (-20.85) (-22.14) (-21.94) (-19.48)
Pseudo−R2 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04
Panel C. 1/AGE
continue on next page
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Low Uncertainty (2) (3) (4) High Uncertainty
pre12vwadj 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.45 0.52
(8.73) (9.00) (8.74) (11.72) (12.69)
post12vwadj -0.44 -0.46 -0.61 -0.2 -0.45
(-3.83) (-3.28) (-6.34) (-3.93) (-7.23)
Log Asset -0.09 -0.16 -0.15 -0.21 -0.2
(-3.88) (-4.50) (-6.54) (-11.30) (-11.23)
Z-score 0 0 0 0 0
(-0.41) (-1.50) (-0.84) (-0.32) (0.13)
Book Leverage 1.22 0.2 -0.52 -1.48 -1.36
(4.43) (0.56) (-2.13) (-7.49) (-7.34)
Tangibility -0.83 -0.75 -0.61 -0.08 -0.24
(-4.06) (-2.65) (-3.18) (-0.50) (-1.60)
Constant -5.09 -4.96 -4.38 -3.42 -4.07
-30.55 -23.46 -32.3 -35.89 -42.74
Pseudo−R2 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05
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Table 5.4: Logistic Regression of SEO Decision on Information uncertainty, Market
Valuation, and Firm’s Characteristics
This table reports the logistic regression of SEOs on information uncertainty, market valuation
and other control variables as following equation.SEO Dummy = α1IV OL + α2TurnOver +
α31/AGE + β1Prior12AR + β2Post12AR + γ1LogAsset + γ2Z − Score + γ3BookLeverage +
γ4Tangibility +Constant where IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility) is the residual return volatility,
calculated by regression daily returns on Fama-French three factor model. Turnover is average
monthly trading shares volume divided by number of shares outstanding. 1/Age is the reciprocal
of number of years since the firm was firstly recorded in CRSP database up to the year in question.
Prior12AR and Post12AR are prior and post 12 month adjusted stock returns by CRSP value-
weighted stock index. Log Asset is the natural logarithm of firm’s book asset value in the previous
fiscal year end. Book leverage is long term debt minus the debt within one year due divided
by book asset value. Tangibility is the tangible asset divided by total asset. Altman’s Z-score
is calculated byZ = 0.012WCTA + 0.014
RE
TA + 0.033
EBIT
TA + 0.006
MV
BookLiability + 0.999
Sales
TA where
WC, TA, RE, MV are working capital, total asset, retained earnings and market value of equity,
respectively. SEO issues are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database. Accounting
and stock data is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. t-statistics is reported
in parenthesis and ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent confidence
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IVOL 13.7*** 8.56***
(14.8) (6.96)
Turnover 0.15*** 0.14***
(16.60) (15.11)
1/AGE 4.84*** 4.95***
(27.55) (26.91)
Prior 12 Month AR 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.28***
(23.11) (17.99) (22.75) (18.22)
Post 12 Month AR -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.32***
(-11.30) (-9.91) (-10.61) (-8.91)
Log Asset -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.16*** -0.09***
(-8.42) (-5.68) (-17.13) (-8.24)
Z-Score 0 0 0 0
(0.17) (-0.36) (-0.23) (-0.59)
Book Leverage 0.66*** 0.53*** 0.78*** 0.58***
(6.35) (4.90) (7.60) (5.38)
Tangibility -0.23*** -0.43*** -0.29*** -0.45***
(-2.75) (-5.00) (-3.45) (-5.25)
Constant -3.85 -3.91*** -4.84*** -4.48***
(-52.76) (-71.64) (-72.20) (-49.70)
Pseudo−R2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06
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Table 5.6: CARs 2-day around SEO issue date
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around SEO announcement date
partitioned by information uncertainty. We use idiosyncratic volatility, turnover and firm age
as proxies for information uncertainty. IVOL (idiosyncratic volatility) is the residual return
volatility, calculated by regression daily returns on Fama-French three factor model. Turnover
is average monthly trading shares volume divided by number of shares outstanding. Age is the
reciprocal of number of years since the firm was firstly recorded in CRSP database up to the
year in question. The abnormal returns are the individual stock returns adjusted by CRSP value
weighted index.
ARi,t = Ri,t −MRt (5.6)
Where Ri,t is individual firm i in date t, and MRt is CRSP value weighted index return on day
t. we then sum up the abnormal returns from two days before the announcement date to two
days after. The CARs of each SEO issuer is calculated as following:
CARi =
t+2∑
t−2
ARi,t (5.7)
SEO issues are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database. Accounting and stock data
is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. t-statistics is reported in parenthesis
followed by number of SEOs. ***, **, * indicate the significance at one, five and ten percent con-
fidence level, respectively.SEO issues are obtained from Thomason one banker (SDC) database.
Accounting and stock data is downloaded from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively.
IVOL TURNOVER 1/AGE
low -0.94%*** -3.08%*** -1.17%***
(-4.35) (-3.31) (-4.37)
524 225 634
2 -4.40%*** -2.34%*** -1.38%***
(-6.54) (-6.19) (-2.81)
764 562 300
3 -1.44%*** -2.35%*** -2.66%***
(-7.90) (-8.15) (-8.06)
1158 1006 659
4 -2.33%*** -2.29%*** -2.56%***
(-11.21) (-9.72) (-9.41)
1475 1417 1168
high -2.95%*** -2.21%*** -2.83%***
(-9.98) (-7.51) (-11.39)
1373 1390 2545
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.0.1 Summary and Conclusion
This thesis has examined the role of information uncertainty in determining
the stock price performance and affecting the equity financing behavioral. The ex-
perimental studies on investor’s decision making under poor/imprecise information
have inclusively shown the significant influence of information uncertainty and uni-
versality of ambiguity aversion among investors. The opinions among researchers,
however, have not reached an agreement about how information uncertainty would
affect the stock pricing and, therefore, require more empirical evidence to shed light
on this issue. We adopt a set of proxies for information uncertainty and apply the
empirical tests on the influence of these proxies in time series and cross section-
al stock performance, as well as the market timing behavioral of seasoned equity
offerings. The evidence suggests that information uncertainty can amplify the
investor’s psychological biases and increase the extent of stock mispricing. The
impact of information uncertainty appears to be universal across the international
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markets, and depends mutually on market environment and firm’s growth options.
The positive relationship between information uncertainty and misvaluation doc-
umented in our study helps to explain the market timing behavioral of seasoned
equity offerings and contributes to the behavioral corporate finance.
Chapter 3 examines the role of information uncertainty in determining future
stock returns in the context of underreaction anomaly. The results show that both
earning momentum effect and price momentum effect are more significant among
stocks with high information uncertainty. Furthermore, stock returns between
high and low information uncertainty portfolios are significantly larger following
bad news compared to those following good news, indicating a positive relationship
between ambiguity aversion and stock overpricing.
This result is consistent with the predictions of behavioral finance that investors
are subject to larger psychological biases when the information of underlying com-
pany is hard to interpret or evaluate (Hirshleifer, 2001; Daniel et al, 1998, 2001).
The evidence is also consistent with the literature of limited arbitrage which sug-
gests that the cost of arbitrage is parallel with the noise trading behaviour and
ambiguous signals/feedbacks to the market (DeLong, et al, 1990; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). Moreover, we find no evidence of discount effect on uncertainty,
which is in contrast to the prediction of incomplete market hypothesis (Merton,
1987).
In Chapter 4, we empirically test the interaction effect between information
uncertainty and firm’s growth options on cross sectional stock returns across the
global markets. We find that the growth options can explain the varying levels
of information uncertainty among stocks, which confirms our conjecture that the
uncertainty of future earnings forms the corresponding value ambiguity. We also
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find a positive correlation between value ambiguity and information asymmetry.
These findings show a new insight that information uncertainty is jointly deter-
mined by endogenous volatility of profitability and exogenous level of information
asymmetry. The confounding empirical evidence in the past literature may be the
results of conflicting effect of endogenous and exogenous attributes of uncertainty.
The Merton’s (1987) incomplete market hypothesis and Epstein and Schneider’s
(2008) imprecise information model consider the uncertainty effect from the an-
gle of exogenous uncertainty aversion and sharing among investors, and predict
the stock price discount for information uncertainty. On the other hand, Pas-
tor and Veronesi (2003, 2008) analyze the endogenous uncertainty stemming from
the volatility of future earnings. Their model suggests a stock price premium for
bearing uncertainty of future profitability according to Jensen’s inequality.
Our empirical work builds a bridge between these two opposite interpretation,
and shows the joint effect of endogenous and exogenous attributes on informa-
tion uncertainty. The results further indicate that when controlling information
asymmetry, the information uncertainty predicts negative future returns, which is
consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003) premium hypothesis. We also find
that the portfolios buying stocks with high uncertainty and shorting stocks with
low uncertainty generate more significantly negative returns in mature markets.
Since the emerging markets are commonly subject to poor market developments,
the impact of information asymmetry should be more strong in these market and
offset the premium effect of uncertainty. The results of portfolio analysis are fur-
ther confirmed by cross-sectional regressions and robustness tests.
The chapter 5 addresses the question that how information uncertainty af-
fects corporate financing decisions, and analyzes the behavior of seasoned equity
182
offerings to answer this question. The results indicate that firms with greater in-
formation uncertainty tend to issue more SEOs than firms with low information
uncertainty. The probability of SEOs issuance is positively associated with infor-
mation uncertainty, even controlling the prior or post stock valuation. Our findings
confirm the market timing behavioral of equity issuance documented in the liter-
ature (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997). Moreover, as suggested by behavioral
corporate finance theory, stock market overpricing is one major motivation for
equity financing. Our evidence is consistent with this point of view that firms
with higher prior stock valuation and lower post performance have a greater prob-
ability of equity issuance. This study links the literature of behavioral corporate
finance and information uncertainty research, and provides value ambiguity being
another indicator of stock mispricing. Using stock price as proxy for stock valua-
tion is under critique from neoclassic finance theory. Loughran and Ritter (2000)
and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) suggest that the estimation of mispricing
from stock price performance would be improper for equity financing research, as
the issuers’ risk bearing varies during the offering process. Our study provides
three proxies unrelated to stock price and supports the mispricing interpretation
on market timing behavior.
6.0.2 Implication, Limitation And Potential Future Re-
search
This thesis has implications for the investors as well as corporate managers.
First, it shows that the stock prices would suffer more misvaluation when the recent
news to the market is hard to interpret. Therefore, investors should avoid invest-
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ing in the underlying firms until the uncertainty is resolved by new information
which has more precise indications of firm’s fundamental value. Also, this work
suggests the increased arbitrage risk for institutional investors who may have bet-
ter knowledge of firm’s value. The misvaluation or arbitrage opportunity of stocks
with information uncertainty is related to the investor’s psychological biases. As
Hirshleifer (2001) argues, the noise traders who beliefs in their personal evaluation
could ’arbitrage away the arbitrageur’ even without the knowledge of firm’s true
value. As long as the force of investors’ biases is strong enough to impact the stock
price, arbitrageurs should be cautioned to choose the right time of trading against
the misvaluation. A proper indicator for arbitrageur to assess the misvaluation
persistence could be idiosyncratic volatility or dispersions among analyst forecast-
s. Moreover, corporate managers should be aware that information uncertainty
imposes the cost of equity issuance in addition to adverse selection cost. The an-
nouncement effect is more negative for firms with larger information uncertainty
which may offset the benefits from selling overpriced stocks. Previous research
shows that adverse selection cost could be lowered by disclosing more information
to the market. However, information uncertainty could not be efficiently mitigated
from the corporate side as it partially stems from the nature of business.
This thesis, inevitably, has some limitations and requires further research on
information uncertainty. Our study adopts several proxies for information uncer-
tainty because there is no one universally agreed proxy in the literature. Each
proxy we use may capture other firm’s characteristics. For example, the idiosyn-
cratic volatility is the main proxy in all three empirical chapters. This proxy has
been widely used to measure price synchronicity in the study of corporate gov-
ernance. Although each proxy alone may be questioned for appropriation, they
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jointly would undoubtedly provide enough explanation power to indicate the in-
fluence of information uncertainty. Also, we are aware that in the international
study, we use only two proxies, less than proxies used in chapters 3 and 5. The
reason is that the data of international stock market in DataStream is limited to
form other proxies, and some proxies, such as firm ages, are not comparable across
the markets. Surely, with more understanding on the characteristics of informa-
tion uncertainty, we may find one proper and unique proxy to test this issue in the
future.
Another potential limitation in this study is that we carry out the empirical
tests in different markets. Chapter 3 uses UK stock market to test the influence of
information uncertainty in stock price continuation, while in Chapter 5 we provide
the empirical evidence based on US equity market. Both of these two markets are
mature and well developed that the difference between them would be trivial. The
reason for using US market in Chapter 5 is simply because the equity market has
more issuance volume that gives us greater statistics power. We have no doubt
that the impact of information uncertainty would be similar in the UK as in the
US.
Along the line of this study, future research could use the proxies in this study
and test more specific misvaluation from investors’ biases. Our study provides the
empirical evidence that the information uncertainty amplifies the effect of psycho-
logical biases, but does not focus on any specific type of psychological biases. For
example, the research on retail investors could use information uncertainty as an
indicator to distinguish the investors’ biases and rational behavior. If the trad-
ing of retail investors is motivated by overconfidence or narrow framing, then one
should observe more such trading behavior on the firms with higher information
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uncertainty.
Secondly, We have not explicitly distinguish information uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetry. A theoretical study in the context of cognitive process as well
as rational reaction is required to clarify the different impacts of information un-
certainty and asymmetry. The potential in this orientation is considerable in both
expanding our understanding and practicing in real market. More disclosure of
information would certainty lower the information asymmetry, while on the other
hand, it may fill the market up with noise that increase the estimation costs and
risks.
Furthermore, our research shows corporate managers tend to issue more equity
when previous information uncertainty is high and market valuation is high. The
behavioral corporate finance suggests that the market timing phenomenon could be
due to either irrational market traders, or irrational managers’ decisions. By com-
paring the usage of SEO proceeds between issuers with high and low information
uncertainty, one may tell whether the market timing behavior can be explained
by irrational managers or not. If managers observe the overpricing and knowingly
sell overpriced stocks, they should not use the proceeds to do investment because
the true cost of equity is high. On the other hand, if managers believe that high
market valuation indicates the low cost of equity or good corporate outlook, they
may overinvest the proceeds to non-profitable opportunities.
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